Ford Motor Company v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court

DOES SPECIFIC JURISDICTION REQUIRE A CAUSAL CONNECTION?

Petitioner Ford argues that specific jurisdiction requires that it have “suit-related” contacts with Montana. Brief for Petitioner, Ford Motor Co. at 18. In other words, Ford continues, its activities within Montana must “give rise to” or somehow cause the claim at issue; a plaintiff’s “unilateral” activities within Montana cannot alone support such a causal connection. Id. at 18–19. For example, Ford explains that in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, the Court held that plaintiffs who bought a car in New York and got into an accident in Oklahoma could not assert specific jurisdiction in Oklahoma over the out-of-state manufacturer. Id. Ford argues that Gullett’s unilateral decision to drive within Montana should similarly fail to justify specific jurisdiction here. Id. Ford also points out that the Court has previously rejected claims of specific jurisdiction asserted on the basis that individuals in the forum state can bring similar claims that are causally related to the defendant's conduct. Id. Ford draws attention to Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San Francisco County, where the Court rejected a California state court's assertion of specific jurisdiction over nonresident claimants who could not trace their claims to the defendant’s activities in that state, despite that the nonresident plaintiffs were seeking to join a class action by California-resident plaintiffs who could in fact do so. Id. at 19–20, 31–32. In other words, Ford concludes, the mere “resembl[ance]” between a plaintiff's claim against the defendant and the defendant’s in-state relationship with third parties fails to justify specific jurisdiction. Id. at 31.

Ford argues that fairness requires that a defendant be subject to suit only in those forums where the defendant itself creates forum contacts and those contacts are “suit-related.” Id. at 23. While recognizing that the Court often uses the phrase “arise out of or relate to” to describe this relatedness, Ford contends that “relate to” should not be read to excuse the lack of a causal connection. Id. at 36–37. According to Ford, the Court merely uses “relate to” as another way to describe a causal connection. Id. Ford asserts that the Court often uses redundant phrasing when describing a single concept, such as the requirement that the exercise of specific jurisdiction must comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 37. Ford also points out that the Court has often omitted the phrase “relate to” in its opinions, indicating that “relate to” is superfluous legalese. Id at 36–37. Indeed, Ford continues, the Court has expressly cautioned against reading the phrase “arise out of or relate to” as encompassing two separate standards. Id. at 37.

Respondent Lucero counters that a causal relationship between a plaintiff’s claim and a defendant’s in-state contacts is not required to support specific jurisdiction. Brief for Respondent, Charles Lucero at 13–14. Lucero notes that in Bristol-Myers Squibb, the Court itself declined an invitation to adopt causal language and instead opted for looser terms such as “connection” and “affiliation” to describe the relatedness required between the claim and the defendant’s contacts in the forum state. Id. at 26. Lucero argues that this relatedness is present where, as here, a defendant “deliberately cultivate[s] a market” for a product in a particular state and one of those products causes an injury in that state. Id. at 16. It does not matter, Lucero maintains, that the particular product that caused the injury was not sold in the forum state; if the defendant “routinely sells” the injury-causing product in the forum state, then the claim may be said to “arise out of or relate to” the defendant’s in-state contacts. Id. at 17–18. Lucero accordingly asserts that specific jurisdiction exists here because (a) Ford cultivated a market for the Explorer in Montana, and (b) an Explorer injured Gullet in Montana––where Gullet bought the Explorer is irrelevant. See id. at 16. Further, Lucero points out, even the United States, as amicus curiae in support of Ford, while otherwise agreeing that Ford’s contacts insufficiently relate to Lucero’s claim, does not go so far as to read the Court’s precedents as requiring a causal link. Id. at 24; see Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States, in support of Petitioner at 29–32.

Lucero insists that the phrase “arise out of or relate to” must be read disjunctively in that “arise out of” and “relate to” have distinct meanings. Id. at 23. While conceding that “arise out of” implies a causal relationship, Lucero asserts that “relate to” carries no such implication. Id. at 23–24. Lucero claims that the Court has regularly employed this or similar disjunctive language for almost 75 years as a way of emphasizing that a causal connection is not required. Id. at 24–25. For example, Lucero notes, the Court has alternatively used the phrases “arise out of or are connected with,” “deriving from, or connected with,” and “related to or arises out of” when describing the relatedness requirement. Id. at 23. Lucero goes on to point out cases where specific jurisdiction existed despite the lack of a causal connection, drawing attention to Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations v. Brown, where the Court recognized that “the flow of a manufacturer’s products into the forum” establishes a connection sufficient to support specific jurisdiction. Id. It is not necessary, Lucero contends, that a plaintiff be able to trace the particular injury-causing product to a source within the forum state. See id. at 24.

FEDERALISM AND DUE PROCESS CONCERNS

Ford contends that a causal rule best addresses the due process concerns fundamental to specific jurisdiction. Brief for Petitioner at 23. According to Ford, specific jurisdiction serves an important “jurisdiction-allocating function” that underscores the principle of federalism. Brief for Petitioner at 23–24. Ford explains that because states are coequal sovereigns, the Court must clearly demarcate the bounds of their authority in order to prevent a state from interfering with the interests of another state in regulating actions taken within or directed toward its territory. Id. Otherwise, Ford contends, states could use a defendant’s unrelated conduct within its borders as a “hook” to regulate the defendant’s conduct outside of the state. Id. at 25. Ford contends that it is especially important to set clear boundaries for each state’s authority where, as here, the defendant is a corporation with nationwide marketing. Id. Under a non-causal rule, Ford contends, so long as a state can show that a defendant's activities within its borders resemble the defendant’s conduct in another state, the former state could potentially draw the defendant into court for conduct committed anywhere in the country. Id. Ford explains that the result would be a “jurisdictional free for all,” undermining any concern for federalism. Id. Ford thus concludes that requiring a causal relationship between a plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s in-state activities is the best way to affect a “sensible division of authority” between the states. Id. at 24. In fact, the United States, in support of Ford, contends that most states have disavowed a strong state interest in regulating conduct in cases such as this one. Brief of the United States at 24–25. The United States explains that about forty states, including Montana, have abandoned the choice-of-law rule under which the law of the place of injury applies. Id. The United States points out that Montana’s courts have explicitly noted that the place of a car accident is too arbitrary a basis for a choice of law determination. Id. at 25.

Lucero counters a causal rule would actually work to undercut federalism. Brief for Respondent at 27. According to Lucero, a state has a strong interest in protecting persons injured within its borders by providing them with a “convenient forum” in which to seek relief. Id. Lucero concedes that while there are circumstances in which another state might have a greater interest in regulating a defendant’s particular conduct, those circumstances are not present here. Id. at 29. Indeed, Lucero argues, the circumstances here especially support Montana having jurisdiction over Ford. Id. at 20. Lucero asserts that because the fatal crash here took place within Montana's borders, Montana has a compelling interest in adjudicating the dispute. Id. at 29. Furthermore, as Lucero explains, Ford “cultivated” not only a first-sale market in Montana, but also a market for replacement parts and for servicing used vehicles. Id. at 20. Lucero moreover notes that Ford’s market relating to used vehicles is an essential complement to its first-sale business, helping it to recoup costs in the latter market. Id. Through its deliberate cultivation of the used vehicle market, Lucero argues, Ford established a “continuing relationship” with anyone driving one of its vehicles in Montana, and thereby obligated itself not to negligently injure any person in Montana with whom it was in that relationship, regardless of where the person may have brought the vehicle. Id. at 20–21. This obligation, Lucero contends, links the claims here to Ford’s contacts in Montana in a manner that justifies specific personal jurisdiction. See id. at 20. Ford’s causal rule, which would permit jurisdiction in the state of the “first sale,” Lucero contends, produces arbitrary results in cases such as this one involving used vehicles purchased from a third party. Id. at 30. Applying Ford's causal rule, Lucero argues, would thus undermine Montana’s ability to enforce its own laws. Id. at 28.