Holguin-Hernandez v. United States

INTERPRETING FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 51

Petitioner Holguin-Hernandez argues that requiring defendants to object to a sentence after a district court’s ruling when they have already argued for a shorter sentence is contrary to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51. Brief for Petitioner, Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez at 10. Holguin-Hernandez explains that the Supreme Court generally interprets and enforces statutory terms according to their ordinary meaning. Id. He contends that Rule 51 clearly states that a party can preserve its objection by informing the court of an action it believes should be taken “when the court ruling is made or sought.” Id. According to Holguin-Hernandez, the word “or” in the text has a clear purpose: a defendant can preserve an objection either by objecting to a sentence after it is made or by asking the court to set a certain sentence before the sentencing phase. Id. at 12. Here, Holguin-Hernandez argued for a specific sentence under the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) prior to the district court’s sentencing. Holguin-Hernandez asserts that doing so informed the court of the action he wished it to take, thus preserving his claim of error for appeal under Rule 51. Id. at 12.

The Court-appointed Amicus counters that the Court should interpret Rule 51 and Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure analogously because the advisory committee’s note to Rule 51’s adoption provides that they are “practically identical.” Brief of Amicus Curiae K. Winn Allen, in Support of the Fifth Circuit at 14. The Amicus argues that while Rule 51 does not expressly require a party to state the grounds supporting its request or objection, Rule 46 does contain this requirement, and therefore, Rule 51 should also contain such a requirement. Id. at 14. Under this reading, asserts the Amicus, to preserve an objection to a sentence, a party must not simply request a different sentence length, but must both explain that it is entitled to a different sentence and state the specific facts that support this explanation. Id. at 15. While generally this is most likely to be done in a post-sentencing objection, Amicus argues that a defendant could still preserve his claim of error by asking for a specific sentence prior to sentencing, but the defendant’s argument must also include an argument that a certain sentence would be unreasonable, and the grounds that support this argument. Id. at 30.

PUTTING THE TRIAL COURT ON NOTICE

Respondent United States, writing in support of vacatur, agrees with Holguin-Hernandez on his interpretation of Rule 51, asserting that a defendant preserves his substantive challenge to a sentence by initially arguing for a shorter one. Brief for Respondent, United States at 15. The United States argues that, once a defendant asks a court for a lower sentence, that court becomes on notice that the defendant views any longer sentence as unnecessary, and the objection should therefore be preserved for appellate review. Brief for Respondent at 22. While the United States concedes that, had the objection here been about a purely procedural issue, like a miscalculation based on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the defendant would have had to object after sentencing, but that does not apply here where the objection was based on a substantive issue of which the court was already aware. Id. at 20. Additionally, the United States argues that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling—that defendants must specifically object to a sentence’s reasonableness—confuses the very issue: reasonableness is the standard of review for the appellate court, while the error asserted by Holguin-Hernandez is that the district court did not adequately consider his circumstances. Id. at 23. A defendant need only notify the court that he disagrees with its ruling; he does not also need to tell the court that their ruling will fail under the appellate standard of review. Id. at 25.

Amicus counters that almost every defendant will ask for a shorter sentence because such a sentence is a preferable outcome. Brief of K. Winn Allen at 21. The Amicus adds that the text of Section 3553(a) requires the court to issue “a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” which creates a range of reasonable sentences. Id. at 15. The Amicus emphasizes that a request for a shorter sentence prior to sentencing does not adequately put the court on notice that a defendant finds the sentence given unreasonable—just that the defendant would prefer a shorter one within the range of reasonable sentences. Id. at 21–22. The Amicus contends that a trial court is only put on notice when it has been given specific grounds in support of an argument, allowing the court the opportunity to determine for itself whether a sentence exceeds the requirements of Section 3553(a). Id. at 28. According to the Amicus, presenting the issue of reasonableness for the first time on appeal would deprive the district court of the opportunity to review the issue on its own, and use their “institutional advantage” to make these decisions prior to consideration by the appellate court. Id. at 19–20, 26.

SUBSTANTIAL REASONABLENESS OF PETITIONER’S SENTENCE

Holguin-Hernandez argues that, because the United States defends the reasonableness of his sentence, the Court may consider the question of whether his sentence is reasonable and find his sentence unreasonable. Reply Brief for Petitioner at 17. At sentencing, the district court stated that the 12-month revocation sentence for his original crime was necessary because the original offense had to “mean something.” Id. at 17. Holguin-Hernandez argues that this is unnecessary: the 60-month sentence he received for his second crime was a mandatory minimum, which the court could have used its discretion to set aside had he not been a repeat offender, and given him a sentence in a range of 30 to 37 months. Id. at 18. Because of his original crime he received a longer sentence already, rendering the additional 12 months added by the court unnecessary and unreasonable, which he says allows the court to overturn his sentence. Id.

The United States, while agreeing that the standard to apply is reasonableness as opposed to plain error, argues that the sentence he received should survive under a reasonableness review. Brief of Respondent at 32. It explains that Holguin-Hernandez committed a breach of trust while on supervised release which should be accounted for, and it did so by applying the lowest sentence in the range of sentences recommend by the Guidelines. Id. at 32–33. This, the United States argues, is a reasonable sentence given the circumstances, and the sentence should be affirmed. Id.

Amicus entirely rejects the assertion that Holguin-Hernandez is entitled to any standard of review other than the plain-error review that the Fifth Circuit has already applied. Brief of K. Winn Allen at 33–34. Even if the Court reviews under a more lenient reasonableness standard, Amicus argues, Holguin-Hernandez would still not be entitled to relief as his sentence was reasonable. Id. The Amicus explains that Holguin-Hernandez argued on appeal that his sentence was unreasonable because he posed no danger to the public, but he did not raise this argument in the trial court, and thus the appellate court reviewed his sentence only for plain error. Id. Therefore, the Amicus argues that the Fifth Circuit was correct to find no plain error here. Id. The Amicus also acknowledges that there was no need, from a deterrence standpoint, to add the additional 12 months to the already existing 60-month sentence, especially since Holguin-Hernandez understood that, given his status as a repeat offender, a third conviction could lead to life in prison. Id. at 35. Despite this concession, Amicus argues that it was not preserved for appeal and thus the plain error review was proper. Id. at 35–36. Even if Holguin-Hernandez had preserved the argument, Amicus argues, it still would have failed under a reasonableness review. Id. 35–36. Because the Fifth Circuit held that there was no “clear or obvious error” as the sentence was both within the Guidelines range and followed policy statements, this is enough, Amicus states, for the Fifth Circuit to also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion under a reasonableness standard. Id. at 35–37.