Mathena v. Malvo

THE SCOPE OF MILLER’S JUVENILE LIFE-IMPRISONMENT-WITHOUT-PAROLE HOLDING

Mathena argues that the Fourth Circuit wrongly interpreted Montgomery when it applied the Miller rule to Malvo’s case and declined to consider whether Virginia law mandated, rather than merely allowed, Malvo’s life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence. Although Mathena acknowledges that the Eighth Amendment prevents states from indiscriminately imposing certain kinds of sentences on juveniles—such as the death penalty or life imprisonment for non-homicide crimes—he disputes the claim that Miller sweeps so broadly as to invalidate discretionary juvenile life-imprisonment-without-parole sentences. Rather, Mathena contends that Miller is narrowly limited to prohibiting mandatory life-imprisonment-without-parole sentencing schemes for juvenile homicide offenders. Mathena bases his view on the text of Miller: he notes that the opinion “uses some version of the word ‘mandatory’ 48 times” and argues that any line that could be interpreted as stating the Court’s holding refers to mandatory life-imprisonment-without-parole sentences. Consequently, he contends that if Malvo’s life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence was discretionary under Virginia law rather than mandatory, the sentence must stand under Miller. Mathena therefore contends that the Supreme Court should send Malvo’s case back to the lower courts to determine whether Malvo’s sentence was mandatory or not.

Mathena further urges the Court to refrain from interpreting Montgomery as extending Miller to discretionary sentencing schemes because of the general principle that the Court does not unnecessarily resolve constitutional questions. As Mathena notes, both Miller and Montgomery involved juvenile homicide offenders whose life-imprisonment-without-parole sentences were mandatory. Therefore, according to Mathena, the Supreme Court should not read the rules from those cases to apply to discretionary sentences because such a reading would not be required as it would have no bearing on those cases’ outcomes.

Malvo, on the other hand, argues that Miller’s scope extends beyond mandatory life-imprisonment-without-parole sentencing schemes for juvenile homicide offenders because it requires courts to consider a juvenile’s youth before sentencing them. In support of this argument, Malvo relies on the Court’s line of reasoning in Miller, including the observation that because juveniles are immature, vulnerable to external pressures, and insecure in their identities, they are less morally blameworthy and more capable of rehabilitation than adults. Malvo further counters that Mathena overstates the Miller opinion’s reliance on the use of the word “mandatory” when referring to sentencing schemes by pointing to language in the opinion stating that sentencing judges are required to consider how children differ from adults and how those differences should caution courts against imposing life imprisonment without parole on juvenile offenders. Accordingly, Malvo contends that sentencing judges must give a juvenile offender’s youth actual consideration, and that the number of times the Court used the term “mandatory” is irrelevant. As such, Malvo maintains that the Fourth Circuit did not err in refusing to determine whether the sentencing scheme used to sentence him was mandatory or discretionary because, either way, the sentencing court failed to consider Malvo’s youth.

Malvo further contends that at the time of his sentencing, the Virginia Supreme Court did not yet hold that Virginia trial courts may suspend life-imprisonment-without-parole sentences for capital murder. Thus, Malvo asserts that no one involved in his criminal proceedings considered the possibility that he might receive less than a life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence, and as such, the sentencing judge did not weigh his youth before imposing a life sentence under Virginia law. Malvo clarifies, however, that had Virginia’s scheme been “discretionary” in the sense that the court could have suspended his sentence, his sentencing still would have run afoul of Miller due to the judge’s failure to weigh his youth.

MILLER’S BASIS IN PRECEDENT AND RETROACTIVITY UNDER MONTGOMERY

Mathena notes that two lines of cases informed the Court’s decision in Miller. The first line of cases—establishing that children are different than adults for purposes of sentencing—Mathena states, is less directly relevant than the second line, which hold that mandatory death sentences violate the Eight Amendment. Mathena further contends that, in relying on this second line of precedent, the Court premised Miller on the idea that mandatory and discretionary life-imprisonment-without-parole sentencing schemes are constitutionally different. Indeed, as Mathena points out, the Court in Miller went through the effort of specifically identifying jurisdictions that it thought imposed mandatory, and jurisdictions that it thought imposed discretionary, life-imprisonment-without-parole sentencing schemes on juveniles.

Mathena squares his reading of Miller with Montgomery’s ruling that Miller announced a substantive rule applicable retroactively to cases on collateral review by arguing that a rule prohibiting mandatory life sentencing is substantive. Mathena conceives of a substantive rule as one that involves preventing a significant risk that a juvenile will face an unconstitutionally excessive punishment. Under Mathena’s definition of a substantive rule, he argues, the Miller rule is substantive, and Montgomery was rightly decided, because mandatory sentencing schemes necessarily involve a significant risk of an excessive punishment, whereas discretionary sentencing schemes do not.

Mathena further argues that, based on his reading of Miller, Malvo is not entitled to relief on the basis of Miller and can only argue that Montgomery itself created a new substantive rule applicable to Malvo’s case. However, Mathena points out, Malvo did not seek habeas relief based on any rule announced in Montgomery and would now be time-barred from doing so. Under federal law, Mathena states, Malvo would have had to amend his habeas petition within one year of the Court’s ruling in Montgomery to seek a claim based on that opinion. Because Malvo did not so, according to Mathena, Malvo cannot now gain relief on the basis of any new rule—if there was one—announced in Montgomery.

Malvo counters that Mathena’s characterization of Miller’s second line of precedent is too narrow and argues that the Court’s death-penalty precedents do not solely limit themselves to mandatory sentences, but rather stand for the broad principle that sentencing judges must be able to consider all mitigating circumstances before imposing the death penalty. Malvo further argues that the Miller Court’s first line of precedent distinguishing juveniles from adults—which Mathena gives little consideration to—undermines Mathena’s insistence on a limited rule against mandatory sentencing. This line of precedent, Malvo argues, is rested on the principle that juveniles have diminished moral culpability, and therefore supports an interpretation of Miller that requires sentencing judges to take a juvenile homicide offender’s diminished culpability into account. Nonetheless, even under Mathena’s construction of the precedent, Malvo notes that the Miller Court specifically identified Virginia as one of the jurisdictions that mandated life imprisonment without parole for juvenile homicide offenders.

Malvo also argues that a rule is substantive if it prevents sentencing judges from imposing certain kinds of punishment. Conversely, Malvo asserts, a rule is procedural if it merely alters the methods that sentencing judges may use to allocate punishment. Operating under these conceptions of substantive and procedural rules, Malvo contends that the distinction between mandatory and discretionary sentencing schemes is procedural, rather than substantive. As Malvo explains, the only difference between a mandatory life-imprisonment-without-parole sentence and a discretionary one is the method by which the sentencing judge arrives at that same punishment. In both scenarios, Malvo states, the sentence is constrained by the same substantive rule—namely, that it cannot be imposed on juveniles without consideration of their youth. Thus, Malvo contends, if Miller did only apply to mandatory sentencing schemes, “Montgomery would have come out the other way” because such a rule only effects the method in which a sentencing judge arrives at their conclusion. Based on his reading that Miller’s substantive rule also covers both mandatory and discretionary sentencing schemes by requiring that sentencing judges take into account juveniles’ youth, Malvo argues that Montgomery simply decided the retroactivity of Miller. As such, Malvo maintains that he is entitled to habeas relief to be resentenced in accordance with Miller.