BP P.L.C. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore

HISTORICAL LIMITATIONS ON REVIEW OF REMAND ORDERS

Petitioner BP, P.L.C. and the other companies (collectively, “BP”) argue that it is not clear that Congress intended to allow a court of appeals to review all issues in a remand order when it amended Section 1447(d) by adding the federal-officer exception. Brief for Petitioners, BP et al. at 34. BP distinguishes amending an existing statute and reenacting it. Id. at 34–35. When Congress merely amends a statute, BP maintains, it does not necessarily endorse previous understandings of the statute’s purpose. Id. at 35. BP notes that here, Congress only made an “isolated amendment” to existing law. Id. This alone, BP asserts, is not proof that Congress meant to approve any alleged prior interpretations of Section 1447(d) as limiting the ability of courts of appeals to consider issues other than the federal-officer or civil-rights exceptions on remand. Id. Moreover, BP argues that allowing review of the whole order where federal-officer or civil-rights grounds are implicated is not in conflict with the historical purpose of Section 1447(d). Id. at 34. BP contends that the purpose of Section 1447(d) was to reduce the load on the Supreme Court’s docket after “broad federal-question jurisdiction became available” and before the courts of appeals were created. Id. at 33. Finally, BP argues that other important federal interests—which Congress tried to protect by creating the exception—would be best served by allowing courts to review other grounds for remand because these grounds are often related to Congress’s goal to protect federal officers. Id. at 27–28.

Respondent Baltimore counters that for over a century, Congress has limited courts of appeals’ ability to review orders remanding cases back to state courts. Brief for Respondent, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore at 39–40. Baltimore maintains that Congress reaffirmed this position by adding Section 1447(d), which Baltimore claims was meant only to protect a “narrow class” of defendants. Id. at 33, 40 n. 4. Against this historical background—and what it characterizes as the nearly unanimous interpretation of Section 1447(d)—Baltimore raises the Supreme Court’s canon of construction that Congress is aware of courts’ interpretation of statutes when making new law or amending existing law. Id. at 31–32. Baltimore also refutes BP’s assertion that when Congress makes an isolated amendment to existing law, it does not necessarily endorse existing interpretations of the law. Id. Instead, Baltimore argues that an amendment “is presumed to carry forward” earlier interpretations of words or phrases in a previous version of the statute. Id. at 32. By adding the federal-officer exemption, Baltimore maintains that Congress could not have intended to make any ground stated in the order to remand reviewable so long as one of the exemptions found in Section 1447(d) was mentioned in the order. Id. at 29–30.

YAMAHA AND THE PLAIN MEANING OF SECTION 1447(d)

BP argues that the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the word “order” in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) should be applied to Section 1447(d)’s use of the word. Brief for Petitioners at 32. In Yamaha Motor Court v. Calhoun, BP explains, the Supreme Court decided that for a federal interlocutory appeal, an order does not only encompass the issue that the district court asks the court of appeals to review, but also includes every issue implicated by the order. Id. BP asserts that—according to the plain language of the statute—a court of appeals reviewing an order to remand should be able to review the whole order because Section 1447(d) does not expressly limit a court of appeals’ ability to review the entire order. Id. BP maintains that this plain language-reading is not at odds with what it cites as the historical purpose of Section 1447(d): to reduce the Supreme Court’s caseload. Id. at 33. Furthermore, BP contends the modern purpose of Section 1447(d) is to prevent delays in the trial of remanded cases. Id. at 33. According to BP, under this interpretation of Section 1447(d), limiting a court of appeals’ discretion to consider only whether the Section 1447(d) exceptions apply furthers the goal of preventing delay only “marginally, if at all.” Id. at 33.

Baltimore responds by acknowledging that, like the interlocutory appeal statute in Yamaha, Section 1447(d) also concerns an order. Brief for Respondent at 21. However, Baltimore argues the Court should not define “order” in Section 1447(d) as expansively as in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) because of the differences between the two statutes. Id. at 21–23. Baltimore argues that when a court of appeals reviews an order in an interlocutory appeal, the court of appeals is allowed to review any issue that it ultimately could review on appeal after the case is decided. Id. at 22. In contrast, Baltimore asserts, a court of appeals would ordinarily lack the ability to review an order to remand because Section 1447(d) normally renders a court of appeals’ decision to remand unreviewable. Id. at 22–23. Therefore, Baltimore claims, BP’s interpretation of the word order would allow courts to review issues that the statute generally considered unreviewable, which would contradict the Court’s precedent, and broaden federal courts’ “limited jurisdiction.” Id.

INCENTIVE TO ASSERT MERITLESS JURISDICTIONAL CLAIMS

BP argues that its interpretation of Section 1447(d) would not incentivize defendants to make frivolous federal-officer claims. Brief for Petitioners at 35. BP maintains that if a defendant frivolously asserted a federal-officer claim simply to receive a review of an ordinarily unreviewable jurisdictional removal claim, courts maintain the authority to deal with that misconduct. Id. at 35. For example, BP notes that any court of appeals has the inherent authority to impose sanctions, dismiss a case, or simply decide not to hear it. Id. at 35–36. Aside from whether a court of appeals could decide not to hear a case, BP claims that a court might lack jurisdiction to hear a frivolous claim in the first place. Id. at 36. According to BP, a court may not have jurisdiction where a defendant’s claim that federal law confers subject-matter jurisdiction is merely a ploy to obtain jurisdiction or the claim is otherwise “wholly insubstantial.” Id.

Baltimore counters that allowing courts of appeal to review an entire order would permit defendants to frivolously assert a federal-officer claim to obtain review of other ordinarily nonreviewable grounds for remand. Brief for Respondent at 36–37. Moreover, Baltimore maintains that the possibility of sanctions and fee-shifting is insufficient to deter defendants from doing so. Id. at 38. Specifically, Baltimore contends that courts rarely utilize its “inherent authority to sanction” and seldom levy sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. Baltimore further argues that the ability for a court to issue an award under Section 1447(c)—which allows district courts to order the defendant to pay costs the plaintiff incurs because of the defendant’s removal—would also fail to dissuade frivolous claims. Id. at 17, 38. According to Baltimore, if defendants could succeed on any other “objectively reasonable” jurisdictional grounds for removal, they would not be required to pay the plaintiff’s costs. Id. at 38.