Foster v. Chatman

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether the Georgia courts erred in not finding race discrimination in accordance with Batson v. Kentucky, which held that prosecutors cannot use peremptory strikes to exclude jurors based solely on race. The Court has established a three-step process for analyzing race discrimination claims under Batson. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of discrimination. Second, the prosecution must provide race-neutral explanations for the contested peremptory strikes. Third, the Court must determine whether the defendant established that the prosecutor purposefully discriminated against the potential jurors. This case is focused on step three: whether the defendant established purposeful discrimination.

DID THE PROSECUTION PURPOSEFULLY DISCRIMINATE AGAINST BLACK PROSPECTIVE JURORS?

VENIRE LISTS & NOTES

Foster argues that the prosecution’s venire lists and notes, combined with the complete exclusion of black jurors, indicate that the prosecution purposefully discriminated against prospective black jurors. Foster notes that the names of black prospective jurors were marked with a “B” and highlighted in green on four venire lists. Foster contends that these lists circulated the prosecutor’s office, indicating that the office was comfortable with labeling jurors by race. Additionally, the race of the black prospective jurors was circled on the prosecution’s juror questionnaires. There was also a separate list containing notes on black prospective jurors, which included a note that one black juror “[m]ight be the [b]est one to put on the [j]ury.” Foster argues that notes made by the prosecutor’s investigator, which state that “[i]f it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [she] might be okay,” are illustrative of the prosecutor’s purposeful discrimination. Finally, Foster notes that the five black prospective jurors were the first five names on a “Definite NOs” list, which meant that the prosecution would strike them. Foster concludes that the venire lists and notes illustrate that the prosecution intended to strike every black prospective juror and thus demonstrates that the prosecution purposefully discriminated against black prospective jurors.

Chatman counters that the lists and notes were prepared in anticipation of a Batson challenge. , Chatman notes that four months prior to trial, Foster filed a “Motion to Preclude the Prosecution from Using Its Peremptory Challenges to Exclude Blacks.” . This motion alerted the prosecution that if the prosecution peremptorily struck any black prospective juror, it would need to explain its reasoning; thus, the prosecution had to maintain detailed notes about the black prospective jurors. Chatman notes that the prosecution lacked guidance from the Georgia courts about implementing the newly-decided Batson. For example, the prosecution was unsure whether to provide race-neutral explanations for all black prospective jurors, or only the black prospective jurors challenged by the defense. Chatman argues that these notes illustrate the prosecution’s attempt to implement Batson’s new requirements in anticipation of a probable Batson challenge. He contends that this preparation provides a sufficient non-discriminatory reason to highlight black prospective jurors. Chatman also criticizes the probative value of these notes, because no one knows who wrote, authorized, or relied upon the notes. He contends that Foster refused to call any prosecutors to the stand, so Foster is speculating about the meaning, authors, and significance of the notes. Chatman also explains that there is unrebutted testimony that the prosecutors did not highlight, instruct anyone to highlight, or rely upon the highlighted names of black prospective jurors on the venire sheets.

JUROR COMPARISON

Foster contends that the prosecution’s purported reasons for peremptorily striking black potential jurors lack credibility. Foster accuses the prosecution of exaggerating facts to discredit black prospective jurors and contradicting its non-discriminatory reasons for peremptorily striking black jurors. Foster also contends that the prosecution failed to ask questions in voir dire about the justifications they later presented for the strikes, indicating that the prosecution’s non-discriminatory justifications lack credibility. To support this argument, Foster compares the treatment of black and white jurors and focuses on two black jurors—Marilyn Garrett and Eddie Hood. Foster asserts that the prosecution justified striking Marilyn Garrett by noting that she was a teacher’s aid for the Head Start Program.The Head Start program is a school program that provides services for underprivileged and low-income children. Garrett’s employment at the Head Start Program was allegedly problematic because the victim was a retired teacher. However, Foster maintains that the prosecution accepted every white teacher and teacher’s aide as potential jurors. Foster also asserts that the prosecution justified striking Eddie Hood because he had an 18-year-old son, which was the same age as the defendant; and thus Hood might be susceptible to sympathizing with Foster. Nevertheless, Foster explains, the final jury included two white jurors who had sons of similar age to Foster.

Chatman counters that Foster’s comparative-juror analysis is distorted because it fails to account for the fact that jurors are the sum of their weaknesses and strengths. Chatman claims that it is not unusual that some white jurors possess a negative trait used to justify the striking of a potential black juror. He illustrates this contention by criticizing Foster’s analysis of Marilyn Garrett and Eddie Hood. Chatman asserts that the prosecution did not strike Garrett because she was a teacher’s aid, but because she worked for the Head Start Program. The prosecution predicted that Foster would present evidence that his underprivileged childhood precipitated murder, and Garrett might be susceptible to this argument due to her occupation. In response to Foster’s analysis of the striking of Hood, Chatman also contends that while other jurors had sons similarly aged to Foster, Hood’s son was prosecuted by the same district attorney’s office prosecuting Foster, which would make Hood an unfavorable juror.

IS THE STATE HABEAS COURT’S DECISION ENTITLED TO DEFERENCE?

Under Georgia law, res judicata typically prevents a petitioner from asserting a claim that the courts have rejected on direct review. To overcome the res judicata bar in his habeas proceedings, Foster presented new documents that he obtained from the district attorney’s file. The state habeas court ruled that Foster failed to “show[ ] any change in facts sufficient to overcome the res judicata bar.” Ordinarily, a reviewing court would give this finding deference and overturn the finding only if the habeas court committed a clear error.

Foster argues that the state habeas court’s factual finding is not entitled to deference because it is dependent on prior findings by the trial court and the Georgia Supreme Court. Foster contends that these findings failed to analyze all relevant circumstances, as Batson requires, because the courts based their findings on a small percentage of the presented evidence. Foster concludes that because these courts failed to follow the requirements of Batson, their findings are not entitled to deference.

However, Chatman contends that Foster fails to cite law to support his argument that the factual findings are not entitled to deference. Instead, Chatman argues that Foster bears the burden of proving that the habeas court committed a clear error in denying his claim. Chatman concludes that if the Court gives deference to the factual findings, the Court should determine that the state habeas court did not commit a clear error and affirm the state habeas court’s decision.