Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, Indiana v. Talevski

ENFORCEABLE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER SPENDING CLAUSE LEGISLATION

HHC argues that legislation enacted under the Constitution’s Spending Clause, such as FNHRA, cannot give rise to an implied private right of action under § 1983, which creates a cause of action for deprivations of federal statutory rights. Brief for Petitioners, Health and Hospital Corporation of Marion County, et al. (“HHC”) at 10, 22–23. HHC reasons that Congress must have intended for § 1983 to incorporate and apply common law principles practiced when Congress enacted § 1983 in the 1870s. Id. at 12. Under 1870s common law, HHC explains that third-party beneficiaries generally could not sue to enforce contracts unless the contract’s text expressly allowed it. Id. at 13–14, 17. HHC argues that common law contract principles should apply to Spending Clause legislation because Spending Clause legislation is akin to contractual agreements between federal and state governments. Id. at 12–13. HHC concludes that Mr. Talevski, as a recipient of nursing home services funded by Medicaid, is a third-party beneficiary to a Spending Clause program contracted between the state and federal governments. Id. at 10, 43. Therefore, HHC reasons that Mr. Talevski may not assert a § 1983 private right of action under FNHRA. Id. at 18.

HHC notes that the common law rule against third-party enforcement of contracts was especially strong in cases where the government was party to a contract, and that even jurisdictions which allowed third-party enforcement prohibited the public from enforcing government contracts. Id. HHC argues that exceptions only existed when governments delegated responsibilities they already possessed and when contracts expressly granted the public the right to sue. Id. at 20–21. Since Spending Clause legislation rarely concerns existing governmental duties, HHC contends that only Congress can explicitly create private rights of action against governmental entities. Id.

Talevski counters that common law analysis is unnecessary because the plain text of § 1983 is clear and unambiguous. Brief for Respondent, Ivanka Talevski at 26–27. Talevski points out that under the text of § 1983, an individual can bring a private right of action to vindicate “any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” Id. at 21; 42 U.S.C. 1983. Talevski argues that the ordinary meaning of § 1983 unambiguously covers all rights created under federal law, which necessarily includes rights created under Spending Clause legislation. Id. at 20–21. Thus, Talevski contends that § 1983 establishes a private right of action whenever Spending Clause legislation conditions federal funding on the protection of specified rights, as FNHRA does. Id. at 36. Additionally, Talevski disagrees with HHC’s reading of the common law and contends that in the 1870s, third-party beneficiaries could enforce government contracts. Id. at 28.

Talevski also claims that Congress ratified the interpretation that Spending Clause statutes give rise to an implied private right of action under § 1983. Id. at 22. Talevski notes that the Supreme Court has repeatedly allowed § 1983 actions enforcing Spending Clause statutes to proceed. Id. at 23. Talevski points out that although it has amended § 1983 to overrule other judicial interpretations of § 1983, Congress has never modified § 1983’s text to exclude private rights of action under Spending Clause legislation. Id. Talevski further notes that Congress even enacted new legislation that ratifies private rights of action in Spending Clause legislation such as the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA), whose language was modeled on the text of § 1983. Id. Given that CRIPA was modeled on § 1983, replicates its language, and contains a private right of action, Talevski concludes that FNHRA should similarly permit access to a private right of action through § 1983. Id. at 24, 44.

OVERRULING PRECEDENT

HHC states that the Supreme Court should overrule Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, which upheld a private cause of action under § 1983 to enforce Spending Clause legislation in the Medicaid context. HHC at 29. HHC alleges that Wilder’s reasoning was impermissibly based on legislative history and the presumed intentions of the statute’s drafters rather than § 1983’s text. Id. at 28. HHC further posits that subsequent cases have cast doubt on implied private rights of action under the Spending Clause. Id. at 29. HHC concludes that the Court should overturn Wilder. Id. at 31. HHC adds that while courts are more deferential to precedent involving questions of statutory interpretation, this heightened deference does not apply to common law statutes like § 1983. Id. at 35–36.

In contrast, Talevski argues that overruling Wilder would overturn an understanding endorsed by all three branches of government that § 1983 applies to all federal laws. Talevski at 21. Talevski argues that it is the Court’s duty, under the doctrine of separation of powers, to abide by the principle of stare decisis and adhere to precedent. Id. a 25. Talevski reasons that if it was truly Congress’s intention to exclude Spending Clause statutes from enforcement under § 1983, then it is within Congress’s legislative power to amend the statute to correct that long-standing judicial error in statutory interpretation. Id. Finally, Talevski states that Congress relies on the current interpretation of § 1983 when drafting Spending Clause legislation, and this reliance weighs against overruling precedent. Id. at 26.

THE NEED FOR A JUDICIAL REMEDY UNDER § 1983

HHC argues that even if § 1983 creates private rights of action under the Spending Clause, FNHRA does not establish one. HHC at 38. HHC states that no § 1983 private right of action exists when a statute already contains an administrative enforcement mechanism that preempts § 1983. Id. at 39. HHC notes that FNHRA provides an individualized appeal process for patients to challenge chemical restraints and involuntary transfers, which Talevski successfully used. Id. at 39–40. Thus, HHC contends that Congress preempted § 1983 by establishing an extensive enforcement mechanism under FNHRA. Id. at 39.

HHC also claims that FNHRA establishes no right against chemical restraint or involuntary transfer because these rights do not meet the standards set out by the Supreme Court in Gonzaga University v. Doe and Blessing v. Freestone. Id. at 38. HHC argues that, under Gonzaga, Courts require “an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action brought under § 1983,” and statutes only provide protected rights when the rights are phrased with a clear focus on the benefitted class. Id. at 43. Because FNRHA issues directives focused on nursing facilities rather than patients, the benefitted class, HHC concludes that FNHRA does not meet the Gonzaga’s requirements. Id. HHC further contends that the alleged rights fail the Blessing test, which states that rights are only created if the relevant provisions were written for the plaintiff’s benefit and are not too vague for the judiciary to enforce. Id. at 44–45. HHC argues that the chemical restraint and involuntary transfer provisions are primarily nursing facility guidelines, not provisions intended to benefit patients, and that the language is too open-ended for judicial enforcement. Id. at 45. HHC concludes that since the provisions regulating chemical restraints and involuntary transfer fail both tests, FNHRA does not grant statutory rights giving rise to an implied private right of action. Id.

Talevski responds that FNHRA’s individualized administrative process is not incompatible with § 1983 and does not demonstrate Congress’ intent to preempt private rights of action. Brief for Talevski at 40. Talevski notes that Congress preserved access to § 1983 remedies through FNHRA’s savings clause. Id. at 37, 39. Talevski explains that under FNHRA’s savings clause, FNHRA’s remedies are available “in addition to those otherwise available under State or Federal law, and shall not be construed as limiting such other remedies.” Id. at 37. Talevski argues that Congress clearly intended to preserve access to judicial remedies. Id. at 43. Talevski adds that FNHRA’s enforcement scheme has no path to federal judicial remedies and provides no remedy other than return to the status quo. Id. at 39–40.

Talevski argues that FNHRA’s text unambiguously establishes two rights: the right to be free from chemical restraints imposed for discipline or convenience, under 42 U.S.C. 1396r(c)(1)(A)(ii), and the right not to be transferred or discharged unless certain criteria are met, under 42 U.S.C. 1396r(c)(2)(A). Id. at 32. Talevski states that FNHRA lists patients’ legal rights in a “Residents’ Bill of Rights,” describes these rights in mandatory language, and mandates that nursing facilities inform patients of these rights. Id. at 13, 33. Talevski contends that these rights are protected in a manner resembling the fundamental rights protected in the Constitution. Id. at 36. Talevski also points to FNHRA’s legislative history, arguing that Congress intended to bind the states by conditioning Medicaid funding on protection of specified rights. Id. Additionally, Talevski claims that FNHRA’s provisions are not vague or ambiguous, and federal courts are well equipped to analyze statutory rights; therefore, Talevski concludes that these rights meet the Blessing test’s requirements and, as such, are enforceable through § 1983 actions. Id. at 37–38.