Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corp. v. Wall-Street.com, LLC

TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)

Fourth Estate argues that, under the text of the Copyright Act (the “Act”), registration is made when a copyright owner submits his registration deposit, application, and fee. Accordingly, registration does not depend on the actions of the Copyright Office and the Register. In support of its position, Fourth Estate emphasizes that statutory interpretation typically requires giving identical phrases within the same statute the same meaning. The phrases used within § 411, Fourth Estate notes, make the copyright owner the relevant actor. For example, Fourth Estate asserts, a copyright owner’s right to sue for infringement depends upon his own compliance with registration procedures. Fourth Estate additionally points to phrases within § 412, which provides copyright owners with remedies if their claim is registered within a three-month deadline. This provision, Fourth Estate maintains, most logically requires copyright owners to make registration because the Copyright Office often takes longer than three months to act. Similarly, Fourth Estate argues, § 408 of the Act states that a renewal registration may be made when an application and fee are filed, and that copyright owners may obtain registration by delivering a deposit, application, and fee to the Copyright Office.

Fourth Estate does admit that, in § 708(a), the phrase “registration is made” refers to the Copyright Office’s action. However, it contends that this single usage provides no guidance for interpretation of the rest of the statute because it was not included in the Act’s original language and was added six years after § 411’s enactment. Further, Fourth Estate recognizes that there are other parts of the Act that use the word “registration” to refer to the Copyright Office’s action. Fourth Estate contends that the mere fact that the Copyright Office sometimes “registers” does not preclude copyright holders from “registering” in other contexts, like § 411(a).

Additionally, Fourth Estate argues that because § 411 provides that a copyright owner may still bring an infringement action even if the Register refuses to register the claim, it follows that “making registration” does not depend upon the Register’s action. Fourth Estate asserts that the Register’s refusal to register a copyright does not mean that registration has not been made; rather, refusal imposes an additional procedural requirement (serving notice on the Register) on these copyright owners who wish to initiate an action.

Wall-Street agrees with Fourth Estate that a textual analysis is appropriate to determine § 411’s meaning—but counters that Fourth Estate ignores critical parts of the statute’s language. To begin, Wall-Street contends that the ordinary meaning of the word “registration” connotes official governmental action, indicating that the statute requires the Register to approve and record a copyright holder’s claim in an official register. Under Wall-Street’s view, the copyright owner’s preceding submission of his deposit, application, and fee are merely earlier steps in the overarching registration process.

Wall-Street also contends that, even though § 411 allows copyright owners to bring infringement actions when the Register refused to register the claim, registration is not made by the copyright owner’s actions. Instead, Wall-Street asserts, the statute provides an exception that allows copyright owners to pursue an infringement suit although registration was not made. Wall-Street further argues that if registration is synonymous with delivering a deposit, application, and fee, this exception would make little sense. Moreover, Fourth Estate’s interpretation, Wall-Street contends, would lead § 411 to dictate that in any case where the Copyright Office denies a copyright application, the copyright holder is entitled to institute an infringement action by providing notice. But, Wall-Street holds, registration cannot be both made and refused, and it further cannot be refused after it has been made.

Wall-Street argues that a better interpretation of § 411 is that a copyright holder cannot initiate suit until the Register has “made” or “refused” registration. Wall-Street contends that this understanding of § 411 is consistent with other provisions of the Copyright Act. For example, the statute contains a registration date relation-back provision and a preregistration remedy system; Wall-Street argues both are only given practical effect if registration is understood to require action by the Register. Additionally, Wall-Street notes that in other provisions of the Act, Congress textually distinguishes between applying for registration and registration itself; Wall-Street contends that this demonstrates Congress’s deliberate decision to not have § 411 apply to copyright holders’ actions. Wall-Street further argues that Fourth Estate’s references to statutes that purportedly exclusively require the copyright owner’s actions for registration fail to address the “plain text of those provisions.” Wall-Street maintains that the Copyright Act’s text plainly makes registration dependent upon the action of the Register.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF 17 U.S.C. § 411(a)

Fourth Estate contends that, in light of the 1909 Copyright Act, the current statute makes registration dependent upon the action of the copyright owner. Fourth Estate maintains that the 1909 Act produced conflicting interpretations about which party’s actions determined registration because it barred a civil action until there was both a “deposit of copies and registration of such work”—suggesting that actions must be taken by both the copyright holder and the Register. But Fourth Estate argues that Congress squarely rejected this inference when it eliminated the separate reference to a “deposit” in the current Act, confirming that registration only requires action by the copyright owner. This is also consistent, Fourth Estate argues, with the goal of ensuring that copyright owners do not encounter long delays when pursuing copyright infringement suits. Fourth Estate posits that it would make little sense for the statute to mean that, where the Register denied a copyright owner’s application, the owner would need to then pursue an independent action to compel registration before its infringement proceeding—a process that would not only be expensive, but would also further aggravate the copyright holder’s injury.

In contrast, Wall-Street argues that Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 to ensure that a copyright holder cannot bring an infringement suit before the Register takes action. Prior to the Act, Wall-Street maintains, a copyright owner’s only recourse when the Register refused to register his claim was to bring a mandamus action against the Register, and then sue for infringement. Wall-Street argues that Congress enacted § 411 to clarify that an infringement suit necessitates prior action by the Register. Further, Wall-Street contends that if the Register refused a proper application, then the copyright owner need only serve notice on the Register in order to initiate an infringement suit. The Register’s decision, Wall-Street maintains, is critical in screening out unfounded claims and, when registration has been refused, providing the court with information that will help it establish key facts and apply the law in the infringement suit. Wall-Street states that § 411 demonstrates that Congress settled the debate by requiring registration, not mere application, prior to suit.

RIGHTS AND REMEDIES UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT

Fourth Estate contends that the rights and remedies provided by the Copyright Act favor finding that copyright owners’ ability to proceed with their lawsuits depends only upon the owners’ compliance with the statute’s requirements. Under the Act, Fourth Estate argues, a copyright owner’s rights dependent solely upon his own actions; for example, a copyright is created as soon as a work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, without any grant by the Copyright Office. Fourth Estate notes that since the Act explicitly provides that registration is not a condition to copyright protection, the logical reading of § 411 is that the requirement of “making registration” is merely a procedural burden—a requirement that can always be satisfied. Additionally, Fourth Estate argues that making copyright holders’ right to seek injunctive relief dependent upon action by the Copyright Office would create perverse results: intellectual property thieves would be able to infringe copyright owners’ rights for extended periods of time, and copyright owners may be precluded from enforcing their rights if the Copyright Office fails to process the registrations before the Act’s statute of limitations lapses.

Wall-Street counters that the Act’s remedies support its position that registration requires action by the Register. It contends that the Act provides a “narrow but powerful exception” to the prerequisite of registration that allows a claimant to pursue an injunction without first obtaining registration as long as he does so within three months of transmission. Wall-Street suggests that even though the Copyright Office is often delayed in processing its decisions, this lag was not anticipated by Congress when it first enacted the Act. Wall-Street also argues that Fourth Estate’s argument improperly hinges upon the Copyright Office’s typical delays in processing claims: interpretation of § 411 cannot be based on legislative concerns like congressional funding. Further, Wall-Street maintains that copyright owners who diligently seek registration can enjoy substantial protection of their rights. In support of this position, Wall-Street notes that even without registration, the Act provides copyright owners with several avenues to protect their property rights from harm, such as injunctions and “special handling” procedures.