Guam v. United States

SECTION 113(F)(3)(B) AND NON-CERCLA SETTLEMENTS

Guam argues that Section 113(f)(3)(B) is only triggered by a prior determination of liability under CERCLA. Brief for Petitioner, Government of Guam at 16. Guam points to the text of Section 113(f)(3)(B), which allows a contribution claim by a party “who has resolved its liability to the United States . . . for some or all of a response action . . . in an administrative or judicially approved settlement.” Id. at 17. Guam claims the term “liability” is best understood by looking to other language within CERCLA. Id. In particular, Guam maintains that the term “liability” is linked to a “response action,” which CERCLA defines as an action that responds to releases of hazardous materials. Id. Therefore, since “response action” is defined by CERCLA, Guam argues that any liability must arise under CERCLA before triggering Section 113(f)(3)(B). Id. Further, Guam claims that reading Section 113(f)(3)(B) to only reach CERCLA settlements fits within the broader context of the statute, where other “interlocking” provisions of Section 113(f) refer to CERCLA-specific liability under Section 107. Id. at 18–20.

The United States agrees that Section 113(f)(3)(B) is triggered by a response action, but counters that a response action does not refer exclusively to CERCLA-specific responses. Brief for Respondent, United States at 12. The United States notes that Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not explicitly reference CERCLA liability itself. Id. at 16­–17. Instead, the United States argues, any directive that is legally binding can trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B)—including Guam’s 2004 consent decree under the Clean Water Act. Id. at 13. The United States notes that CERCLA’s broad use of “response action” to include “cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances” need not refer to measures undertaken pursuant to CERCLA alone. Id. Additionally, United States argues that reading Section 113(f)(3)(B) to encompass non-CERCLA settlements makes sense in the context of the entire statute, given that other parts of the statute specifically limit claims to those arising under CERCLA, but Section 113(f)(3)(B) does not. Id. at 17–19.

SECTION 113(F)(3)(B) AND OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY SCHEMES

Guam asserts that reading non-CERCLA settlements to trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B) would interfere with other environmental regulatory schemes. Brief for Petitioner at 25. For example, Guam notes that the Supreme Court has stated that the Clean Water Act contains “unusually elaborate enforcement provisions” that provide the exclusive remedy for violations under that statute. Id. at 26. In order for CERCLA to harmonize with other regulatory frameworks, Guam claims, Congress included a savings clause providing that CERCLA does not modify any “obligations or liability of any person under other Federal or State law.” Id. Guam argues that settlements made under other regulatory frameworks—such Guam’s 2004 consent decree under the Clean Water Act—must not trigger Section 113(f)(3)(B) lest CERCLA permit contribution claims that other regulatory frameworks would bar. Id. at 26–27.

The United States responds that Section 113(f)(3)(B) supplements, rather than displaces, other regulatory schemes. Brief for Respondent at 30. The United States argues that Congress intended for CERCLA to operate in conjunction with other environmental statutes, and that federal statutes overlap frequently. Id. When statutes overlap, the United States notes, the Court attempts to give effect to both statutes rather than reading one statute to preclude the other. Id. at 31–32. Here, the United States contends that the overlap between Section 113(f)(3)(B) and other statutes is limited because Section 113(f)(3)(B) can only be used when “administrative or judicially approved” settlements resolve liability “to the United States or a State” and impose liability for a “response action” or its costs. Id. at 31. Further, the United States argues, the savings clause that Guam cites is irrelevant because CERCLA does not modify any liabilities—contribution under Section 113(f)(3)(B) leaves parties free to invoke remedies for violations under other statutes as well. Id.

SETTLEMENTS THAT DISCLAIM DETERMINATIONS OF LIABILITY

Guam claims that regardless of whether a settlement is reached under CERCLA, Section 113(f)(3)(B) is not triggered when that settlement explicitly disclaims a party’s liability. Brief for Petitioner at 37–38. Given that CERCLA does not define the word “resolved,” Guam asserts that the Court must turn to the ordinary meaning of the word when Congress originally enacted the statute. Id. at 38. The common meaning of the “resolve,” according to Guam, was that an issue was rendered “not susceptible to further dispute or negotiation.” Id. Guam maintains that this reading is underscored by the framework CERCLA lays out for settlement, which allows the EPA to cap the settling party’s liability by including a provision in the settlement agreement which prevents the EPA from suing the settling party. Id. at 39. Since the 2004 consent decree leaves Guam vulnerable to future claims under CERCLA, Guam asserts that the settlement did not resolve Guam’s liability within the meaning of Section 113(f)(3)(B). Id. at 41–43.

The United States counters that the word “resolved” focuses on what a settlement obligates a party to do, rather than on whether the plaintiff’s claim is valid. Brief for Respondent at 38. To support this reading, the United States relies on dictionary definitions which state that “resolve” means “to determine” an issue about “which there is doubt or dispute.” Id. at 35, 38. Therefore, the United States maintains, a resolution of liability does not necessarily require resolution of a legal wrong. Id. at 39. The United States also claims that principles of tort law support this reading, since one party may seek contribution from another without proving that party would have been liable to the plaintiff too. Id. Finally, the United States claims that if a provision in a settlement agreement that blocks the EPA from suing the settling party could also block resolution of liability, it is likely that a CERCLA settlement could never resolve a party’s liability. Id. at 45.

THE MEANING OF A CONTRIBUTION CLAIM

Finally, Guam argues that it could not assert a contribution claim against the United States under Section 113(f)(3)(B) because the two parties lacked “common liability” at the time of the consent decree. Brief for Petitioner at 23. By adopting the term “contribution” in Section 113(f), Guam contends that Congress presumably intended to use the term as courts have traditionally understood it. Id. at 20–21. Guam asserts that under the doctrine of contribution, a settling party that who has discharged its liability to a second person may then sue a third person who was partially responsible for the causing the same harm. Id. at 21–22. However, Guam argues the United States enjoys sovereign immunity from liability under the section of the Clean Water Act that Guam settled; therefore, Guam could not logically assert a contribution claim against the United States when the federal government never faced liability under the 2004 consent decree in the first place. Id. at 23. Likewise, Guam notes that since it too did not admit any CERCLA liability under the 2004 consent decree, and contribution requires that one party discharge a liability, a contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B) would be impossible. Id.

The United States maintains that “common liability” existed with Guam, such that Guam had the opportunity to seek a contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B). Brief for Respondent at 28–30. The United States asserts that although contribution requires that two parties face liability for causing the same harm to a third party, contribution does require the two parties who cause the harm to bear liability for the same reason. Id. at 28–29. The United States points to an example that although a drunk driver and a bar may both be liable to a third person for a car accident, both the drunk driver and the bar may claim contribution against each other even though their liability is based on separate grounds. Id. at 29. Under this reasoning, the United States highlights Guam’s claim that the United States bears partial responsibility under CERCLA for contaminating the Dump and must therefore pay a part of the cleanup costs to Guam. Id. at 30. The United States asserts that Guam’s own rationale establishes common liability which would have sufficed to permit Guam to assert its contribution claim under Section 113(f)(3)(B) after the 2004 consent decree. Id. at 29–30.