Heien v. North Carolina

The parties in this case disagree over whether a police officer’s misinterpretation of North Carolina’s Vehicle Light Statute, even if objectively reasonable, can provide the reasonable suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop. Heien argues that the traffic stop at issue violated his Fourth Amendment rights because Sergeant Darisse did not have reasonable suspicion that Heien had violated a law. However, North Carolina argues that since Sergeant Darisse had reason to believe that Heien was breaking a traffic law, the traffic stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The parties further disagree on whether a reasonable mistake of law should negate a violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Heien contends that even if a reasonable mistake of law leads to the admission of evidence stemming from that reasonable mistake, that mistake should not render the search legal and thus, not a violation of the civilian’s Fourth Amendment rights. In opposition, North Carolina counters than forcing courts to determine the differences between mistakes affecting rights and mistakes affecting remedies will become too complicated.

CAN A MISTAKE OF LAW GIVE RISE TO REASONABLE SUSPICION?

Heien argues that whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the correct interpretation of the law as applied to the facts. Heien argues that the Supreme Court’s precedent has dictated that the test for reasonable suspicion is an objective two-step analysis. The first step of the analysis involves a determination of facts, and the second step involves whether the rule of law is violated when applied to the facts. Thus, a court must evaluate whether the facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion “that a driver is violating an applicable traffic regulation.” Heien contends that the purpose of the reasonable suspicion standard is to constrain the exercise of discretion by government officials, including police officers, in order to protect the privacy of individuals against subjective seizures. Heien also argues that the traditional rule is that ignorance of the law excuses no one, including those entrusted to enforce the law.

North Carolina responds that if law enforcement officers have a reasonable suspicion that a driver is breaking a traffic law, that officer can stop the vehicle and conduct a search. North Carolina further asserts that the reasonable suspicion standard examines whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had an objective basis for suspecting that the particular person he stopped was engaging in a crime. Therefore, regardless of whether an officer erroneously believed that the driver was violating a law, the police officer’s actions may still pass the objectively reasonable standard.

MISTAKE OF FACT VS. MISTAKE OF LAW

Heien maintains that the Fourth Amendment allows traffic stops based on reasonable mistakes of fact but not traffic stops based on reasonable mistakes of law. Heien explains that this distinction exists because officers need flexibility in making good-faith mistakes of fact, due to the necessity of making fast factual assessments in the workplace. However, Heien claims that courts examining the legality of traffic stops have already demonstrated that officers can easily distinguish mistakes of law from those of fact. Moreover, Heien asserts that even if officers cannot easily distinguish between mistakes of law and those of fact, officers have several ways of obtaining legal guidance on unclear substantive law. As examples, Heien notes that police departments can confer with their lawyers to clarify statutory directives or obtain opinion letters from attorney generals’ offices. They can also request declaratory judgments, seek advisory opinions, and ask legislatures to amend confusing statutes.

In opposition, North Carolina asserts that treating mistakes of fact and mistakes of law the same is justified because of the ambiguity that police officers face during the course of their duties. North Carolina argues that an officer may struggle in interpreting intricate state laws and that, with new and continually changing laws, police officers cannot be expected to be legal experts. Furthermore, North Carolina argues that mistakes of law can be objectively reasonable. According to North Carolina, the decision as to whether a mistake of law is objectively reasonable takes into consideration whether the controlling law is confusing and contradictory, as well as whether a mistaken interpretation of law is common knowledge. North Carolina concedes that objectively reasonable mistakes of law are rare and that traffic laws are generally straightforward and clear, but the traffic law at issue in this case is not. North Carolina also claims that courts struggle to distinguish between mistakes of fact and mistakes of law and that this struggle must be even worse for police officers.

REASONABLE MISTAKES OF LAW AND REMEDIES

Heien argues that with certain mistakes of law, the reasonableness of a police officer’s mistake of law is relevant to a Fourth Amendment violation, but this relevance is strictly limited to remedies and does not extend to rights. Heien asserts that a reasonable mistake of law may render evidence that would otherwise be inadmissible admissible, but it should not make the traffic stop—based on a reasonable mistake of law—legal under the Fourth Amendment. Heien contends that if the Court does not restrict the reasonableness of mistakes of law to remedies, then courts will have to distinguish between mistakes affecting rights and mistakes affecting remedies, causing confusion and unnecessary spending of judicial resources. Further, Heien maintains that courts can evaluate important evidence relevant to reasonableness determinations at the remedy stage such as police customs, training manuals, and court decisions, but these resources are off-limits when addressing rights. According to Heien, validating the use of evidence such as training manuals or customs when addressing rights would produce unacceptable variation in Fourth Amendment rights.

North Carolina responds by asserting that courts will be overburdened by having to assess whether an officer’s mistake of law was reasonable. North Carolina argues that officers have easily applied the Terry rule, which states that if the law enforcement reasonably suspects that a person is armed and dangerous, they may conduct a frisk or a quick pat-down of the person’s outer clothing. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court of North Carolina no longer recognizes the exclusionary rule’s good-faith exception, which allows the government to use evidence gained from a reasonable search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, it is in the minority of state courts on this issue. Thus, North Carolina contends that Heien’s argument of saving the issue for the remedy stage saves no judicial resources. North Carolina also points out that reasonable suspicion issues often arise in the context of traffic stops and that most traffic laws are clear and simple; thus, assessing whether mistakes of law are objectionably reasonable will not add significant work to the courts’ duties.