Shular v. United States

TEXT AND CONTEXT OF SECTION 924(e)

Petitioner Eddie Shular contends that the plain text, structure, and history of Section 924(e) of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) mandates courts to apply an offense-matching categorical approach. Brief for Petitioner, Eddie Lee Shular at 9. First, regarding the text of the serious drug offense provision, Shular focuses on the statute’s language of “involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance.” Id. at 9. Thus, Shular explains, the statute considers serious drug offenses in terms of four categories: (1) manufacturing, (2) distributing, (3) possessing with intent to manufacture, and (4) possessing with intent to distribute. Id. at 10. Shular contends that this language reflects state and federal controlled substances laws that were in use in 1986 when the ACCA’s “serious drug offenses” provision was enacted, such as the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) and the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (“UCSA”). Id. at 10–12. According to Shular, when the ACCA was enacted, the majority of states used the UCSA’s standard to create their own controlled substances offenses. Id. at 12. Shular continues that while many states no longer reflect the language of the CSA, UCSA, or ACCA, these state laws still analyze drug offenses in the language of the four categories, allowing them to continue to apply the categorical approach of matching the state law drug offense to the ACCA offenses. Id. at 13. Shular, however, asserts that the Court must also consider the “involving” language of the ACCA. Id. at 13–14. He explains that Congress’s use of the word “involving” demonstrates that courts should use a generic-offense matching analysis to determine whether the prior state offense qualifies as a serious drug offense under the ACCA. Id. at 14.

Shular also contends that Section 924(e)’s structure requires courts to apply a generic-offense matching categorical approach. Id. at 16. He points to the parallel definition of serious drug offense under the Federal-offenses clause of Section 924(e)(2)(A)(i) and the State-offenses clause in Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). Id. at 16. Finally, Shular argues that legislative history demonstrates Congress’s intent that courts use an offense-matching categorical approach for serious drug offenses under the ACCA. Brief for Petitioner at 19. According to Shular, when Congress added “serious drug offenses” to the ACCA in 1986, its intention was to expand the statute to include more predicate offenses. Id. He argues that this means that Congress meant for courts to consider serious drug offenses under the same analysis as violent felonies under the ACCA. Id. at 19–20. He also argues that legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended for both violent felonies and serious drug offenses under the ACCA to have a mens rea element. Id. at 20.

Respondent United States argues that Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) encompasses state crimes as “serious drug offense[s]” if the crime comprises one of the types of conduct included in the statute itself. Brief for Respondent, United States of America (“Respondent”) at 12–13. Respondent focuses on the “involve” language of the statute and argues that the term means to “include (something) as a necessary part or result.” Id. at 13. Respondent contends that, under the text of Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), a state crime involves one of the four “serious drug offense” categories—manufacturing, distributing, possessing with intent to manufacture, or possessing with intent to distribute—if the action was a necessary part or result of the offense. Id. The United States draws support from the Supreme Court case Kawashima v. Holder, which concerned the offense of an “aggravated felony” and defined it as one that “involves fraud or deceit in which the loss to the victim or victims exceeds $10,000.” Id. at 13–14. The United States asserts that the Court in that case determined that the “involves” language of the offense referred to offenses with “elements that necessarily entail” deceit or fraud. Id. at 14.

The United States also argues that the context of Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) demonstrates that Congress intended the statute to cover state crimes with elements that “necessarily entail” the four categories of a “serious drug offense.” Id. at 16. In analyzing the context of the statute, the United States compares the “involving” clause of Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) to the “enumerated-offenses clause” of Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Id. at 16–17. It points out that the “enumerated-offenses clause” includes language of an offense that “is burglary, arson, extortion, [or] involves use of explosives,” and argues that the “is” phrasing of that clause contrasts with the “involves” language of the “serious drug offense” clause. Id. at 17. The United States contends that the enumerated-offenses clause uses a generic-analogue approach, as it necessitates that courts compare the generic analogue offense to a defendant’s prior crimes. Id. at 18. The United States argues that Congress purposefully chose not to use the “is” language of the enumerated-offenses clause when enacting the “serious drug offenses” provision, and that while the “is” language requires that courts employ a generic-analogue approach, the “involving” language does not. Id. The United States reiterates that instead, the “involving” language requires that courts employ the “necessarily entails” analysis. Id. at 18.

MENS REA ELEMENT

Shular argues that the Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) offenses that qualify under state law must include a mens rea element. Brief for Petitioner at 21. Shular claims that by 1986, the federal government as well as a majority of the states required that the defendant had knowledge that the substance was an illicit controlled substance under the four categories of crimes: manufacturing, distributing, possessing with the intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance. Id. at 21–22. Shular argues that because of this overwhelming understanding that there be a mens rea requirement when the serious drug offense provision of the ACCA was enacted in 1986, there must also be a mens rea requirement under the categorical approach for a serious drug offense. Id. at 22. Under current Florida law, Shular argues that there is no mens rea element necessary for the sale of controlled substances; the only requisite elements are that the defendant sells a substance, and that the substance is an illicit drug. Id.

The United States counters that Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) has no such mens rea requirement. Brief for Respondent at 19. It argues that the Court should look to the Kawashima approach, which does not require that the elements of an offense exactly replicate a “generic” crime, but that they “involve” certain characteristics or actions. Id. at 20–21. The United States also argues that the Federal-offenses and State-offenses clauses in Section 924(e)(2)(A) are not parallel to each other, as the language of these clauses differs. Id. at 21–22. The United States points out that the language of the Federal-offenses clause defines “serious drug offense” as an offense “under” federal statutes, whereas the State-offenses clause defines “serious drug offense” as a crime under state law “involving” certain conduct. Id. The United States argues that because the clauses have different language, with the State-offenses clause including “involving” language, the clauses need not be interpreted parallel to each other. Id. at 22. Also, the United States argues that the “involving” language does not require a generic-offense matching analogue approach, because the Court’s prior use of the generic analogue approach for the enumerated-offenses clause was specific to that clause and has no bearing on the serious drug offenses provision. Id. at 23–24.

CONCERNS WITH POSSIBLE OUTCOMES

Shular contends that the Eleventh Circuit has bifurcated “serious drug offense” under Section 924(e)(2)(A) by excluding the mens rea of the illicit nature of substances, creating confusing results in controlled substances cases. Brief for Petitioner at 24. For example, Shular asserts that the Eleventh Circuit’s decision would cause behavior not normally considered a “serious drug offense,” to become such an offense according to Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) if it were under Florida law or an equivalent state law. Id. Shular also argues that the Eleventh Circuit has decided that state statutes on “trafficking” of controlled substances by virtue of possession is a “serious drug offense.” Id. at 24–25. Shular contends that this allows a state possession law, which does not require intent, to be analyzed as a “serious drug offense,” thereby conflicting with Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii)’s explicit intent language. Id. Additionally, Shular asserts that the statute’s “related to” language negates the statute’s limiting power. Id. at 25. Shular explains that giving courts the ability to determine whether a state drug offense is “related to” the four categories stretches the confines of the statute and ultimately renders it limitless. Id.

The United States counters that requiring courts to analyze Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) under a generic analogue approach would create difficulties for courts in practice and would result in a lack of uniformity in sentencing. Brief for Respondent at 29. The United States contends that applying a matching-generic analogue analysis to Section 924(e) would encourage defendants to argue that any state law that differs slightly from the generic federal offense would not be applicable under the ACCA. Id. at 30. Additionally, the United States invokes Kawashima to argue that interpreting Section 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) to incorporate that case’s “necessarily entails” test reduces the potential for laws to differ across states and result in different sentences for the same actions. Id. at 31. Therefore, the United States asserts that the Court should apply a generic analogue approach, thereby ensuring uniformity in sentencing and state laws. Id. at 29–31.