Shapiro v. McManus

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a single-judge district court may dismiss a claim, otherwise covered by the Three-Judges Court Act, on its merits. Shapiro argues that the Act imposes a jurisdictional requirement, therefore limiting a single judge from dismissing such claims for reasons other than lack of jurisdiction or insubstantiality. See Brief for Petitioners, Stephen M. Shapiro et al. at 19. Additionally, Shapiro argues that Duckworth incorrectly read the Act, and that such reading contravenes congressional intent. See Id. at 29–30. On the other hand, McManus argues that the Act does not impose a jurisdictional requirement, thus allowing a single judge to dismiss such a claim on its merits. See Brief for Respondents, David McManus, Jr. et al. at 15–16. Additionally, McManus argues that Duckworth best exemplifies the Act’s congressional intent. See Id. at 25.

DOES THE THREE-JUDGE COURT ACT IMPOSE A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT?

Shapiro contends that the Three-Judge Court Act requires convening a three-judge panel whenever a party files an action “challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts.” See Brief for Petitioners, Stephen M. Shapiro et al. at 17. Shapiro argues that the text of the statute permits a single judge to dismiss a claim otherwise applicable under the Three-Judge Court Act only for lack of jurisdiction or justiciability in the federal courts. See id. at 18–19. Shapiro contends that the Court has previously held that district courts lack jurisdiction for federal claims considered to be insubstantial. See id. at 19. Shapiro states that, according to Court precedent, an insubstantial claim is one that is frivolous, with no room for controversy or dispute. See id. at 20. Shapiro argues that if the single judge determines that the claim is not wholly insubstantial, then that judge must refer the claim to a three-judge panel. See id. at 21–22.

McManus, on the other hand, argues that the Act authorizes a single judge to dismiss a claim on its merits. See Brief for Respondents, David McManus, Jr. et al. at 15–16. McManus maintains that because the Act is a technical one, intended for a narrow reading, it should not apply when the reasons behind convening a three-judge court do not apply. See Id. at 16. McManus contends that the text of the Act provides a procedural framework for the disposition of three-judge panels as opposed to a jurisdictional restriction on single judges. See Id. at 17. McManus states that if the Act were a jurisdictional test, the parties would not have the ability to waive the three-judge panel, given that jurisdiction can “never be forfeited or waived.” See Id. at 18. Additionally, McManus argues that once a party requests a three-judge court, the Act authorizes a single judge to decide whether a three-judge court is required. See Id. at 19. According to McManus, only after a single judge has convened a three-judge court does the Act expressly forbid a single judge to dismiss a claim on its merits. See Id. at 19.

THE DUCKWORTH PRECEDENT

Shapiro contends that the Act’s statutory structure proves that the holding in Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. of Election Laws was erroneous. See Brief for Petitioners at 25. Accordingly, Shapiro states that Duckworth contravenes the Act’s structure in two ways. See id. First, Shapiro contends that Duckworth undercuts the division that Congress intended to create between the responsibilities of a single-judge and a three-judge court. See Id. Shapiro argues that § 2284(b)(3) of the Act provides explicitly that a single judge may not “enter judgment on the merits.” See Id. If a single judge were permitted to dismiss a claim for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Shapiro argues, then the dismissal on the merits would frustrate § 2284(b)(3)’s distribution of authority. See Id. at 25–26. Second, Shapiro maintains that allowing a single judge to dismiss a claim on its merits would render the Act’s appellate review scheme illogical. See Id. at 27. Shapiro maintains that if a single judge dismissed a claim on its merits and the injured party appealed to the court of appeals, the court of appeals would then have to decide the merits of the claim. See Id. Shapiro argues that if the court of appeals were to find the claim meritorious, then the same court would render a decision on the merits of a claim over which, according to § 1253, it has no jurisdiction. See Id.

McManus argues that, even if the Court rejects the Duckworth standard permitting single-judge courts to rule on reapportionment cases with no plausible claim for relief, the Court should still arrive at the same conclusion as the Duckworth court in holding that the plaintiffs’ claims are insubstantial. See Brief for Respondents at 41, 47. In Duckworth, the Fourth Circuit held that the congressional redistricting in that case did nothing to impact plaintiffs’ ability to engage in political debate and was therefore not a violation of the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights. See Id. at 47 (quoting Duckworth v. State Admin. Bd. Of Election Laws, 213 F. Supp. 2d 543, 558 (2002). Here, McManus notes Shapiro previously conceded in the lower court that the redistricting plan did not prohibit participation in political parties or frustrate the structure and activities of such parties. See Id. Moreover, McManus argues that Shapiro’s First Amendment claims cannot be separated from Shapiro’s amended claims, which Shapiro abandoned. See Id. at 41–42, 45. Significantly, McManus claims, the Court treats “various constitutional theories as a single set” when a single element of a state’s reapportionment allegedly violates several constitutional provisions. See Id. at 42. McManus argues that the complaint, viewed in its entirety, is barred because the Court has already considered and rejected similar complaints. See id. at 42–43.

STATUTORY PURPOSE AND ADMINISTRATIVE EFFECT

Shapiro maintains that Duckworth contradicts the statutory purpose of the Act. See Brief for Petitioners at 29. First, Shapiro contends that Congress meant for the Act to reduce the individual biases and predilections of a single judge in politically sensitive matters. See Id. at 29–30. By convening three-judge courts, Shapiro argues that Congress intended to create a judicial mechanism insulated from local influences. See Id. at 30. Shapiro argues that apportionment challenges are “highly sensitive matters” that a single judge should not be able to dismiss on her own. See Id. at 31. Second, Shapiro maintains that Congress intended for the rapid resolution of apportionment claims under the Act by allowing a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. See Id. at 31. However, Shapiro contends that a claim dismissed on its merits by a single judge would have to be appealed to a court of appeals as opposed to the Supreme Court and would add an additional layer of litigation. See Id. at 32. Shapiro argues that a significant delay in the resolution of a claim will result, potentially rendering the reason behind the claim moot. See Id. at 32–33. Moreover, Shapiro argues that Duckworth runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s preference for “clear jurisdictional tests” and administrative simplicity. See id. at 27–28. Shapiro maintains that the Act was meant to serve as a jurisdictional statute that defines the jurisdictional line between a single-judge and three-judge court. See Id. at 28. Shapiro argues that a “complex jurisdictional test” would complicate claims and significantly extend their litigation time on jurisdictional matters, as opposed to the merits of the claims. See Id. Shapiro affirms that by allowing a single judge to dismiss claims on their merits, Duckworth creates a “complex jurisdictional test.” See Id.

McManus argues that Duckworth best exemplified Congress’ reasoning for creating the Three-Judge Court Act. See Brief for Respondents at 25. McManus states that Congress intended for the Act to protect states against the intrusion of individual federal judges on state sovereignty while promoting the public’s confidence in the federal courts. See id. at 26–27. McManus argues that the political nature of reapportionment cases required the convening of three-judge courts in order to stop lone federal judges from implementing their own districting plans over those of sovereign states. See id. at 30. McManus claims that allowing all reapportionment cases to be heard by three-judge courts regardless of their merits would contravene the statute’s purpose of reducing state disruption in applying its laws. See id. at 32. Moreover, McManus argues that few cases would be affected by the additional litigation time that Duckworth imposes, and the extended litigation “would be more than justified by the overall savings to judicial economy” from decreasing the number of three-judge courts. See id. at 34–35. McManus also claims that the additional litigation would be no different than the one created by applying a substantiality test because plaintiffs seeking a reversal of a wrongly dismissed complaint must go to the court of appeals regardless. See id. at 34.