Air and Liquid System Corp. v. Devries

FOR WHOSE CONDUCT IS A MANUFACTURER LIABLE?

The Manufacturers argue that a supplier cannot be held liable for injuries caused by third-party products, including replacement parts, that were used with the supplier’s own products.   In advocating for this “bare-metal rule,” the Manufacturers claim that imposing liability here would undermine a core principle of tort law—namely, that a defendant cannot be liable for failing to warn the public about the negligent conduct of third parties.  The Manufacturers thus reason that they have no duty to warn of asbestos-related dangers of third-party products because the Manufacturers are outside of those products’ “chain of distribution.”  In other words, the Manufacturers stress, they did not make, sell, or distribute the injury-causing components. Although the Manufacturers acknowledge that supplying the product forms “one link in the causal chain leading to injury,” the Manufacturers argue that such a connection is too remote to be considered a proximate cause.  

This absence of duty and proximate cause, the Manufacturers maintain, prevents a defendant from being held liable even where it is reasonably foreseeable that the defendant’s products will be used in conjunction with another product that causes injury.   The Manufacturers thus state that a duty of care cannot arise out of “foreseeability alone.” While acknowledging that some courts have nevertheless used foreseeability-based tests to impose liability, the Manufacturers contend that courts often define “foreseeability” vaguely enough to create pervasive uncertainty in this area of the law.

In response, Devries argues that the Manufactures define “product” too narrowly. According to Devries, a machine product is the “integrated package” of the machine, rather than its individual component parts. Devries claims that because the Manufacturers sold asbestos-containing components with their original equipment, the Manufacturers’ products include those asbestos-containing components. Furthermore, Devries states, the later introduction of an asbestos-containing replacement component does not change the “identity” of the product. This view makes sense, Devries contends, because the Manufacturers’ products required these asbestos-containing components in order to function.Furthermore, Devries argues, disassembling an integrated product into its component parts would frustrate the law’s preference for simplicity. Devries therefore claims that the Manufacturers should be subject to a duty of reasonable care.

Devries also questions the Manufacturers’ claim that their products lack a causal connection to the asbestos injuries. Devries contends that installing a replacement asbestos-containing part does not amount to an intervening cause that would absolve the Manufacturers of liability. Instead, according to Devries, it is an event which the Manufacturers should have reasonably foreseen, especially given that their maintenance manuals called for the regular replacement of asbestos-containing components. Thus, Devries argues, the Manufacturer’s products were defective from the start, and the act of replacing the asbestos-containing component parts did not alter the “dangerous condition” of the original product.

WHO HAS A DUTY TO WARN?

The Manufacturers contend that holding a manufacturer liable for a non-defective product would be inefficient. The Manufacturers argue instead that third parties are better-positioned to provide warnings about asbestos-related dangers, because the third parties can better ensure that a product’s end users receive the warning. Furthermore, the Manufacturers claim, third parties can more easily test their products for defects and repair those defects once discovered. Imposing liability on a defendant who has no control over the defective product, the Manufacturers conclude, would increase consumer costs without actually improving product safety. Additionally, the Manufactures caution that imposing a duty to warn here would result in “overwarning,” meaning that warnings would become so lengthy that users would decide not to read them. Finally, the Manufacturers point out that the Navy required the Manufacturers to use asbestos-containing components.

Devries questions the assertion that the Manufacturers had no control over the third-party products. Accordingly, Devries argues, the Manufacturers were in a better position than the replacement-part suppliers to warn of asbestos-related dangers. Devries also suggests that holding manufacturers liable in this context would improve product safety. Absent exposure to liability, Devries contends, manufacturers whose machines require asbestos-containing replacement parts have no incentive to develop alternative, asbestos-free components. Devries argues that exposing such manufacturers to liability is also appropriate because the manufacturers rely on the availability of asbestos-containing replacement parts in order to sell their equipment, and therefore indirectly profit off of those parts. Devries therefore concludes that the Manufacturers were negligent in failing to warn of the foreseeable dangers of asbestos.

WHICH APPROACH ALIGNS WITH PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME LAW?

The Manufacturers argue that adoption of the bare-metal rule is consistent with principles of maritime law.  Maritime law, the Manufacturers contend, affords manufacturers greater protection than traditional tort law does.  By way of example, the Manufacturers focus on the “economic loss rule,” which holds that commercial manufacturers have no duty “to prevent a product from injuring itself.” The economic loss rule—like the bare-metal rule—thus limits the scope of manufacturer liability. The Manufacturers also claim that the bare-metal rule’s predictability comports with maritime law principles of simplicity and uniformity. These principles would be frustrated if liability depended on whether the injury was foreseeable, the Manufacturers argue, because “foreseeability” cannot be clearly defined. Furthermore, the Manufacturers claim, because “most things” on ships are connected with each other, every asbestos-related injury is arguably foreseeable to anyone whose products end up in ships. Finally, the Manufacturers stress that the bare-metal rule is not unfair to sailors, since sailors could still sue the companies who produce the asbestos-containing components and bring claims against “asbestos trusts.”

Devries disagrees, arguing that the bare-metal rule comports with established principles of maritime law. Such an inflexible rule, Devries contends, conflicts with maritime law’s preference for providing a remedy in borderline cases. Devries also claims that shielding manufacturers from liability is inconsistent with maritime law. According to Devries, ship owners who defend against asbestos-related product liability claims routinely implead manufacturers. Adoption of the bare-metal rule would prevent these indemnification claims, which, Devries suggests, are necessary to apportion liability fairly. Devries also maintains that a foreseeability standard would not be overly vague or too difficult to apply. Devries argues that whether a manufacturer should foresee that its product will be used with asbestos components is a straightforward question, which, if answered yes, imposes a duty to warn on the manufacturer. Indeed, Devries claims, “general maritime law” has adopted a foreseeability standard. Devries also states that abandoning the foreseeability standard in maritime law would leave sailors with fewer remedies than similarly situated non-maritime workers, and would thus contradict maritime law’s goal of protecting sailors’ welfare.