Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. Texas

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

The Ysleta del Sur Pueblo argue that the Restoration Act integrated the California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians interpretation of Public Law 280, which grants certain States criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country located within the States, into both sections 105 and 107 of the Restoration Act. Brief for Petitioners, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo at 23–24; see also Public Law 280. In Cabazon Band, the Tribe explains, the Court interpreted Public Law 280 to mean that tribes cannot operate games that state law prohibits; however, tribes do not have to follow state regulations governing games that are not otherwise prohibited. Id. at 23–24. Section 105, the Pueblo note, grants Texas civil and criminal jurisdiction over the Tribe in accordance with Sections 401 and 402 of the Indian Civil Rights Act, which grants the same civil and criminal jurisdiction that Public Law 280 grants. Id. at 24. Therefore, the Tribe concludes that Public Law 280 is incorporated into Section 105 and, accordingly, Texas does not have the authority to regulate the gaming activities of tribes. Id. at 25. Additionally, the Pueblo note that Section 107 of the Restoration Act, which is specific to gaming, supports this interpretation of Section 105 by distinguishing between laws that prohibit types of gaming and laws that merely regulate gaming. Id. at 27–28. The Tribe points to other laws passed at the same time that granted states the power to both prohibit and regulate gaming on Tribal lands. Id. at 29. If Congress intended to give Texas the power to regulate tribal gaming, the Tribe asserts, it would have been explicit in the text of the Texas Restoration Act. Id. Moreover, the Tribe notes that Ysleta I misconstrued the Restoration Act by finding that the Act federalizes all Texas gaming law. Id. at 38. The court in Ysleta I, the Tribe explains, did not fully engage with the statute’s text, improperly relied on the tribal resolution, misinterpreted the legislative history, and too quickly found conflict between the Restoration Act and IGRA. Id. at 38–47. The Tribe also contends that a different interpretation of 105 would contradict 107(b), which explicitly precludes any interpretation of the statute from granting regulatory power to Texas. Id. at 30. Finally, the Pueblo cite legislative history supporting the codification of Cabazon Band into Sections 105 and 107, as a Senate Report clarifies that Section 107(b) “is a restatement of the law as provided in [Public Law 280].” Id. at 33.

The State of Texas (“Texas”) argues that the Restoration Act does not integrate Cabazon Band but federalizes all of Texas gaming law. Brief for Respondents, The State of Texas at 21. Texas highlights three important rules of statutory construction that the Fifth Circuit followed: first, “look at every word in context;” second, “give each word its ordinary meaning unless otherwise defined;” and third, “give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used.” Id. at 20. Texas maintains that the ordinary meaning of the first sentence of Section 107, which prohibits tribal gaming activities prohibited by Texas, includes all of Texas’s gaming regulations and, accordingly, federalizes both Texas’ prohibitions and regulations. Id. at 20–21. Furthermore, Texas indicates that the inclusion of Tribal Resolution No. T.C.-02-86, which expressed the Pueblo’s intent to “prohibit outright any gambling or bingo in any form on its reservation,” in Section 107 affirms the Pueblo’s intent to outlaw these activities on its reservation. Id. at 22. By including this Resolution, Texas argues, Congress planned to act broadly and federalize all Texas gaming law. Id. at 20–23. Additionally, Texas asserts that the Cabazon Band interpretation only applies to state regulation of Indian tribes and not in this context, where a state law has been federalized. Id. at 24. Texas adds that Congress did not provide any indication that it meant to incorporate the Cabazon Band interpretation of “prohibited” and thus contends that the Court should adopt the plain meaning of “prohibited” instead of distinguishing between outlawed and merely regulated games, as Cabazon Band does. Id. at 27. Moreover, Texas argues that the Cabazon Band interpretation should not be adopted, even if it is applicable, because it is unworkable. Id. at 29. Specifically, Texas explains, the public policy portion of the doctrine is ambiguous and contradicts how the phrase “public policy” is used in most other contexts. Id. at 30. Utilizing the Cabazon Band framework rather than the Restoration Act framework, Texas contends, will lead to more confusion and will contravene how other courts have decided to solve the issue. Id. at 30–31.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

The Pueblo argue that applying the Cabazon Band interpretation to the Restoration Act reconciles otherwise contradictory readings of the Restoration Act and IGRA. Brief for Petitioners, Ysleta del Sur Pueblo at 35. Under Cabazon Band, the Pueblo explain, if a gaming activity is not prohibited by Texas law, Texas regulations and the Restoration Act do not apply, but IGRA does apply. Id. If a gaming activity is prohibited by Texas law, the Tribe adds, the Restoration Act applies. Id. The Tribe notes that this interpretation gives the Restoration Act and IGRA full effect. Id. Any other interpretation, the Pueblo highlight, produces a contradiction between the Restoration Act and IGRA. Id. Moreover, the Tribe maintains that a different interpretation of the Restoration Act would not protect tribes from state regulation, as IGRA is meant to do. Id. at 36. The Tribe also contends that a different interpretation would indefensibly exclude the Pueblo from IGRA’s regulations. Id. at 36. Additionally, the Tribe points to an established presumption that conflicts of law should be resolved in favor of the tribes. Id. at 37. This presumption, the Tribe explains, stems from an attempt to maintain tribal sovereignty and demands the application of state law only “if Congress has expressly so provided.” Id. Therefore, the Tribe asserts, the Tribe’s interpretation of the Restoration Act should be applied and, accordingly, the Tribe should not be subject to any Texas gaming regulations. Id. at 38.

In contrast, Texas argues that under the ordinary rules of statutory construction, the Restoration Act rather than IGRA controls here. Brief for Respondents, The State of Texas at 33. Texas explains that the Restoration Act controls because it is more specific, and rules of statutory interpretation demand the application of a more specific statute over a general statute. Id. at 34. The Pueblo’s reliance on the “Indian canon of construction,” Texas notes, is misleading because this canon is only meant to be applied when the statute at issue is ambiguous. Id. The Fifth Circuit, Texas explains, found that the Restoration Act is not ambiguous and thus the Indian canon of construction should not be applied. Id. Further, Texas asserts that the Restoration Act and IGRA can be harmonized if applied properly. Id. Texas maintains that IGRA does not apply in this case because it is a general statute, while the Restoration Act applies because it is a more specific statute. Id. at 34–35. IGRA, Texas contends, does not apply to the Pueblo because the Restoration Act already prohibits gaming on Pueblo lands. Id. at 35. Texas argues that this does not constitute an indefensible exclusion of the Pueblo from IGRA because IGRA is only meant to be applied in accordance with other federal law, highlighting that IGRA states in two separate sections that it should only be applied “in light of other federal law.” Id. Therefore, Texas argues, there is no contradiction between the Restoration Act and IGRA under Texas’ and the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of the Restoration Act. Id. at 36.