Devillier v. Texas

IMPLIED RIGHT OF ACTION

According to Devillier, the Takings Clause is self-executing, rendering Congress’ affirmative recognition unnecessary. Brief for Petitioner, Richard Devillier, et al. at 11. In Devillier’s view, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, California, a Supreme Court case holding the destruction of property value constitutes “taking,” clarified that the federal Constitution mandates compensation for property taken. Id. at 12. Devillier also contends that First English confirmed that the Constitution’s just-compensation requirement aims to ensure compensation for justified takings, rather than limit government intervention. Id. Devillier further asserts that a new cause of action does not require Congress’ recognition to bring a suit to a court, as this right is grounded in the Constitution, not statutes like the Tucker Act, which waives some of the government’s sovereign immunity. Id. Furthermore, Devillier contends that regardless of the counterparty being the state or federal government, the Constitution allows individuals to seek just compensation against the government entity in question. Id. at 14.

Addressing concerns about the Court potentially overstepping its power by creating a private right of action, Devillier argues that such a move aligns with the Court’s role in enforcing the Constitution. Brief for Petitioner at 34–35. According to Devillier, federal courts that grant implied causes of action are interpreting the Constitution rather than making unjustified inferences. Id. at 35, 37. Devillier emphasizes that the Court is obligated to enforce the Constitution, ensuring uncompensated individuals have their day in court. Id. at 37. Devillier also posits that disallowing the pursuit of damages would lead to more adverse outcomes, limiting courts to granting costlier equitable remedies such as injunctive relief. Id. at 38.

Texas counters that the Fifth Amendment is unlikely to include an implied cause of action without Congress’s consent. Brief for Respondent, State of Texas at 20. Texas points out the omission of US-party suits from the Court’s original jurisdiction and notes that the Takings Clause originally only applied to the federal government. Id. Therefore, Texas concludes that there is no forum to pursue Takings Clause claims without a Congressionally established lower court under Article III of the federal Constitution. Id. Additionally, Texas insists that the Supremacy Clause and the Court’s interpretation of it should apply to the Takings Clause. Id. at 21.

Texas asserts that cases like Jacobs et al. v. United States, an eminent domain case in the Supreme Court, never addressed the issue of an implied cause of action. Brief for Respondent at 36. Regarding First English, Texas claims that the issue was never raised at the state level initially. Id. Texas also points out that the Jacobs court addressed the amount of just compensation required under the Fifth Amendment in a Tucker Act suit, not the availability of the cause of action under the Constitution Id. at 38. Furthermore, Texas contends that Devillier neglects to acknowledge that the Tucker Act would immunize the government from potential compensation obligations. Id. at 43. Texas maintains that the Tucker Act was legislated well before the Erie case, allowing federal courts more leeway in creating the cause of action, as common law was understood to provide causes of action. Id. at 44.

TEXT AND HISTORY OF JUST-COMPENSATION RIGHTS

Devillier asserts that the text of the Constitution explicitly necessitates damages as a remedy, even in the absence of Congressional endorsement. Brief for Petitioner at 18. Devillier argues that, unlike other constitutional clauses, the Takings Clause uniquely specifies what must occur rather than what should be prohibited. Id. at 19. Devillier contends that the Constitution’s explicit reference to compensation empowers competent jurisdiction courts to order the government to pay when it fails to do so. Id.

Devillier supports that argument with historical precedents, citing the Magna Carta’s establishment of the principle of immediate payment, which found success in early American courts as common law. Brief for Petitioner at 19–21. According to Devillier, early American courts generally deemed laws seizing property without compensation as void, asserting that the Founding Fathers intended the Takings Clause to imply a cause of action Id. at 22–26. Devillier also highlights Madison’s assertion that the constitutional protection against uncompensated takings was essential to the constitutional order, suggesting an implied new cause of action. Id. at 24–26. Devillier further argues that the history of takings litigation nationwide confirms the enforceability of the just-compensation right, with property owners relying on suits against public entities as a remedy Id. at 27–33.

Devillier further argues that history points to the same conclusion. Brief for Petitioner at 19. For instance, Devillier points out that after the principle of immediate payment was established in the Magna Carta, it was successfully settled in the early American courts as common law. Id. at 19–21. Devillier argues that early American courts generally held that laws seizing property without compensation were void based on this principle. Id. at 22–23. Devillier further contends that the Founding Fathers intended the Takings Clause to imply a cause of action. Id. at 24–26. For instance, Devillier asserts that Madison’s comment that the constitutional protection against uncompensated takings was essential to the constitutional order demonstrates that he intended the Takings Clause to create an implied new cause of action. Id. Lastly, Devillier contends that the history of takings litigation in courts nationwide confirms that the just-compensation right is enforceable. Id. at 27. Devillier contends that early federal courts clarified the just-compensation right is founded upon the Constitution, not statutes. Id. at 28–30. Therefore, Devillier argues that property owners could demand just compensation based on this right. Id. at 28. Devillier further explains that this role of compensation shifted over to the judicial branch, leading property owners to rely on suits against public entities as a remedy. Id. at 33.

Contrarily, Texas argues that a structural reading of the Constitution does not establish an implied takings cause of action against the States. Brief for Respondent at 17. According to Texas, the Founding Fathers intended Congress, as the entity closest to the people, to control government finances, and granting a cause of action not provided under the Fifth Amendment would undermine Congress’ appropriation power Id. at 17–19. Texas asserts that the Constitution prevents courts from granting a monetary remedy without Congressional authorization. Id. at 19. Under the Separation of Power principle, Texas contends that the judicial branch should refrain from creating an implied Constitutional cause of action if the executive branch might be better equipped for the task, especially since alternative remedies already exist, and Congress only granted a cause of action against local government, not the state Id. at 28–30.

Texas counters Devillier’s argument by asserting that compensation until the nineteenth century was facilitated not through litigation but through Congress’ immediate cash payment, indicating that a new cause of action was not created through the Constitution but through Congress’ delegation power. Brief for Respondent at 23, 25. Texas emphasizes that only after the Tucker Act in 1887 did Congress delegate its power to compensate property to the courts Id. at 25. Texas argues that the right to sue requires Congress’ delegation, as seen in the Tucker Act, a Congress-made statute providing courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate takings-claim cases. Id. at 43. Furthermore, Texas dismisses Madison’s comment about the constitutional protection against uncompensated takings, asserting that it does not indicate an intention to imply a cause of action, as the Constitution empowers but does not mandate Congress to create lower courts for takings litigation. Id. at 44. Lastly, Texas contends that takings litigation at state courts is irrelevant, as state laws do not implicate the U.S. Constitution's Takings Clause. Id. at 44–45.