Thompson v. Clark

REQUIREMENTS OF THE FAVORABLE-TERMINATION RULE

Thompson argues that the Second Circuit incorrectly interpreted the requirements of the rule that a plaintiff must await favorable termination before bringing a Section 1983 action alleging unreasonable seizure pursuant to legal process. Brief for Petitioner, Larry Thompson at 16. Thompson asserts that the rule requires the plaintiff to show only that the criminal proceeding against him has “formally ended in a manner not inconsistent with his innocence,” as the Eleventh Circuit decided in Laskar v. Hurd. Id. As such, Thompson contends the Second Circuit erred in requiring that a civil plaintiff must prove that the previous criminal case ended in an “affirmative indication” of the plaintiff’s innocence before the plaintiff pursues a cause of action arising from the claim. Id. According to Thompson, the Supreme Court imposed the “favorable termination” requirement to address concerns about parallel civil and criminal litigation which could lead to conflicting judgments. Id. at 18. To support his argument, Thomas highlights language from the Court indicating that convictions expunged by executive order or declared invalid by another state tribunal would satisfy the favorable termination requirement. Id. at 21. Thompson elaborates that neither of those terminations indicates the defendant’s innocence. Id. Thompson concludes that a civil plaintiff bringing a malicious prosecution claim needs only to show that the relevant criminal proceeding is at its end, not that the way in which it ended suggested the plaintiff’s innocence. Id. at 17.

Thompson also contends that there was no consensus among the states requiring a showing of affirmative indications of innocence when the federal government enacted Section 1983 in 1871—and thus, the court should not recognize one now. Id. at 22. Thompson maintains that when inquiring about the requirements of a claim under Section 1983, the Court has held it should look first to the legal consensus when Section 1983 was adopted in 1871. Id. By Thompson’s account, both English common-law courts and most American state courts did not require a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution suit to demonstrate that the underlying criminal case was resolved in a way that affirmatively indicated the plaintiff’s innocence. Id. at 26–27. Finally, Thompson claims that those modern courts that have adopted the affirmative indications of innocence standard mistakenly base their decision on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, instead of the legal consensus when Section 1983 was enacted. Id. at 31

In response, Clark maintains that the Second Circuit correctly applied the favorable termination rule. Brief for Respondent, Police Officer Pagiel Clark et al. at 25. Clark argues that the rule requires the plaintiff to show the proceeding “ended in a manner that affirmatively indicates his innocence,” as the Second Circuit decided in Lanning v. City of Glens Falls. Id. Therefore, according to Clark, the dismissal of all charges against a criminal defendant does not constitute “favorable termination” such that the defendant can bring a claim for malicious prosecution arising from the criminal proceeding. Id. Clark relies on the seven circuits and twenty state courts which use the same standard to support his claim. Id. at 34. Clark further maintains that an affirmative indications of innocence standard is more consistent with the principles underlying malicious prosecution suits and that courts tend to follow the principles underlying malicious prosecution claims “strictly.” Id. at 32. Clark cites to courts and treatises that caution against allowing litigants who avoided criminal liability through technicalities to be able to initiate civil action against the law enforcement officers who rightfully arrested them. Id. at 33.

Moreover, Clark asserts that, based on a survey of the highest state courts and legal commentary, the law in 1871 was unsettled on whether the favorable-termination requirement of a claim for malicious prosecution obligated a civil plaintiff to meet the affirmative indications of innocence standard. Id. at 26. As such, Clark contends that the court should look at modern jurisprudence, which he argues advocates for including the affirmative indications of innocence standard. Id at 28. Clark highlights that the federal circuits are nearly unanimous—except for the Eleventh Circuit—in adopting the affirmative indications of innocence standard for malicious prosecution claims. Id. at 30. Clark also notes that the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning is based on an outdated historical interpretation rather than modern jurisprudence, further proving the legitimacy of an affirmative indication of innocence standard.

EXISTENCE OF THOMPSON’S CLAIM UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

Thompson contends that the Second Circuit was justified in recognizing the existence of his Section 1983 claim. Brief for Petitioner at 19. Thompson argues that he has a cause of action under Section 1983, because Clark violated Thompson’s Fourth Amendment rights by unreasonably seizing Thompson under the guise of legal process. Id. at 16. And, because Thompson interprets the Court’s decision in Manuel v. City of Joilet as recognizing that this claim does in fact arise under the Fourth Amendment, he concludes that he brings a cognizable action against Clark. Id. at 19 n. 6.

Clark counters that the Second Circuit erred in recognizing Thompson’s claim at all. Brief for Respondent at 14. Clark maintains that malicious prosecution claims, which are based on groundless prosecution, do not arise under the Fourth Amendment, which is focused on unreasonable seizures. Id. at 17. Clark continues that a malicious persecution claim cannot be forced under the Fourth Amendment, explaining that courts historically did not require a plaintiff bringing a common-law malicious prosecution claim to show a seizure, the key element of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. And according to Clark, the jurisdictions that have now added seizure requirements to malicious prosecution claim do so in name only, as plaintiffs can satisfy the requirement by pointing to a pending criminal proceeding. Id. at 18. As such, Clark urges the Supreme Court, which has yet to recognize a malicious prosecution claim arising under the Fourth Amendment, to join the three circuit courts that have expressly rejected the existence of such claims. Id. at 15–16. Clark asserts that the court will only muddy an already confusing area of the law even father if they refuse to rule on the existence of the claim Id. at 16.

DOES THE FOURTH AMENDMENT HAVE A DISTINCT FAVORABLE TERMINATION RULE?

Thompson asserts the Second Circuit erred in finding that there are two favorable termination rules under a malicious prosecution claim: Section 1983’s accrual favorable-termination rule, which only requires the outcome not be inconsistent with innocence, and a separate substantive favorable-termination rule under Fourth Amendment, requiring indication of innocence. Brief for Petitioner at 32. Thompson notes that his Section 1983 claim is based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizure, and therefore, the relevant inquiry under the Fourth Amendment is whether he was subject to an unreasonable seizure without probable cause, not an additional favorable-termination requirement. Id. at 33. Thompson suggests that the Second Circuit may have confused the Fourth Amendment’s substantive requirement of showing a lack of probable cause with the Section 1983 prerequisite requirement of showing favorable termination. Id. at 33. Accordingly, Thompson argues, the court should have applied Section 1983’s favorable-termination requirement—defined as not inconsistent with innocence—to his claim. Id. at 32–33.

In response, Clark counters that even if Thompson’s malicious prosecution claim does exist, a claim under the Fourth Amendment does not require a showing of favorable termination; therefore, Thompson’s claim may not even implicate the question presented to the court. Brief for Respondent at 21. Clark argues that the Court has imposed a favorable-termination requirement based on the nature of individual claims, and in support, he points to Supreme Court cases which held that some Fourth Amendment claims do not require such a showing. Id. at 21­–23. Clark further maintains that imposing a favorable termination rule on the claim at hand would contradict the jury’s verdict against Thompson at trial, which Clark alleges has impliedly found that Clark did not deprive Thompson’s liberty. Id. at 24. Finally, Clark argues that if the Supreme Court finds that malicious prosecution claims exist under the Fourth Amendment and that the Fourth Amendment requires a showing of favorable termination, the Second Circuit’s indication of innocence approach to favorable termination is correct. Id. at 25.