McWilliams v. Dunn

DOES DUE PROCESS REQUIRE AN INDEPENDENT MENTAL HEALTH EXPERT?

McWilliams argues that an indigent defendant whose mental health is a significant issue at trial is entitled to a partisan mental health expert to assist with the defense’s case. McWilliams maintains that the Court in Ake v. Oklahoma held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an indigent defendant a competent expert to “assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense.” McWilliams contends that assistance includes, but is not limited to, fact gathering through professional examination and interviews, analyzing gathered information to draw plausible conclusions about the defendant’s mental state, and assisting with cross-examination of the state’s psychiatric witnesses. McWilliams notes that the right established in Ake follows from the right to counsel recognized in Gideon v. Wainwright and ensures every defendant has an opportunity to present a defense fairly within the adversary system. McWilliams further argues that Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Ake confirms that Ake clearly established the right to an independent expert because he disagreed with the Court’s holding that due process requires appointment of an expert who assists in “evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense,” arguing instead that a defendant is entitled only to a competent expert. McWilliams contends that Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals failed to apply this law by only availing McWilliams of the assistance of a mental health expert that he shared with the prosecution.

Jefferson Dunn, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections, (hereinafter “Alabama”), disputes that there was federal law on point at the time of the state court’s decision that clearly established a defendant’s right to a partisan mental health expert. Alabama asserts that due process, as determined in Ake, does not entitle an indigent defendant to a partisan state-funded psychiatrist; rather, due process requires only that a defendant have access to a competent and impartial psychiatrist. Alabama notes that while the Court in Ake recognized the “evolving practice” of parties employing their own experts, the decision does not require the practice as a matter of constitutional law. Alabama conveys that because due process is a flexible rule about fairness, its requirements vary based on the facts of the case. Alabama argues that providing a neutral, court-appointed psychiatrist is just as fair as allowing each party to hire a separate partisan expert. Furthermore, Alabama distinguishes Ake from the facts before the Court because in Ake the defendant was not provided with any form of psychiatric assistance. Thus, Alabama argues, Ake does not clearly establish the right to a partisan defense expert, particularly considering that the question of partisan versus neutral psychiatric assistance was not raised in Ake.

Alabama contends that, at most, Ake permits a defendant to use a partisan psychiatrist when the prosecution is doing so. Furthermore, Alabama disputes the claim that a mental health expert can never be independent when it is shared with the prosecution. Alabama notes that in the case before the Court, none of the experts were selected or hired by the prosecution, and that they evaluated McWilliams solely based on defense counsel’s request.

WHAT CONSTITUTES “CLEARLY ESTABLISHED LAW”?

McWilliams contends that Ake’s requirement of an independent expert constitutes clearly established law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). According to Lockyer v. Andrade, “‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” McWilliams argues that the Court’s holding in Ake clearly sets forth the right to an independent mental health expert. Thus, McWilliams argues the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals decision was contrary to the clearly established law set forth in Ake.

Alabama contends McWilliams errs by asking the Court to extend the rule of Ake to an issue that Ake did not directly address. Alabama notes that “clearly established” law constitutes holdings, as opposed to the dicta, at the time of the relevant state-court decision. When there is no precedent directly on point, Alabama notes, a state court cannot misapply clearly established law. Alabama argues that Ake’s holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to psychiatric assistance is too broad to clearly establish McWilliams’ assertion that an indigent defendant is entitled to partisan psychiatric assistance. Thus, because Ake fails to establish a right to a partisan expert, Alabama claims that there is no violation of clearly established law.

WAS THE ERROR HARMLESS?

McWilliams argues that the Court should remand to the Eleventh Circuit to determine whether the trial court’s failure to provide him with a partisan expert had a “substantial and injurious effect” on the outcome of his case. McWilliams rejects the Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion that there was a “mountain of evidence” that damaged his mental illness claim. Rather, McWilliams contends that defense counsel had inadequate time and expertise to understand the report, which prevented them from calling Dr. Goff as a witness. Furthermore, McWilliams claims that Dr. Goff’s late arrival to the proceedings prevented him from offering meaningful assistance as required by Ake. McWilliams argues that meaningful independent expert assistance would have enabled counsel to educate the judge about McWilliams’s brain damage and challenge the suggestion that McWilliams was faking his mental illness. In addition, McWilliams claims that with expert assistance, defense counsel could have demonstrated that Dr. Goff would have understood McWilliams’s “faking” as well as explained the impact of his heavy medication regimen. Because some appellate courts have found such circumstances to be compelling mitigating factors, McWilliams argues that the absence of a partisan expert was not harmless error.

Alabama argues that the court of appeals was correct to hold that even if a due process violation took place, it would have been a harmless error. Alabama contends that because this was a very aggravated case, a mitigating factor such as McWilliams’s mental health would not have affected the result. In particular, Alabama cites McWilliams’s prior convictions for robbery and rape, as well as the heinous nature of the murder. Alabama also remarks that four mental health experts found that McWilliams was not suffering from psychological problems. Further, Alabama notes that the trial court granted every defense motion on the issue, except the motion to delay the sentencing hearing to seek another round of expert assistance, and that the trial court admitted it would have considered another motion to appoint a new expert if McWilliams had simply asked for one. Lastly, Alabama contends that providing defense counsel with more time for Dr. Goff’s report would not have led to a different outcome because the report was five pages in length, and McWilliams failed to request another round of expert assistance until after the jury had voted to impose the death penalty.