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LII Supreme Court Bulletin: Oral Argument Previews

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Bilski v. Kappos (08-964)

Oral argument: Nov. 9, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Oct. 30, 2008)

PATENT LAW, PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER, INVENTIONS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MACHINE-OR-TRANSFORMATION TEST

In 1997, the United States Patent and Trademark Office denied Bernard Bilski's patent application for a method of hedging risk in commodities trading. Affirming the rejection on appeal, the Federal Circuit held that a process must be tied to a particular machine or transform an article into a different state to be patentable. The Supreme Court will consider the validity of the machine-or-transformation test for patentability. This case will have implications for the validity of current process patents as well as the availability of future patent protection for business methods. If the court decides that business-methods are not patentable, this would invalidate numerous patents and may curb innovation in the biotechnology and software industry. If, however, the court overturns the machine-or-transformation test and declares that Bilski’s idea is patent-eligible, expensive litigation may continue and uncertainty will mount regarding business-method patents.


Graham v. Florida (08-7412); Sullivan v. Florida (08-7621)

Oral argument: November 9, 2009

Appealed from: Florida First District Court of Appeal (Graham v. Florida, Apr. 10, 2008; Sullivan v. Florida, June 17, 2008)

EIGHTH AMENDMENT, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT, JUVENILE

Terrance Jamal Graham ("Graham") committed an armed burglary when he was sixteen years old. Joe Harris Sullivan committed sexual battery when he was thirteen years old. Both men are currently serving life sentences in the State of Florida ("Florida") with no possibility of parole. Graham and Sullivan each argue that sentencing a juvenile to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole violates the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishments. Florida counters that such sentences are not constitutionally barred and reflect a state's considered legislative response to the growing problem of juvenile crime. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court will determine whether juveniles may be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for committing non-homicide offenses.


Hertz Corp. v. Friend (08-1107)

Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Oct. 30, 2008)

DIVERSITY JURISDICTION, CITIZENSHIP OF CORPORATIONS

Though federal courts are generally only able to hear claims arising under federal law, Congress gives them the power to exercise so-called “diversity jurisdiction” over any state law civil claim between citizens of different states. When a multistate corporation seeks relief in federal court on the basis of a diversity action, courts wrestle with exactly what factors they should look to in determining the corporation’s citizenship. Here, a group of California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court alleging violations of California’s state labor laws. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit concluded Hertz was a California citizen and denied removal jurisdiction. This case presents the Supreme Court with the opportunity to lay out a specific test for determining corporate citizenship for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction.


Kucana v. Holder (08-911)

Oral argument: Nov. 10, 2009

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (July 7, 2008)

IMMIGRATION, JUDICIAL REVIEW, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Agron Kucana, an Albanian immigrant, missed his immigration hearing and, in absentia, was ordered to be removed. The Board of Immigration Appeals (the “Board”) denied Kucana's motion to reopen his case. Kucana appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled that the Board’s decision was not subject to judicial review. In relevant part, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) specifies that certain matters subject to the Attorney General’s discretion are not subject to judicial review. The dispute in this case centers on the scope and proper interpretation of the statute — in particular, on whether it allows judicial review of decisions not to reopen cases, or whether these decisions are outside the realm of judicial review, because they are the subject to the Attorney General’s discretion. The outcome of this case will determine the ability of immigrants to challenge denials of their motions to reopen through the regular judicial process.