Issues
Does Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorize relief based on a district court’s error of law?
This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1), which authorizes relief from a final judgment on the grounds of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” authorizes relief on the grounds that a district court committed an error of law. A federal district court determined that petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp’s motion for relief from legal error under Rule 60(b)(6) should instead be construed as a motion under Rule 60(b)(1) and dismissed Kemp’s petition because it was not presented within the one-year limitations period that applies to motions under Rule 60(b)(1) but not to motions under Rule 60(b)(6). On appeal to the Supreme Court, Kemp argues that, because Rule 60(b)(1) replicated identical state statutory provisions that did not allow relief for legal error, the Court cannot construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. The United States responds that both the plain meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) and the fact that Rule 60(b)(1) replicated a California statute allowing relief for legal error establish that Rule 60(b)(1) allows relief for legal error. Because the Court’s decision on the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1) will determine for how long after entry of final judgment a litigant is entitled to seek relief for legal error, the resolution of this case will affect the expediency and finality of federal civil litigation.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes relief based on a district court’s error of law.
Facts
On November 15, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district court judgment convicting petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp and several codefendants of various drug and firearm offenses. Kemp v. United States, No. 20-10958, slip op. at 2 (11th Cir. May 25, 2021). Kemp and several codefendants filed a motion for an extension of time to file a petition to rehear the case, and the Eleventh Circuit granted the motion. Id. Later, one of the codefendants filed a petition for rehearing en banc. Id. Kemp did not join this petition. Id. Afterwards, Kemp and several codefendants filed an additional motion for extension of time, which the Eleventh Circuit also granted. Id. Another codefendant then filed a petition for rehearing en banc, which Kemp did not join. Id. The Eleventh Circuit denied both petitions for rehearing en banc on May 22, 2014. Id. Some of the codefendants petitioned for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court; however, Kemp never filed such a petition, nor did he join any of the codefendant petitions for certiorari. Id.
Slightly over a year later, on April 29, 2015, Kemp moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, raising several ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. On September 30, 2016, the district court determined that the judgment in Kemp’s case became final on February 13, 2014, 90 days after the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Kemp’s conviction, because after this deadline, Kemp lost the ability to file a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Id. at 2–3. The district court found that § 2255(f) prohibited Kemp from moving to vacate his conviction after the judgment had been final for more than one year, and thus dismissed Kemp’s motion as untimely. Id. at 3.
On June 22, 2018, Kemp moved to reopen proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) on the grounds that his petition was timely under Supreme Court Rule 13.3. Id. Kemp argued that, had the district court correctly followed the Supreme Court Rule, the filing deadline for his § 2255 motion would have been August 20, 2015, and that his motion in April of that year would have been timely. Id. Reading Kemp’s argument as one falling under Rule 60(b)(1), requiring that the court make a “mistake” for the argument to succeed, the district court found that it did not make such a mistake and accordingly denied Kemp’s motion as untimely. Id. The district court declined to read Kemp’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6), which gives courts more time and discretion to grant relief. Id. at 3–4. The district court found that Rule 60(b)(1) and Rule 60(b)(6) claims are mutually exclusive, and that courts should avoid reading motions under Rule 60(b)(6) whenever courts can read such motions under other provisions within Rule 60(b). Id.
On March 6, 2020, Kemp moved for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), which the district court denied as untimely and, alternatively, meritless. Id. at 4. Kemp appealed both his Rule 60(b) and Rule 59(e) motions to the Eleventh Circuit. Id. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, noting that while Kemp was correct that the filing deadline for his § 2255 motion was August 20, 2015, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reading Kemp’s challenge to the § 2255 judgment under Rule 60(b)(1) because, under this subsection, Kemp’s Rule 60(b) motion was untimely. Id. at 4–5. The Eleventh Circuit stated that, while Kemp’s arguments were “precisely the sort of judicial mistakes” contemplated by Rule 60(b)(1), the district court did not reversibly err in denying Kemp’s two motions. Id. at 5–7.
Kemp then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 10, 2022.
Analysis
HISTORY OF RULE 60(b)(1)
Petitioner Kemp argues that, because Rule 60(b)(1) descends from identically-worded state statutes that did not authorize relief for legal error, the Court should not construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. Brief of Petitioner Dexter Earl Kemp (“Kemp”) at 13–14. According to Kemp, state courts did not interpret state statutes authorizing relief for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect” to allow relief for legal error. Id. at 15. Instead, Kemp argues, relief for legal error was available through traditional common law and equitable remedies. Id. at 20. For example, Kemp asserts that even after states adopted statutes allowing relief for “mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect,” litigants continued to seek relief from obvious legal error by filing equitable bills of review. Id. at 20.
According to Kemp, the original form of Rule 60(b), adopted in 1937, replicated the states’ remedial structure, so that relief for legal error was available through common law and equitable remedies, not a motion under Rule 60(b). Id. at 21–22. Kemp argues that a subsequent amendment in 1946 codified the post-judgment common law and equitable remedies in Rules 60(b)(2)–(6). Id. at 22. Kemp asserts, in particular, that the Advisory Committee intended Rule 60(b)(6) to codify the common law and equitable remedies for obvious legal error. Id. at 23. As a result, Kemp concludes that relief for legal error is available under Rule 60(b)(6), not Rule 60(b)(1). Id.
The United States argues in response that, because Rule 60(b) replicated a California statute that authorized relief for both errors of fact and law, the Court should construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error. Brief of Respondent United States (“United States”) at 21. According to the United States, Rule 60(b) specifically replicated Section 473 of California’s Code of Civil Procedure, which authorized relief for errors of both law and fact. Id. at 23. The United States argues that, because the Rule 60(b) replicated California’s Section 473, the construction of “mistake” adopted by the courts of other states is irrelevant to the meaning of Rule 60(b)(1). Id. at 24–25. The United States further contends that the courts of other states did not uniformly consider the term “mistake” to exclude legal error. Id. at 25–26.
The United States also argues that the Court should construe Rule 60(b)(1) to authorize relief for legal error because the Advisory Committee specifically amended the Rule in 1946 to allow relief for a judge’s legal error. Id. at 26. The United States observes that, when first adopted, Rule 60(b) authorized relief to rectify an error resulting from a litigant’s "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect." Id. The United States asserts that, with the 1946 amendment, the Advisory Committee deleted the language requiring that the mistake be attributed to the litigant. Id. at 28. The Advisory Committee’s intent, according to the United States, was to ensure that relief would be available even if the error was committed by the court itself. Id. The United States argues, finally, that the 1946 Advisory Committee could not have intended Rule 60(b)(6) to be a ground for relief from legal error, because the Committee made no mention of legal error during its deliberations on Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 30–32.
RULE 60(b)(1)’s TEXT AND STRUCTURE
Kemp argues that the “mistake” ground of relief would be incongruous if it were interpreted to allow relief for legal error when the other grounds listed in Rule 60(b)(1)—“inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”—do not. Brief for Kemp at 24. To defend this conclusion, Kemp invokes the noscituur a sociis canon of construction, which provides that the meaning of one word can be determined in part by reference to the words it is surrounded by. Id. at 23. Kemp argues that, because “inadvertence, surprise, [and] excusable neglect” are faults attributable to a litigant, not a court, these terms cannot refer to a judge’s mistake of law. Id. at 25. Kemp asserts, for example, that it would be nonsensical to say that a court committed legal error because of “surprise” or “excusable neglect.” Id. Kemp argues that, if “mistake” is to be interpreted to be consistent in meaning with the “inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect,” “mistake” cannot encompass a judge’s legal error. Id. at 25.
Kemp additionally argues that the varying deadlines Rule 60(c)(1) places on motions under Rule 60(b) confirm that Rule 60(b)(1) does not allow relief for legal error. Id. at 27. Kemp observes that Rule 60(c)(1) requires that motions under Rules 60(b)(1)–(3) be filed within one year of final judgment but allows motions motions under Rules 60(b)(4)–(6) to be filed within a “reasonable time.” Id. According to Kemp, the one-year deadline placed on motions under Rules 60(b)(1)–(3) reflects the Advisory Committee’s understanding that motions under those Rules concern questions of fact that must be resolved quickly to avoid the loss of relevant evidence. Id. at 30. By contrast, Kemp argues, the indefinite deadline placed on motions under Rules 60(b)(4)–(6) reflects the Advisory Committee’s understanding that motions under those Rules concern legal errors and other serious defects in a judgment that should remain remediable for as long as is reasonable. Id. Kemp concludes that, because Rule 60(c)(1) places a strict deadline on motions under Rule 60(b)(1), those motions are most naturally understood to concern non-legal error. Id. at 27.
The United States responds, first, that “mistake,” understood according to its plain meaning, clearly encompasses obvious legal error. Brief for United States at 14. Citing dictionaries such as Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines a “mistake” as an “unintentional act, omission, or error,” the United States argues that a court commits a “mistake” when, as in this case, it fails to apply a clear rule to simple facts. Id. at 15–16. The United States argues, second, that the context of Rule 60(b)(1) confirms that “mistake” as used in Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses obvious legal error. Id. at 16. The United States observes, for example, that Rule 60(a) specifies that a court may correct a mistake that is “clerical” in nature and argues that the lack of similar qualifying language in Rule 60(b)(1) establishes that the Advisory Committee intended the term “mistake” in that Rule to encompass all kind of error, including legal error. Id. at 16. The United States denies that the others grounds of relief listed in Rule 60(b)(1)—“inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect”—establish that the Advisory Committed intended “mistake” to exclude legal error. Id. Instead, the United States argues, these terms simply define a category of unintentional errors, some of which may be legal. Id.
The United States further contends that the one-year deadline Rule 60(c)(1) places on motions under Rule 60(b)(1) is consistent with the conclusion that motions under Rule 60(b)(1) are available to correct obvious legal errors. Id. at 32. According to the United States, the one-year deadline imposed by Rule 60(c)(1) reflects the fact that, because an obvious legal error should be immediately evident to a litigant, any delay in presenting a claim for relief from that error is unjustified. Id. The United States argues that, by contrast, the indefinite deadline placed on motions under Rule 60(b)(6) indicates that these motions should be used when a change in the law raises the possibility of relief, but not when, as here, the need for relief was clearly evident from the time of judgment. Id. at 34.
Discussion
RULE 60 CLASHING WITH ITSELF
Kemp argues that not only is the United States’ proposed plain language approach to reading the word “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) both historically and textually incorrect, but further, that the United States’ interpretation would gobble up the rest of Rule 60. Brief for Petitioner, at 30–31. Kemp first asserts that a plain language definition of “mistake” in Rule 60(b)(1) logically must carry over to Rule 60(a), given that the close proximity between usages of “mistake” creates a strong presumption that the word carries the same definition throughout Rule 60. Id. If this is true under the plain language approach, Kemp argues, the result would produce massive confusion for courts and litigants alike. Id. at 31–32. Kemp posits that this confusion would arise from an increased difficulty in determining whether Rule 60(a) or Rule 60(b)(1) applies to a particular legal error or a particular set of factual circumstances. See Id. Kemp suggests that litigants would be left in the dark when attempting to determine whether they are subject to a fixed filing deadline under Rule 60(b)(1) or rather, have no specific cutoff date under Rule 60(a). Id. Under this framework, Kemp contends that appealing litigants will be left to hope that they pick the right time to file and invoke the correct provisions to obtain relief. Id. Kemp further asserts that the plain language approach would render Rules 60(b)(4) and (5) effectively useless, as these Rules encompass specific categories of legal errors that would simply transform into Rule 60(b)(1) “mistakes.” Id. at 32. Kemp concludes by arguing that the plain language approach would force courts to decide whether Rule 60 favors finality and expediency or if the Rule relaxes time limits in the interest of justice. Id. at 34.
The United States counters that a plain language approach is the best way to ensure Rule 60’s internal consistency because this approach treats only “obvious legal errors” as Rule 60(b)(1) “mistakes” while simultaneously allowing litigants and courts to save time and expense during the appeals process. Brief for Respondent, at 32–33. The United States argues that courts would interpret different legal errors under whichever subsection of Rule 60(b) most specifically applies to a given error. Id. The United States claims this would allow most motions to appropriately fall under Rules 60(b)(1) through (5) while reserving Rule 60(b)(6) for errors apparent from intervening legal developments, as this is the typical indicator of “extraordinary circumstances” for Rule 60(b)(6) cases. See Id. at 33–35. Countering Kemp’s allegation that the plain language approach clashes with Rule 60(a), the United States notes that Rule 60(a)’s emphasis on clerical mistakes prevents any muddling of the Rules. Id. at 35–36. Further, the United States notes that confusion is mitigated because Rule 60(a) is invoked to correct minor blunders in a judgment’s execution, whereas Rule 60(b)(1) is invoked to relieve litigants from more substantive errors. Id. at 36–37. The United States concludes by arguing that the plain language approach is “necessary to implement the Rules as they are written.” Id. at 37.
CLASHING WITH OTHER RULES AND LITIGATION INEFFICIENCY
Kemp posits that the United States’ plain language approach will exacerbate confusion between Rule 60 and other Rules. Kemp argues that although there is an existing overlap in the filing deadlines for Rules 59(e) and 60(b)(1), the plain language approach provides a perverse incentive for litigants to bypass one Rule’s deadline and sneak the same arguments into motions under a different Rule. Brief for Kemp at 36–37. Kemp contends that his interpretation of Rule 60(b) avoids this problem because Rule 60(b)(6) motions require “extraordinary circumstances” to succeed. Id. at 37. Kemp warns that defining legal errors as Rule 60(b)(1) “mistakes” would “explode the overlap with Rule 59(e)” while also serving as a vehicle to bypass deadlines in other provisions such as Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107 without showing extraordinary reasons to do so. Id. at 37–38. Kemp concludes by arguing that the cumulative result of this confusion will be a bifurcated appeals process with little regard for filing deadlines. Id. at 38–39.
The United States responds by asserting that Rule 60’s overlap with other provisions is inevitable, and that Kemp’s concerns about litigants “repackaging” their arguments to extend deadlines will not be solved regardless of the Court’s decision in this case. Brief for United States at 38–39. The United States contends that courts already know of and have developed practices to account for Kemp’s concerns about the overlap between Rules 59 and 60. Id. The United States also notes that none of the federal courts currently using the plain language approach have encountered the significant administrability challenges that Kemp warns of. Id. at 41–42. The United States also claims that Kemp’s approach forces courts down a line-drawing rabbit hole by requiring sharp distinctions between factual mistakes and legal mistakes. Id. at 42–43. Additionally, the United States argues that Kemp’s approach requires courts to draw distinctions between party mistakes and court mistakes. Id. The United States suggests that these line-drawing exercises are often extremely difficult and forcing this task onto courts will inevitably increase ambiguity in how different Rules work in the appeals process. Id.
Conclusion
Acknowledgments
The authors would like to thank Professor Kevin M. Clermont for his insights into this case.
Additional Resources
- Jordan S. Rubin, Justices to Settle Procedural Split on Courts’ Legal Errors, Bloomberg Law (Jan. 10, 2022)