Edwards v. Vannoy

DID RAMOS ANNOUNCE AN OLD RULE OR A NEW RULE?

Edwards argues that Ramos v. Louisiana recognized the “old rule” that juries must be unanimous to convict a criminal defendant under the Sixth Amendment. Brief for Petitioner, Thedrick Edwards at 12. Using the framework established by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, which held that old rules that emerge from long-recognized principles embodied in legal precedent should be given retroactive effect, Edwards contends that his conviction by a nonunanimous jury violates his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. Id. at 10, 12–13. Edwards claims this result is compelled based on three principles: first, a criminal conviction by a unanimous jury is an “ancient guarantee” found in the common law, state practices when the Constitution was written, and court opinions from that era; second, the right to trial by jury is incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause because it is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice”; and third, federal law requires that a unanimous jury alone can convict a defendant faced with a criminal prosecution, which should also be a requirement in state court because incorporated constitutional rights such as this apply the same way against the federal and state governments. Id. at 13–16. Edwards further asserts that Ramos did not articulate a new rule, despite the fact that Supreme Court overruled Apodaca v. Oregon. Id. at 17–18. Instead, Edwards argues that a reasonable jurist would have recognized that the Supreme Court’s Apodaca decision was an outlier and was inconsistent with existing precedent. Id. at 18–20. In Apodaca, the court’s opinion was deeply divided; a majority of the justices found that the Sixth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts to convict in federal court, and that the Sixth Amendment applies against the state and federal government identically, implying that state juries must also be unanimous to convict. Id. at 18–19. However, the Court upheld the nonunanimous conviction in Apodaca and issued a “badly fractured set of opinions.” Id. at 19. In fact, in Ramos, Apodaca was described as “uniquely irreconcilable” with the Supreme Court’s precedent. Id. Therefore, a reasonable jurist would have recognized that Apodaca’s outcome was anomalous, and Apodaca should not be interpreted to foreclose Ramos from recognizing an old rule. Id. at 18–20.

Vannoy contends that Ramos instead articulated a new rule that cannot be applied retroactively to cases like Edwards’, which were finalized before Ramos was decided. Brief for Respondent, Darrel Vannoy at 14. Vannoy distinguishes Ramos from other cases where the Court has found old rules, such as Stringer v. Black. Id. There, the Court found that the rule in question was logically dictated by past Supreme Court decisions, but importantly, the Court did not explicitly overrule a prior Court case as was necessary in Ramos. Id. Vannoy asserts that the three precepts articulated by Edwards are not persuasive arguments that Ramos articulated an old rule and, instead, are merely reasons why Apodaca was wrongly decided. Id. at 23. After all, Vannoy notes, lower courts were bound by Apodaca to uphold nonunanimous convictions in Oregon and Louisiana for nearly five decades. Id. Therefore, the Supreme Court’s overturning of Apodaca in Ramos “broke new ground” and imposed new obligations on state courts consistent with a new rule. Id. at 19. Vannoy also argues that reasonable jurists could not have anticipated that the Supreme Court would overrule Apodaca, a 47-year-old case, when deciding Ramos which renders the rule announced in Ramos as new. Id. at 14, 23. Further, Vannoy reasons that in the founding era, the Bill of Rights applied only against the federal government and after incorporation, the Supreme Court has only generally recognized that the rights articulated in the Bill of Rights apply in the same way against the federal and state governments while continuing to acknowledge the Apodaca exception. Id. Taken together, Vannoy asserts that when Edwards’ claim was decided, reasonable jurists could disagree about the requirement of jury unanimity under Apodaca. Id. at 24.

DID RAMOS ANNOUNCE A WATERSHED RULE?

Alternatively, Edwards contends that if Ramos announced a new rule, it would be a watershed rule that is “central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt” and would also apply retroactively under Teague. Brief for Petitioner at 22, 30. A watershed rule applies retroactively because the rule fundamentally impacts “bedrock procedural elements” that are essential “to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction” and guard against procedures that allow “an impermissibly large risk” of convicting innocent defendants. Id. at 23. For this rule, Edwards cites Ramos, which argued that jury unanimity is a crucial and necessary component of an accused’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 24. Edwards reasons that in Oregon and Louisiana, the only two states that still allowed convictions by way of nonunanimous juries, Ramos effected a widespread change consistent with a watershed rule. Id. at 26. Considering the historical origins of the jury-trial right, Edwards maintains that the jury-trial right is even more fundamental than an accused’s right to counsel, as vindicated in Gideon v. Wainwright. Id. Consistent with Gideon, Edwards asserts that a defendant’s conviction by a nonunanimous jury so fundamentally alters a defendant’s trial so as to constitute a structural error. Id. at 26. Edwards also contends that requiring jury unanimity maximizes accuracy in the fact-finding process and does not allow a majority of jurors to disregard a dissenting juror. Id. at 27–28. Therefore, the requirement of jury unanimity ensures there is not an intolerably large risk that an innocent defendant is convicted, therefore rendering jury unanimity a watershed rule. Id. at 22. Edwards further points out that Ramos’s rule aligned Oregon and Louisiana’s due process requirements, as they pertain to jury unanimity, with the requirements observed by the remaining states and federal government. Id. at 30–31. Importantly, Edwards notes that Oregon and Louisiana’s nonunanimous systems had roots in the disenfranchisement of minority voters. Id. at 38. While Teague respects a state’s interests in finality, Edwards claims that fairness ultimately supports retroactive application in cases where the nonunanimous jury requirements are rooted in state-sponsored racial discrimination. Id. at 38. Therefore, Edwards asserts the Ramos holding clears the high bar to recognition as a watershed rule and should be retroactively applied. Id. at 30.

Vannoy counters that Ramos’s new procedural rule does not qualify as a watershed rule. Brief for Respondent at 24. Unlike substantive rules, Vannoy asserts, procedural rules are rarely applied retroactively because they “do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have been acquitted otherwise.” Id. at 25–26. Vannoy contends that procedural rules less directly implicate a defendant’s guilt or innocence and, therefore, no court has identified a procedural rule under Teague worthy of watershed status. Id. at 26–27. Vannoy points to prior Court decisions that declined to render retroactive procedural rules relating to the jury right and racial discrimination, as well as in some capital cases. Id. at 30. Importantly, Vannoy posits that jury unanimity does not present an intolerable risk of convicting an innocent defendant. Id. at 30. Vannoy argues that sometimes requiring unanimity may actually decrease accuracy of a jury verdict in situations where a single holdout juror can disregard the evidence and stymy progress. Id. at 34–35. Vannoy asserts that this distinguishes the Edwards’s case from Gideon. Id. at 35. Further, Vannoy points to other countries that have done away with the unanimous-jury requirement as evidence that a conviction by a unanimous jury is not presumptively inaccurate or unfair. Id. at 36–37. Vannoy adds that in Edwards’ case, a unanimous-jury requirement would not have increased the risk of an erroneous conviction because Edwards confessed to the crimes he was charged with and there was also compelling evidence of his guilt. Id. at 37.

DOES THE AEDPA BAR RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF RAMOS?

Edwards emphasizes that the Court chose to limit the question presented in this case to whether Ramos applies retroactively on federal habeas review, and therefore the Court does not have to decide whether Edwards should receive relief under the standard enunciated in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA"). Reply Brief for Petitioner, Thedrick Edwards at 19. Importantly, Edwards contends, whether Ramos applies retroactively under Teague should be decided before the Court conducts an analysis under the AEDPA. Id. at 19–20. Nonetheless, Edwards states that old rules presumptively apply retroactively and have been recognized as qualifying “clearly established federal law”; therefore, if the court finds that Ramos articulated an old rule, Edwards’s claim would not automatically be barred by the AEDPA. Id. at 20. On the other hand, if the Court found that Ramos recognized a new rule, Edwards believes that Congress’s mention of the retroactivity of new rules in different statutory provisions of the AEDPA is entirely consistent with retroactive application of new rules that come before the court on federal collateral review. Id. at 21. Edwards argues that the AEDPA sections that explicitly mention retroactive application of new rules in federal habeas cases only apply to further limit successive petitions by defendants whose convictions have already withstood collateral attack once. Id. Edwards also reasons that other statutory provisions of the AEDPA would be superfluous if the relevant AEDPA barred all relief for retroactive new rules, antithetical to the canons of statutory interpretation. Id. Edwards concludes by referencing lower-court decisions that have interpreted the AEDPA to allow habeas petitions after the Supreme Court designates a new substantive or watershed rule. Id.

Vannoy claims that regardless of whether Ramos articulated an old rule or a new rule, Edwards is not entitled to habeas relief under the AEDPA. Brief for Respondent at 46. The AEDPA bars relitigation of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus claim that was litigated by a state court on the merits in federal court. Id. at 47. However, there are two exceptions to this relitigation bar if the prisoner can show that the state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision that was (1) contrary to, or (2) involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 47. Here, Vannoy argues that the state court correctly applied Apodaca in upholding Edwards’s conviction and so Edwards cannot meet this standard. Id. at 49. Alternatively, even if Ramos provided a watershed rule, Vannoy contends that Edwards still cannot overcome the relitigation bar of the AEDPA and watershed rules generally should not be exempted from the relitigation bar. Id. at 50–52. Vannoy rejects the idea that federal courts should retroactively apply watershed rules to habeas petitions based on the plain language of the statutory provision because Congress included exceptions for watershed rules in other statutory provisions but not for the relevant federal habeas petition provision, which implies that Congress intentionally left that language out. Id. Vannoy asserts that this is within Congress’s power over the federal courts and should be respected, especially because procedural rules are less likely to lead to wrongful convictions. Id. at 52.