Ohio v. Clark

LII note: The U.S. Supreme Court has now decided Ohio v. Clark.

Issues 

  1. Whether someone who must report suspected child abuse is considered an agent of law enforcement under the Confrontation Clause.
  2. Whether a child’s statements to a teacher about child abuse are “testimonial” statements for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.
Oral argument: 
March 2, 2015
Court below: 

The Supreme Court will determine whether teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse are agents of law enforcement and whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher about child abuse are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. Ohio asserts that a child’s statements made to teachers about potential child abuse are not testimonial because their primary purpose is not intended to further investigation, but rather to protect children. Also, Ohio argues and that teachers that must report suspected child abuse to authorities are not agents of the state. Darius Clark counters that teachers intend to report the potential child abuse when they question children and thus, teachers are agents of the state in doing so. The Additionally, Clark contends that the children’s statements are testimonial because they are meant to further the prosecution of the suspected abuser. The Court’s ruling impacts the admissibility of children’s statements about potential child abuse under the Confrontation Clause when children make statements to teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse to state authorities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties 

  1. Does an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse make that individual an agent of law enforcement for purposes of the Confrontation Clause?
  2. Do a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher in response to the teacher’s concerns about potential child abuse qualify as “testimonial” statements subject to the Confrontation Clause?

Facts 

T.T. had two children, L.P. and A.T., and lived with her boyfriend Darius Clark. While L.P., T.T.’s three-year-old son, was at the William Patrick Day Head Start Center in Cleveland, Ohio, on March 17, 2010, one of his preschool teachers noticed that his eye was bloodshot. In response to the two times that the teacher asked L.P. what had happened, L.P. stated that he had fallen. Later in the day, the same teacher observed that L.P. had what appeared to be red whip-type marks on his face. Another teacher then asked L.P. who had made the marks, and L.P. stated that “Dee” had done it, referring to Darius Clark. The teacher who first observed L.P.’s eye and the red marks on his face called the Ohio state hotline to report suspected child abuse, as she is required to do under Ohio R.C. 2151.421.

On March 18, 2010, a social worker visited L.P. and A.T. and took them to a hospital. According to a doctor, L.P. had bruising and abrasions on his face and body, and A.T. had “bruising, burn marks, a swollen hand, and a pattern of sores at her hairline.” The doctor believed that the injuries were consistent with child abuse. Prosecutors charged Clark with counts of felonious assault, endangering children, and domestic violence. At trial, Clark motioned to exclude statements made by L.P to his teachers while at daycare, which identified Clark as the person who hurt L.P. Although the trial court allowed the statements into evidence, it ruled that L.P. was not competent to testify at trial. In total, seven witnesses, including police officers, social workers, and teachers, recounted the statements that L.P. made to report the alleged abuse. The trial court found Clark guilty of eight of the nine charges, and Clark was sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison.

On appeal, Clark asserted that the trial court violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause when it allowed L.P.’s statements into evidence. The appellate court, the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals, ruled that L.P.’s statements were testimonial, and, therefore, it held that the trial court violated Clark’s Confrontation Clause rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution when it admitted L.P.’s out-of-court statements. Under the appellate court’s decision, Clark’s convictions were overturned, and he was granted a new trial. Finally, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled that L.P.’s statements to his teachers should not have been admitted at trial because the statements were testimonial and because L.P.’s teachers acted as agents of law enforcement when they questioned L.P to gather information for future prosecution. The Supreme Court of the United States will determine whether an individual’s obligation to report suspected child abuse to authorities makes that person an agent of law enforcement and whether a child’s out-of-court statements to teachers about potential child abuse are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.

Analysis 

The parties in this case disagree over whether a child’s out of court responses to his teachers questions regarding suspected child abuse qualify as testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause. Statements are testimonial if they are formally given during questioning to prove facts or evidence possibly applicable to a later criminal prosecution, and testimonial statements qualify as an out-of-court replacement for testimony. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment allows a defendant to cross-examine the witnesses against him or her and governs testimonial statements of a witness who does not appear at trial.

Ohio contends that L.P.’s statements to his teachers are not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because L.P. is too young to testify and his statements were made informally to his daycare teachers in a classroom, rather than formally in the courtroom, to the police, or to formal investigators. Further, Ohio also argues that when L.P’s statements are applied under the primary-purpose test, which evaluates whether out-of-court statements uttered under questioning were made with the main goal of producing testimony for trial, L.P.’s statements are not testimonial because L.P. made them informally and his teachers were questioning him in order to protect him and the classroom environment.

In contrast, Clark asserts that L.P.’s statements are testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because through the teachers being mandatory reporters of child abuse, the statements given to the teachers are akin to statements given to the police. Thus, Clarke argues that the primary-purpose test is satisfied here; L.P.’s statements and his teachers’ questions to him were to collect evidence that he had been abused, which would implicate criminal prosecution, and as such, Clark can cross-examine L.P. Clark claims that L.P. is mature enough to testify, that L.P.’s statements were made to his day care teachers who are authority figures, and that a ruling that L.P.’s statements are testimonial will uphold cross-examination and the adversarial process.

ARE A CHILD’S STATEMENTS TO PRIVATE PARTIES TESTIMONIAL UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE?

Ohio maintains that L.P.’s statements to his day care teachers are not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because L.P.’s statements were not given to the police in an official setting, such as a courtroom or police station. Additionally, Ohio asserts that L.P.'s statements are not testimonial because L.P. was only answering his teacher’ vague questions about his injuries and retelling alleged events. Ohio also contends that L.P.’s responses were not meant to be formal statements designed to support evidence of the alleged child abuse that L.P.’s teachers were asking him about. Rather, Ohio argues that L.P. spoke to two private individuals that fit under the category of friends and neighbors (two daycare teachers), and it was impulsively done in the informal setting of a classroom. Further, Ohio emphasizes that allowing statements to private parties to be testimonial frustrates the purpose of the Confrontation Clause, which is to uphold confronting witnesses through cross-examination to find the truth rather than relying on affidavits and depositions.

Clark counters that L.P.’s statements are testimonial evidence and do implicate witness testimony because they were given to his teachers who are L.P.'s authority figures, not his friends and neighbors, and at three years old, L.P.’s perception of his teachers as authoritative figures is even stronger. Additionally, Clark argues that L.P.’s statements that he gave to his teachers identifying Clark as abusing him were testimonial. Clark argues that L.P.’s statements are testimonial for a number of reasons. First, Clark notes that the teachers questioned L.P. to investigate who his abuser was. Next, Clark points out that the teachers were required to question L.P. under Ohio law. Finally, Clark argues that because the teachers then contacted Ohio authorities to aid them in finding L.P.’s alleged abusers, these constitute actions that are relevant to provide evidence for criminal prosecution and are thus testimonial in nature. Additionally, Clark argues that if L.P.’s statements are testimonial, Clark can cross-examine L.P. Furthermore, according to Clark, cross-examination is particularly helpful in this context due to the vague questions the teachers asked L.P. and the vague answers L.P. gave, raising the risk that Clark is not the one who harmed L.P.

DOES A CHILD’S STATEMENTS TO PRIVATE PARTIES APPLY UNDER THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST?

Ohio contends that under the primary purpose test for police questioning, which examines L.P.'s exchange with his teachers, if L.P. made his statements intending to use them for trial testimony, then his statements are testimonial. On the other hand, if L.P. did not intend to use his statements for trial testimony, then they are non-testimonial. Ohio argues that L.P. did not intend for his statements to be used as trial testimony and his statements are therefore non-testimonial. Ohio argues that this is because when L.P.’s teachers questioned him about his injuries, they were questioning L.P. to protect him and the classroom, not to investigate who hurt L.P. Additionally, Ohio asserts that because L.P. is three years old, his purpose during the exchange with his teachers was not to pursue criminal action, and due to his young age, his responses were automatic and influenced by his teachers’ leading questions. Ohio further argues that the questions that the teachers used were based on their roles as educators, and that neither of the teachers were the ones who called the police; rather, the supervisor did.

In contrast, Clark argues that the primary purpose test does apply to L.P.’s day care teachers because the Confrontation Clause implicates whether L.P.’s day care teachers were conducting investigative tasks that were related to the police, and not police conduct itself. Specifically, Clark states that the teachers questioned L.P. to find out who his abuser was, and while the teachers did want to protect L.P. and maintain safety in the classroom, their main purpose, as required by law under Ohio R.C. 2151.421, was to perform an investigative function similar to law enforcement. Clark further argues that the courts should focus not only protecting children, but also on the criminal prosecution for those that commit child abuse. Clark admits that it is rare for a non-police member to conduct investigative tasks but that it does happen occasionally, as in the situation here with L.P.'s day care teachers, and when non-police members do perform investigative tasks, the statements they collect are testimonial. Further, Clark asserts that it does not matter whether the individual making the statements had the intent to generate evidence for trial or not.

ARE YOUNG CHILDREN TOO YOUNG TO TESTIFY?

Ohio claims that young children, such as L.P., are too young to provide testimony and their statements are thus non-testimonial. Specifically, Ohio argues that under the Ohio R. Evid. 601(A), children younger than ten-years-old are too young to testify if they cannot recall evidence, remember facts, and give truthful accounts. Additionally, Ohio argues that young children are especially vulnerable to questioning patterns involving recurrence, selective reinforcement, and suggestion.

Clark counters that young children, such as L.P., are not too young to testify because like L.P., they can understand and respond to questions relating to serious issues. Clark also asserts that young children tend to be particularly brazen due to being less aware of bias and societal norms than adults, and thus young children are possibly more reliable on the witness stand. Clark also claims that jurors, like everyone else, regularly interact with young children and can read them well. Clark notes that although Ohio believes it is trying to prosecute child abuse cases through testimony from mandatory reporters so that children can avoid the trauma of testifying on the stand, rather than pushing to eliminate cross-examination and confrontation completely, Ohio should instead attempt to change the methods that children subject to testifying must endure.

Discussion 

The Supreme Court will determine whether teachers who are obligated to report suspected child abuse are agents of law enforcement and whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a teacher about child abuse are testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. The State of Ohio argues that statements made to private parties are not the equivalent of trial testimony and are therefore not testimonial, and that teachers are not agents of the state when they are obligated to report child abuse because their intent is to protect children, not to investigate the abuse in anticipation of prosecution. Clark asserts that the purpose of teachers questioning L.P. was to discover who had been hurting L.P. and that, because L.P.’s statements were meant to further the investigation into the suspected child abuse, the statements were testimonial. The Court’s ruling in this case impacts the admissibility of children’s statements about potential child abuse under the Confrontation Clause when children make statements to teachers who must report suspected child abuse to state authorities.

RELIABILITY AND PROBATIVENESS OF CHILDREN’S STATEMENTS

Amicus for Ohio, American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children, argues that children are less likely to lie in child abuse cases because they often have close relationships with the alleged abuser. Additionally, Domestic Violence Legal Empowerment and Appeals Project (“DV Leap”), another amicus for Ohio, asserts that statements of children in child abuse cases should not be considered testimonial because those who are closest with children abuse them. As a result, DV Leap contends that children face a “continuing threat of harm” and report abuse with the primary purpose of protecting themselves.

However, according to Clark and amicus Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice and other organizations, even though children are often the sole witnesses to child abuse, a ruling in favor of Ohio would allow states to conduct child abuse trials without testimony from the victim or opportunity to cross-examine the victim. The Family Defense Center and other organizations contend that this fact is problematic because children in particular are subject to suggestion of adult authority figures and do not have extensive vocabularies or strong memories. They worry that if a child’s unreliable out-of-court statements made to the child’s teachers are admissible, then law enforcement officers may make no further investigation into the case because prosecutors may have enough information to get a conviction.

EFFECTS ON OTHER PROCEEDINGS AND TEACHERS

The National Education Association and other organizations (collectively, “NEA”), writing as amici for Ohio, contend that teachers will have more difficulty in fulfilling their duties as mandatory reporters if they are expected to be investigative bodies. As a result, the NEA contends, teachers will require significantly more training due to increased complexity in their duties. In addition, the NEA argues that teachers and other private parties would be considered law enforcement agents in other contexts, such as custodial interrogation and search and seizure purposes, if the Court decides that teachers count as law enforcement agents under the Confrontation Clause. According to the NEA, classifying teachers as law enforcement agents would require teachers to know that routine disciplinary situations could lead to serious constitutional violations, considerations for which teachers lack the knowledge to understand.

In contrast, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”), amicus for Clark, asserts that if the Court were to rule in favor of Ohio, states would attempt to use non-police parties in the investigation process because statements made to those parties would not be testimonial and possibly admissible evidence at trial. According to the NACDL, this fact would mean that some defendants would essentially lose their right to confront the witnesses against them. The Family Defense Center and other organizations further contend that the investigation in civil custody and divorce proceedings would also be affected, thereby allowing statements of children who are allegedly abused into trials without an opportunity for cross-examination. Despite the potential for false accusations due to children’s susceptibility, these organizations argue that parental relationships and families would be damaged in civil trials, which would rely heavily on hearsay evidence as a result of a ruling in favor of Ohio.

Conclusion 

The Supreme Court will determine whether a child’s out-of-court statements to his or her teachers regarding suspected child abuse qualify as testimonial statements under the Confrontation Clause. Ohio asserts that a child’s statements to a teacher are not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because the child in question, L.P., is too young to testify, and his statements were made informally to his teachers in a classroom rather than the police. Additionally, Ohio argues that L.P.’s statements fail the primary-purpose test because L.P. did not make them with the purpose of providing evidence for criminal proceedings. On the other hand, Clark asserts that L.P.’s statements are testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because he made the statements to two authoritative figures. Clark further maintains that the primary-purpose test is satisfied since L.P.’s statements were made in furtherance of criminal proceedings, L.P. is mature enough to testify, and a ruling that L.P.’s statements are testimonial will further the adversarial process. The Court’s ruling implicates the status of teachers as mandatory reporters and the admissibility of children’s statements about suspected child abuse under the Confrontation Clause.

Acknowledgments 

The authors would like to thank Professor Valerie Hans of Cornell Law School for her insights into this case.

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