Fort Bend County, Texas v. Davis

THE “FAIRLY DISCERNIBLE” ANALYSIS

Fort Bend argues that the text, structure, and purpose of Title VII demonstrate Congress’s intent to confer courts with jurisdiction over only those Title VII claims that have first been presented to the EEOC. Fort Bend points to several Supreme Court decisions interpreting similar administrative review schemes, in which the Court developed a rule stating that administrative claims that have not first been presented to the relevant agency may not be heard by courts, as long as it is “‘fairly discernible that Congress intended’ to limit jurisdiction in this way.” According to Fort Bend, where the administrative review scheme is “integrated” and “comprehensive” as well as vests authority in a competent federal agency, and where allowing jurisdiction would be inconsistent with the overall aim of the relevant statute, it should be understood to be “fairly discernible” that Congress intended to limit jurisdiction.

Fort Bend further contends that Title VII clearly fulfills these criteria. Fort Bend claims that if the text and structure of a statute fully detail the statute’s administrative process, this constitutes strong evidence in favor of a finding that the administrative scheme is “integrated” and “comprehensive.” Here, Fort Bend asserts, the multi-step administrative procedure laid out in Tile VII is “painstaking[ly] detail[ed],” and is fully comprehensive in that every category of employee must present every claim they have through the statute’s review process. Fort Bend also argues that the EEOC’s competence and expertise make it specifically suited to hear and resolve Title VII claims. Fort Bend notes that Title VII claims are charges of workplace discrimination, and the EEOC’s singular purpose as a federal agency is to address workplace discrimination. Fort Bend next asserts that conferring courts with jurisdiction over claims that have not first been presented to the EEOC would contravene Congress’s purposes in enacting Title VII. Title VII, Fort Bend contends, was implemented by Congress in order to create a scheme of review that would avoid “simultaneous proceedings” and “inconsistent decision-making,” aims that would be subverted if claimants were allowed to bypass EEOC review and first present their claims in court. Finally, Fort Bend posits that although certain federal courts of appeals have determined that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement is non-jurisdictional, these courts rely on case law that addresses the status of Title VII’s timeliness requirement—rather than its exhaustion requirement. According to Fort Bend, the reasons for deeming Title VII’s timeliness requirement non-jurisdictional are not relevant to a determination of whether the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional.

Davis counters that where a procedural requirement has not been satisfied with respect to a claim, courts should only be deprived of jurisdiction over the claim if Congress “clearly states” that the requirement is jurisdictional. According to Davis, because Congress has not made any such clear statement that the administrative exhaustion requirement under Title VII is jurisdictional, jurisdiction should not be limited where that requirement has not been satisfied. Davis argues that the “fairly discernible” standard put forth by Fort Bend arises out of decisions addressing completely different issues from the case at hand. According to Davis, the precedent that Fort Bend relies upon articulates the “fairly discernible” standard as a test to determine which court should have jurisdiction over a type of claim, not which types of requirements are jurisdictional.

Davis further contends that even if a “fairly discernible” analysis is the standard that ought to apply, the text, structure, and purpose of Title VII fail to even suggest—let alone make “fairly discernible”—the proposition that Congress intended to limit jurisdiction over Title VII claims to claims that have first been presented to the EEOC. Davis asserts that the Court has frequently held that requirements laid out in the text of statutes are not jurisdictional when that text does not use jurisdictional terms or refer to the jurisdiction of courts. Here, Davis claims that the text of Title VII has not framed the exhaustion requirement in such terms; rather, it refers only to claimants’ procedural obligations. Nor does the structure of Title VII make “fairly discernable” the position that its exhaustion requirements are jurisdictional, according to Davis. Davis notes that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement is located in a separate section of the statute from the sections granting courts subject-matter jurisdiction over claims. Davis asserts that there are no links between those sections that would suggest that the grant of jurisdiction contained in the latter sections was intended to extend to the exhaustion requirement. Davis also argues that the statutory purpose arguments raised by Fort Bend are irrelevant here, as the Court has stated that a requirement should not be interpreted to be jurisdictional just because that reading would promote certain congressional objectives.

THE “CLEAR-STATEMENT” ANALYSIS

Fort Bend argues that the Court has never applied the “clear-statement” test advanced by Davis in assessing whether an administrative review scheme is jurisdictional, and that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement should thus be considered jurisdictional because it satisfies the “fairly discernible” standard. Fort Bend contends, however, that even if the “clear-statement” analysis is the proper test to apply, Title VII’s exhaustion requirement should still be considered jurisdictional. Fort Bend claims that in determining whether Congress has made a “clear statement” that a requirement is jurisdictional in nature, the Court generally undertakes a holistic analysis of the text and structure of the statute in question, as well as the context of the Court’s precedent regarding that statute.

The language of Title VII’s exhaustion requirement, Fort Bend asserts, bears important similarities to other exhaustion requirements that the Court has deemed jurisdictional, and the requirement is located in the same section of Title VII as the statute’s jurisdictional grant. Fort Bend further argues that the Court has held on numerous occasions that exhaustion requirements in general should be considered jurisdictional absent an explicit indication in the statute—an indication which is not present in the text of Title VII. According to Fort Bend these factors—taken together—amount to a “clear statement” in Title VII that the exhaustion requirement should be understood as a jurisdictional prerequisite.

Davis counters that the Court has consistently applied the “clear-statement” rule to resolve questions similar to the one presented here. Davis asserts that on two specific occasions, the Court has applied the “clear-statement” rule to determine that an exhaustion requirement was not jurisdictional, and notes that the decisions relied upon by Fort Bend significantly predate the Court’s adoption of the “clear-statement” rule. Davis states that to assess whether Congress has made a clear statement as to whether a certain statutory requirement is jurisdictional, courts must examine the statutory text, structure, and relevant precedent. Just as under a “fairly discernible” analysis, Davis contends, these factors do not even suggest—let alone give rise to a clear statement—that Title VII’s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional; rather, they reinforce the opposite conclusion.

Davis argues that when Congress intends a provision to impose a limit on jurisdiction, it does so—as is evident in similar statutes—by including explicit language in the provision about the authority of courts. Davis asserts that such language is conspicuously absent from any part of Title VII. Moreover, Davis claims that the Court has indicated that it will not lightly reach a determination that Congress intended to limit jurisdiction in some way. Davis posits that the Court imposes a high standard due to the consequences that a successful jurisdictional objection can have for a lawsuit, and the fact that jurisdictional rules represent a departure from the “normal functioning of our adversarial system.” Finally, Davis contends that the Court has consistently adhered to this position, through to the present day. According to Davis, the Court has applied the “clear-statement” test to hold that certain statutory requirements were non-jurisdictional where the relevant provisions were framed in even less “emphatic” jurisdictional terms than the terms contained in Title VII’s exhaustion requirement.