Ramirez v. Collier

SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN ON THE EXERCISE OF RELIGION

Petitioner John Henry Ramirez argues that RLUIPA provides broad and extensive protections for prisoners’ religious liberty. Brief for Petitioner, John Henry Ramirez at 18. Ramirez asserts that a violation of RLUIPA occurs when the state imposes a substantial burden on an inmate’s ability to adhere to a sincere religious belief by interfering with religious practices deemed necessary by the prisoner. Id. at 18-19. Ramirez asserts that allowing his pastor to touch him during the execution is an important part of his religious exercise, noting examples of touch fostering healing in the Bible. Id. at 20–21. Ramirez also emphasizes the significance of audible prayer in the Christian faith, noting that prayer is generally meant to be spoken or sung as opposed to being silent. Id. at 21–23. Ramirez further contends that there is no reason to conclude that his beliefs are not sincere. Id. at 20. Thus, Ramirez maintains that forbidding touch and audible prayer during his execution would substantially burden his exercise of religion and cannot be alleviated by allowing his pastor’s mere presence. Id. at 23.

Respondent Bryan Collier and other TDCJ officials (collectively “Collier”) contend that demonstrating a substantial burden under RLUIPA requires Ramirez to prove that his religious belief requiring his pastor must touch him during his execution is both sincere and the basis for his requested accommodation. Brief for Respondents, Bryan Collier et al. at 33. Collier notes Ramirez provided an affidavit speaking only to his pastor’s beliefs as evidence of this. Id. at 34. Collier contends that this affidavit fails to demonstrate a substantial burden because evidence of Pastor Moore’s beliefs does not speak to the substance or sincerity of Ramirez’s beliefs. Id. Additionally, the affidavit focuses on the need to comfort Ramirez during his execution; and comfort, Collier argues, is not a religious purpose under RLUIPA. Id. Collier further asserts that Ramirez failed to show his request was motivated by a religious belief. Id. Collier highlights a time when Ramirez once reasoned “I’ve got this thing in the courts” when deciding to allow Pastor Moore to visit with him shortly before his execution, and even then only agreed to see the pastor for five minutes. Id. Collier also explains that death row inmates are never allowed to touch or have physical contact with visitors. Id. at 36. Nonetheless, Collier notes that Ramirez never previously asked for a similar accommodation while he was in prison and that Pastor Moore has in fact never touched him at the prison before. Id. Collier argues that these facts, coupled with Ramirez’s delayed request and litigation on the issue, demonstrate that Ramirez brought this RLUIPA suit merely to delay his execution, not to protect a sincere religious belief. Id. at 37.

LEAST RESTRICTIVE MEANS OF FURTHERING A COMPELLING INTEREST

Ramirez asserts that Texas must identify that it has a specific and important interest that is furthered by denying Ramirez’s religious accommodation. Brief for Ramirez at 24. Ramirez contends that such an interest cannot be overbroad and must apply particularly to Ramirez. Id. at 24–25. Ramirez argues that Texas’s interest “in maintaining an orderly, safe and effective process” is too broad and fails to provide any specific reason why audible prayers or any physical touch impedes the execution process; therefore, Texas has no compelling interest. Id. at 26. Alternatively, Ramirez argues, even if Texas did have a compelling reason to deny his request, Texas nonetheless fails to show that its policy is the least restrictive way to promote that interest. Id. at 27. Ramirez asserts that to show a policy is the least restrictive means, Texas must prove there is no less restrictive, adequate alternative to promote the same interest. Id. at 28. Ramirez argues that Texas’s prior execution policies and the current policies in other jurisdictions establish that banning physical touch and audible prayer is not the least restrictive means for ensuring safety and security during executions. Id. at 28–29. Ramirez maintains that Texas has a long history of allowing spiritual advisors and prison chaplains to audibly pray and touch inmates in the execution chamber. Id. at 33. Ramirez also contends that the fact that Pastor Moore is not an employee of TDCJ is irrelevant to Texas’s security concerns. Id. Ramirez further highlights several other jurisdictions that continue to allow touch and audible prayer during executions without incident. Id. at 34

Collier argues that its policy promotes important interests including “safeguarding the security of the execution, the solemnity of the proceeding, and the privacy of those who carry it out.” Brief for Collier, at 37. Security, Collier warns, could be affected if a contentious inmate was able to escape their restraints and harm a spiritual advisor in the chamber. Id. at 37–38. Additionally, Collier contends that allowing a spiritual advisor to stand close enough to touch the inmate and speak in the chamber could lead to issues injecting the lethal drugs and monitoring their effects, which may cause the inmate to suffer. Id. at 39. Collier further worries that letting a spiritual advisor in the chamber could increase victim distress and emotional trauma for the inmate’s family. Id. at 39–40. In addition, Collier argues Ramirez has failed to present an adequate alternative, and thus he has failed to prove that the TDCJ policy is not the least restrictive means of promoting these compelling interests. Id. at 41. Collier contends that, while Ramirez’s pastor may have a background check, he still poses a risk without the extensive experience and training of TDCJ employees involved in the execution process. Id. Collier further argues that Ramirez’s second alternative, that other jurisdictions allow touch, also fails to provide an adequate alternative because the least restrictive means must be tailored to the individual state. Id. at 43–45.

COMPLIANCE WITH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES

Ramirez asserts that he complied with all prison administrative procedures before filing his suit because he submitted a grievance requesting his pastor be allowed to touch him and pray aloud during his execution one month before bringing suit. Brief for Ramirez, at 39. Ramirez notes that he added to his initial grievance by requesting that his pastor be able to “lay hands on me” and “pray over me.” Id. at 39. The TDCJ’s allegations that it interpreted this request to mean silent prayer, Ramirez maintains, amounts to an unfair “gotcha” technique. Id. at 40. Ramirez asserts that there is no silent prayer rule in TDCJ policies and as such he did not know that his pastor’s prayers would have to be silent until three weeks before his execution. Id. at 42–43. Moreover, Ramirez argues that the TDCJ continually changed its policies as he filed requests, making it difficult for him to comply. Id. at 42.

Collier asserts that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires Ramirez to follow all prison rules and exhaust administrative options for relief before bringing a suit, which he has failed to do. Brief for Collier, at 23. Collier argues that Ramirez did not comply with Texas’s two-step grievance procedure before turning to litigation. Id. at 24. Additionally, Collier notes that Ramirez did not follow Texas’s rules for fair notice and opportunity to respond by not clearly stating his grievance. Id. at 25–26. Collier asserts that Ramirez only requested that his pastor be present during the execution as opposed to requesting permission for his pastor to touch him or pray aloud. Id. at 25. Additionally, Collier argues that Ramirez did not submit his grievance within the allotted time under its policy, and thus he should not be allowed to now turn to litigation on his unpursued claims. Id. at 26.