DOJ v. House Committee on the Judiciary

INTERPRETING THE TERM “JUDICIAL PROCEEDING”

The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) argues that the term “judicial proceeding” is limited to proceedings that occur in a court in front of a judge, and excludes proceedings that take place in front of a legislative body, such as the Senate. Brief for Petitioner, Department of Justice at 16–17. According to the DOJ, the references to “other courts” and “parties” in Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 6(e) would not apply to the Senate and the House Judiciary Committee (“Committee”), respectively. Id. at 17–18. The DOJ also maintains that Rule 6(e) refers to a “judicial proceeding” only as a proceeding in an ordinary court, demonstrating Congress’s intent that this term be applied consistently in the same way. Id. at 19.

The Framers’ use of the terms “judicial,” “court,” and “trial” when describing impeachment, the DOJ emphasizes, served only to illustrate the distinctiveness of the impeachment process from an ordinary proceeding. Id. at 23. The DOJ contends that the Court of Appeals erred in stating that the term “judicial proceeding” should be interpreted broadly because a broader interpretation is counterintuitive to the narrow construal set forth by the exceptions to grand-jury secrecy. Id. at 24. Furthermore, the narrow interpretation of “judicial proceeding,” the DOJ argues, requires a clear indication that grand jury materials can be disclosed for impeachment inquiries, an indication that the DOJ points out is absent. Id. at 25. The DOJ maintains that the Court of Appeals erroneously brought forth only lower-court decisions that authorized disclosure of grand jury materials for matters outside of ordinary court proceedings because the Supreme Court has never validated those cases or directly addressed whether or not disclosure of grand jury materials under Rule 6(e) applies to anything outside of ordinary court litigation. Brief for Petitioner at 29–30. Additionally, all of the precedents cited by the Court of Appeals, according to the DOJ, pertained to proceedings that were “preliminary to an eventual judicial proceeding,” which does not deem the relevant case to be a “judicial proceeding” in and of itself under Rule 6(e). Id. at 30–33.

The House Committee on the Judiciary (“Committee”), on the other hand, argues that the ordinary meaning of “judicial proceeding” encompasses any action that involves judicial action being taken in a court, which includes impeachment trials. Brief for Respondent, House Committee on the Judiciary at 16. The Framers’ intention regarding impeachment trials, according to the Committee, was to allow the Senate to function as a court that renders a judgment after litigation, demonstrating that an impeachment trial falls under the ordinary meaning of “judicial proceeding.” Id. at 17–18. The Committee maintains that dictionaries classify impeachment trials as instances in which the Senate takes on the role of a court. Id. at 22. Furthermore, the Committee emphasizes, the Supreme Court, state courts, current writings, and past Senate impeachment proceedings classified the Senate as “sitting as a Court of Impeachment,” demonstrating that an impeachment proceeding is a particular circumstance that allows the Senate to function as a court. Id. at 22–26.

The Committee further argues that other parts of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure support the interpretation that “judicial proceeding” applies to a Senate impeachment trial. Id. at 27. Under other subsections of Rule 6(e), the Committee asserts that it would actually classify as a “party” to a trial because it is an approved agent of the House of Representatives. Id. at 27–28. The Committee maintains that another subsection of Rule 6(e), which refers to transferring a case to “other courts,” is not relevant in determining whether a Senate impeachment trial is a “judicial proceeding” because the rule regarding case transfer does not need to apply to every case, only those that require a transfer. Id. at 28. Additionally, the Committee contends that impeachment trials have previously been classified as “judicial proceedings” because Congress received grand jury materials related to impeachment investigations of President Clinton, federal judges, and Congress members. Id. at 30–34.

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CLASSIFYING AN IMPEACHMENT TRIAL AS A “JUDICIAL PROCEEDING”

The DOJ argues that the Committee has not demonstrated the “particularized need” required to overcome the presumption in favor of grand-jury secrecy. Brief for Petitioner at 37–38. The three factors that the DOJ asserts weigh in favor of maintaining secrecy in this case, outlined in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, establish that in order to demonstrate particularized need, the party seeking to disclose grand-jury materials must show (1) that the disclosure of the materials would prevent injustice; (2) that the need for disclosure outweighs the desire for secrecy; (3) and that the request for the materials is specific and not over-broad. Id. at 36. The DOJ maintains that the analysis of the factors would force the federal courts to determine the likelihood that the majority would choose to impeach the President, placing the federal court in a difficult position to essentially predict the outcome of the impeachment proceedings. Id. at 37. The federal court, the DOJ asserts, would be forced to take on a similar role to that of the Committee, which would create constitutional strain because this is not a role the Constitution grants to the federal courts. Id. at 38–39.

The DOJ contends that allowing the term “judicial proceeding,” as used in the exception to grand-jury secrecy under Rule 6(e), to apply to a Senate impeachment trial would create further constitutional difficulties. Id. at 33. One of the key components of grand-jury secrecy under Rule 6(e)(3), the DOJ argues, is the district court’s ability to impose protective limitations on the disclosure of materials. Id. at 34. The DOJ maintains that it would be extremely difficult to enforce the imposed limitations on disclosure when the court in question would involve members of Congress. Id. The DOJ claims that enforcing these protective limitations in connection with an impeachment proceeding may be unconstitutional, making it even more apparent that an impeachment trial does not fall under the ordinary meaning of “judicial proceeding.” Id. at 35. Once the grand jury materials are disclosed to Congress for the impeachment trial, the DOJ emphasizes that it would be incredibly difficult to prevent the materials from being distributed further. Id. at 35.

The Committee contends that applying the Douglas Oil “particularized need” factors does not weigh in favor of maintaining secrecy, but rather indicates that there is a range of flexibility conferred upon the district courts that allows them to accommodate specific circumstances in determining whether or not the situation warrants disclosure. Brief for Respondent at 40–41. There would be no constitutional strain, the Committee argues, in applying the “particularized need” requirement because it does not render any part of Rule 6(e) unconstitutional. Id. Furthermore, contrary to the DOJ’s argument, the Committee asserts that there would also be no constitutional strain on the federal courts. Id. at 41. The federal courts, the Committee contends, would not be forced to undertake a role similar to that of the Committee because there is no requirement that the federal court conduct an invasive analysis into the predicted outcome of the impeachment trial. Id. at 41.

The Committee argues that it would be a violation of the Constitution if Rule 6(e), which uses the term “judicial proceeding,” would not apply to an impeachment trial because it would prevent the Committee from assuming its constitutional role in identifying and addressing any injustice committed by the President. Id. at 35. The Committee maintains that the Constitution grants impeachment power to it, and the Committee can only fulfill that role to its utmost extent if it has access to all the relevant information. Id. at 36. Refusing to grant access to the grand jury materials in connection with the impeachment investigation, the Committee emphasizes, runs contrary to the power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. Id. The Committee asserts that preventing disclosure of grand jury materials to the Committee would infringe on the separation of powers because it would impede the Committee’s ability to exercise “an essential check” on the executive branch of government. Id. at 36–37.