Molina-Martinez v. United States (14-8913)

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) (“Rule 52(b)”) triggers a rebuttable presumption that affects a defendant’s substantial rights when the Sentencing Guidelines result in an inaccurate sentencing range. If a defendant’s substantial rights are prejudiced due to a plain error, appellate courts will consider the error on appeal despite it not being raised in the lower court. Molina-Martinez argues that sentencing guideline errors, un-objected to by defense counsel, trigger a rebuttable presumption that the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. On the contrary, the United States argues that sentencing miscalculations, un-objected to by defense counsel, do not trigger a rebuttable presumption that the error affected a defendant’s substantial right. The United States maintains that a defendant seeking relief from such an error must fulfill all the “requirements of the plain-error standard” set forth in Rule 52(b).

DOES THE DIFFICULTY OF PROVING PREJUDICE NECESSITATE A REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE?

In United States v. Olano, the Supreme Court established a four-prong test for plain-error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). Under the third prong of plain-error review, the defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice to a substantial right. Molina-Martinez argues that the Supreme Court created two exceptions to this presumption in Olano. Molina-Martinez focuses on the second Olano exception, which presumes prejudice when there is a high probability that the error will affect the outcome of the case and the nature of the error makes it unlikely that the defendant will be able to make a specific showing of prejudice. Molina-Martinez argues that the difficulty of proving prejudice under the Sentencing Guidelines necessitates a rebuttable presumption of prejudice for sentencing miscalculations. Molina-Martinez contends that it is nearly impossible to determine whether an erroneous sentence would have been different because a judge can render a sentence with “little or no explanation.” Molina-Martinez concludes that unless the sentencing judge makes a “fortuitous comment” explaining why a specific sentence was imposed, the defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.

The United States disagrees with Molina-Martinez and argues that the miscalculation of a sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines is not an error that is “presumptively prejudicial.” The United States maintains that the Supreme Court’s precedent indicates that “structural errors”—those errors “affect[ing] the framework within which the trial proceeds”—are presumptively prejudicial. The United States argues that the misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines is a “non-structural” error that requires a showing of prejudice. The United States therefore argues that relief under Rule 52(b) requires Molina-Martinez to demonstrate that there is a high likelihood he would have received a lesser sentence. The United States argues that a presumption of prejudice is inappropriate when based on the “difficulty in establishing case-specific prejudice from a Guidelines error.” . The United States maintains that a fortuitous comment is not necessarily required for proving specific prejudice in Sentencing Guideline cases. The United States points out that the reviewing court will know the “nature and magnitude” of the sentencing error in every case, which will allow the court to determine the likelihood of prejudice regardless of a “fortuitous comment”. The United States further contends that there will be other evidence on the record for proving specific prejudice, such as sentencing memoranda, pre-sentence reports, and any objections filed by either party.

CAN THE “NATURAL EFFECT” OF THE SENTENCING GUIDELINE SUPPORT A PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE?

Molina-Martinez maintains that Supreme Court precedents “suggest that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is appropriate in a criminal case where the [] ‘natural effect’ of a particular type of error is to affect a defendant’s substantial rights.” Molina-Martinez then argues that the “natural effect” of erroneously calculating a Sentencing Guideline is to directly affect a defendant’s sentence, which subsequently affects the substantial rights of that defendant. Molina-Martinez contends that the Sentencing Guidelines’ “continuing centrality and influence in federal sentencing provide compelling reasons for presuming that Guideline application errors affect a defendant’s substantial rights.” Molina-Martinez supports this assertion by noting that the Sentencing Guidelines are not only the starting point for district court judges in determining a sentence, but that judges must take them into consideration throughout the entire sentencing process. Molina-Martinez highlights Supreme Court precedent post Booker to demonstrate that the Sentencing Guidelines still hold considerable weigh in sentencing decisions despite not being mandatory. Thus, Molina-Martinez asserts that an erroneously calculated sentence under the Sentencing Guideline affects a defendant’s substantial rights, because “the whole point of the guidelines is to affect the defendant’s ‘substantial rights’ by guiding the district court’s analysis of how much of his liberty he must forfeit to the government.”

The United States disagrees and argues that a “category-wide presumption of prejudice” cannot be “based on an error’s natural effect.” The United States maintains that the Supreme Court has cautioned against the use of “mandatory presumptions and rigid rules rather than case-specific application of judgment, based upon examination of the record.” The United States further contends that there is a “congressional preference for determining ‘harmless error’ without the use of presumptions.” The United States argues that the courts of appeals, when determining Guideline errors, has never “determined the ‘natural effect’ of a type of error based on ‘empirical evidence’ and ‘expertise.’” . The United States maintains that Molina-Martinez’s ‘natural-effects test’ is inappropriate. In stating so, the United States relies on United States v. Booker to demonstrate the test’s impracticality because, during Booker, there was “no relevant data to consult because district courts had just begun sentencing under advisory Guidelines.” The United States argues that “even now, with a body of judicial experience and data on advisory Guidelines sentencing, empirical evidence still provides an unreliable and shifting basis for crafting legal presumptions that may long outlive empirical generalizations thought true at the time.”

IF A PRESUMPTION OF PREJUDICE IS NOT PRESUMED, CAN THE COURT FIND THAT MOLINA-MARTINEZ’S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN AFFECTED?

Molina-Martinez argues that even if the rebuttable presumption of prejudice he proposes is not adopted, “the Court should hold that [he] nevertheless met his burden of establishing an effect on his substantial rights, because the record shows at least a reasonable probability that the sentence would be lower under the correct Guideline range.” Specifically, Molina-Martinez points out that although the government asked for the longest sentence under the Guidelines, the district court actually assigned Molina-Martinez the shortest possible sentence within that range.

The United States counters by arguing that Molina-Martinez’s argument for reversal lacks merit because it was not articulated in the question presented. The United States further notes that it is erroneous to address Molina-Martinez’s alternative argument because “it would not resolve whether the [Molina-Martinez] is entitled to relief under the fourth prong on the plain-error test.” The United States argues that even if the court did address this argument, it would not grant Molina-Martinez relief because there is no evidence to suggest that the court would have imposed a shorter sentence had the correct Guidelines been used.