Rosales-Mireles V. United States

SHOULD A GUIDELINES MISCALCULATION SATISFY THE FOURTH PRONG OF THE PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW STANDARD IN MOST CASES?

Rosales-Mireles argues that sentencing a defendant under an incorrect Guidelines range, as in this case, normally satisfies the fourth prong of the plain-error review standard as explained in Molina-Martinez. Rosales-Mireles asserts that though the plain-error standard gives courts of appeals discretion to decide whether to correct plain errors, some errors always seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings and should be corrected in most cases. A sentence based on an erroneous Guidelines range, Rosales-Mireles contends, is one such error. Rosales-Mireles bases this contention on the fact that the sentencing Guidelines are central to judicial proceedings and, thus, leaving sentencing errors in place would, in most cases, undermine the integrity of the entire system. Rosales-Mireles argues that Congress’s mandate in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) – that a court of appeals should remand cases for further sentencing proceedings when it determines that the sentence resulted from an incorrect use of the sentencing Guidelines – shows that Congress agrees with this contention. In addition, Rosales-Mireles argues that other courts of appeals are in virtually unanimous agreement that a Guidelines calculation error satisfies the fourth prong, and that this view is extended to situations where the error resulted in a range that was also within the correct Guidelines calculation.

In response, the Government asserts that a forfeited Guidelines calculation error does not, and should not, generally satisfy the fourth prong of plain-error review. The Government argues that interpreting the fourth prong of the plain-error review standard to mandate this would completely change the usual plain-error review process by eliminating any incentive to make timely objections and eliminating any consequences of failing to do so. The Government contends that the contemporaneous objection rule of Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that certain rights may be forfeited if a timely objection is not made, works with the plain-error rule to encourage litigants to pursue initial fair trials while allowing for correction of some overlooked injustices. Because of the balance struck by the two rules, the Government contends that the plain-error review standard’s fourth prong is, and should be, difficult to satisfy. Though the Supreme Court has not articulated any exact rules for when this prong should be deemed satisfied, the Government identifies guideposts that have been recognized by the Supreme Court. These guideposts include: 1) the fourth prong must be applied on a case-by-case, fact-by-fact basis; 2) the fourth prong is an independent barrier to relief and that a defendant must thus prove not only that his substantial rights were affected, but also that there was a harm to the system as a whole; 3) even though such a harm to the system may be proved, some policy interests do not warrant reversal, and, thus, the fourth prong must only be satisfied in exceptional cases; and 4) that a court of appeals’ decision about the fourth prong should be guided by the policies underlying the plain-error and contemporaneous objection rules.

WOULD A PRESUMPTION OF REMAND FOR GUIDELINES MISCALCULATIONS TAKE AWAY COURTS’ DISCRETION UNDER PLAIN-ERROR REVIEW?

Rosales-Mireles asserts that correcting Guidelines errors in most cases still allows courts to consider countervailing factors, and thus would not remove courts’ plain-error discretion. Rosales-Mireles first argues that Molina-Martinez’s directive that courts of appeals “should” exercise discretion if the fourth prong is satisfied demonstrates that the Supreme Court intended remand to be granted in most cases. In addition, Rosales-Mireles contends that court of appeals’ discretion is a discretion to decline remand only when case- and fact-specific countervailing factors weigh against it. Rosales-Mireles notes that examples of countervailing factors which would merit denial of relief for a Guidelines miscalculation include 1) when a defendant waived his right to appeal in a plea agreement and the sentence imposed does not unreasonably exceed the correct guideline range; 2) when a defendant’s sentence is already completed; and 3) when the defendant has a concurrently running sentence.

Rosales-Mireles further argues that the Fifth Circuit’s “shocks the conscience” standard ensures that courts will never exercise the discretion granted by the fourth prong. He asserts that “shocks the conscience” is a substantive due process standard that was meant to allow for very narrow scrutiny of government actions. The standard, Rosales-Mireles argues, was meant to help identify government actions deliberately depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. Because the “shocks the conscience” standard is targeted at deliberate conduct, Rosales-Mireles asserts that it is unsuited for plain-error review, which is meant to remedy inadvertent mistakes in the judicial process. Rosales-Mireles argues that the Fifth Circuit’s standard thus effectively nullifies the Supreme Court’s holding in Molina-Martinez that a defendant can ordinarily show prejudice simply by demonstrating that he received a sentence under an incorrect sentencing scheme.

The Government responds that there is no basis for Rosales-Mireles’s contention that Guidelines errors should be corrected in most cases and that creating a presumption of remand for Guidelines errors would effectively eliminate courts’ discretion under the fourth prong. The Government asserts that, though Molina-Martinez determined that Guidelines miscalculations usually satisfy the third prong of plain-error review, it also stated that satisfying the first three prongs is sufficient to get relief, but that courts of appeals maintain ultimate discretion under the fourth prong to determine whether to correct the error. This discretion, the Government argues, centers on whether the Guidelines error prejudiced, not the defendant, but the administration of justice as a whole. In making this determination, the Government contends that courts may consider 1) whether, despite the error, the sentence reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion; 2) the severity of the error in light of the sentencing as a whole; and 3) whether the defendant was given proper procedural protections to ensure the sentencing proceeding was fair. In addition, the Government contends that Rosales-Mireles’s examples of countervailing factors are all situations in which plain-error review would not be used fully, if at all, and that the argument is a pretense for ensuring that errors are corrected regardless of case-specifics.

Further, the Government agrees with Rosales-Mireles’s contention that the Fifth Circuit’s “shocks the conscience” standard is an inaccurate elaboration on the fourth plain-error prong. The Government concedes that this standard is usually meant to target intentionally injurious conduct and that it is an inappropriate and impossible standard for correcting inadvertent errors under plain-error review. Yet, the Government contends that the Fifth Circuit’s decision to affirm Rosales-Mireles’s sentence was proper under the appropriate fourth plain-error-prong analysis. To support this argument, the Government asserts that 1) the sentence reflects a reasonable exercise of discretion because the nature and circumstances of Rosales-Mireles’s offense and history were serious; 2) the error was not severe in light of the sentencing as a whole because the sentence was selected based on consideration of many sentencing factors; and 3) proper procedural protections ensured a fair proceeding because Rosales-Mireles was given many weeks to review the PSR and had further opportunity to raise concerns at the sentencing hearing.