Williams v. Pennsylvania

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide if a state appellate court judge’s refusal to recuse himself from a capital case violates that defendant’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights where he had approved the decision to pursue capital punishment against the defendant in his prior capacity as a prosecutor. See Brief for Petitioner, at 20. Additionally, the Supreme Court will determine whether the participation of a potentially biased judge on a multimember panel of judges deciding a capital case violates that defendant’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Brief for Petitioner, at 35-36. Williams argues that the appellate judge in this case, Justice Castille, is essentially acting as a judge in his own case by refusing to recuse himself, which violates his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 19. Further, Williams contends that a potentially biased justice on multimember panel taints that panel’s final decision, even if that biased justice’s vote was not decisive to the outcome. See id. at 19, 42. Pennsylvania argues that there is no constitutional obligation to disqualify a judge from ruling on case that he previously worked on in a professional capacity. See Brief for Respondent at 19. Pennsylvania responds to Williams’ argument that a potentially biased justice sitting as part of a panel presumptively contaminates the entire panel, by arguing that the constitution requires a probability of bias before the entire panel’s decision can invalidated as set forth in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009). See id.

WHAT TEST APPLIES TO ISSUES OF RECUSAL, AND SHOULD JUSTICE CASTILLE RECUSE HIMSELF?

Williams argues that due process requires an objective inquiry into a judge’s bias. See Brief for Petitioner at 20. To find bias in this case, Williams contends that the Court should consider whether “the average judge” in Justice Castille’s position would likely be impartial, and not the justice’s true feelings. See id. at 21. Williams notes that the Eighth Amendment has traditionally required stronger due process protections in capital cases. See id. at 20. To that end, Williams argues that an objective inquiry is better than a subjective one, because it is inherently challenging to find actual bias when judges convene privately. See id. at 21.

Williams next looks to the Court’s precedent. In some cases, the Court found recusal necessary when judges had a financial interest in the case or an interest in receiving campaign contributions, or when a justice was a plaintiff in a very similar lower court case. See Brief for Petitioner at 22. Williams suggests that the judges in these situations are even less in need of recusal than Justice Castillo. Justice Castillo must rule on whether his subordinates committed prosecutorial misconduct when he was the district attorney, which means he has a personal interest in the ruling. See id.

Pennsylvania contends that the Constitution requires a finding of actual bias, and the facts supporting bias must be strong. See Brief for Respondent at 20. Pennsylvania suggests there are several mitigating factors in this case that indicate Justice Castille’s involvement with Williams’ capital case do not warrant a finding of actual bias. See id. For example, twenty-nine years passed between prosecution and Justice Castille’s refusal to recuse. See id. at 20–21. Pennsylvania contends that even if the Court presumes the existence of bias, the presumption must have a “half-life,” and dissipate over time. See id. at 25. Otherwise, the presumption would require the justice to recuse himself from all of the District Attorney Office’s cases, because he supervised the entire office. See id. at 27-28. Instead, Pennsylvania contends the question should be whether there is any bias currently affecting Justice Castille, thirty years after his involvement in the prosecution. See id. at 22.

Pennsylvania argues that recusal must be based in ethics or statute, not the constitution. See Brief for Respondent at 41. Pennsylvania asserts that the Supreme Court has clearly held that at the time the Constitution was ratified, the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause incorporated the common law regarding judicial recusal. See id. Pennsylvania then argues that the only common law incorporated into the due process clause regarding judicial recusal was recusal in cases where a judge had a direct financial interest, which is absent in this case. See id.

WAS THE RECUSAL ERROR HARMLESS?

Williams argues that allowing a biased justice to sit on a panel of justices violates his right to an impartial tribunal. He claims this is what the Court calls “a structural error”—an error that cannot be cured by harmless-error analysis. See Brief for Petitioner at 37. In harmless error analysis, appeals courts can affirm judgments, despite actual or potential errors, because the errors did not affect defendants’ rights. Williams contends that allowing a biased judge to sit on a tribunal satisfies both attributes of structural errors: (1) those that threaten the integrity of the “entire adjudicatory framework,” and (2) those for which the consequences are “necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate.” See id. at 37–38 (internal quotations omitted). Williams argues that the “collegial” and private nature of the judicial decision making process make it possible for one biased justice to taint a decision, but at the same time makes it difficult to determine the consequences of the bias. See id.

Williams notes that Justice Castille not only participated in the tribunal, but presided over it. See Brief for Petitioner at 39. Furthermore, Williams argues that when an appellate court hands down a decision, the power behind the decision is institutional, as opposed to personal. The court, and not an individual judge, issues the decision. See id. at 40. Accordingly, Williams concludes that any bias that threatens one judge’s integrity affects the integrity of the institutional court. See id.

Pennsylvania disputes Williams’ characterization of what constitutes structural error. See Brief for Respondent at 58. Pennsylvania cites the Court’s decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), for the proposition that the Court should not look to just one judge’s potential bias. Rather, the Court should examine whether the panel as a whole was biased. See id. at 58-59. Pennsylvania raises the possibility that the other justices sitting with Justice Castille would actively argue against the bias that supposedly tainted their decision. See id. at 59. Pennsylvania explains that because each justice considers the issues and exercises her own judgment, it is reasonable to believe the unbiased judges would temper biased viewpoints. See id.

For two reasons, Pennsylvania contends that Williams has already received the relief he requests: consideration of his case without the participation of Justice Castille. See id. at 48-49. First, Pennsylvania points out that when Williams had his re-argument hearing, it was more than a month after Justice Castille retired, so Williams had access to a panel free from any potentially biased justices to hear his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. See id. at 49. Second, Pennsylvania points to the state’s moratorium on capital sentences. See id. at 52.