Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission

The Court will consider whether redistricting authority can be delegated to the AIRC pursuant to the Elections Clause and 2 U.S.C. § 2a(c) (“§ 2a(c)”). However, the Court must first decide whether the Legislature has standing to bring suit against the AIRC. The Legislature contends that it has standing to sue because it has suffered a particularized injury in fact, which is traceable to the AIRC’s exercise of redistricting authority and can be remedied by the Court. Conversely, the AIRC argues that the Legislature’s alleged injury is a nonjusticiable question.

Assuming the Legislature has standing, the Court will decide whether the AIRC can exercise redistricting authority. Legislature argues that the Elections Clause explicitly vests redistricting power in state legislatures alone as part of their authority over the manner of elections. Furthermore, the Legislature maintains that § 2a(c) does not authorize the AIRC to exercise redistricting power. The AIRC argues that the Elections Clause’s language permits state citizens to alter the manner of elections through initiative. Likewise, the AIRC contends that Congress took steps to protect this right through § 2a(c).

DOES THE LEGISLATURE HAVE STANDING TO BRING SUIT AGAINST THE AIRC?

The Legislature contends that it satisfies the three prongs of the Court’s Article III standing analysis: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. First, the Legislature argues that it suffered an injury in fact because it has been divested of its redistricting power. The Legislature maintains that the Elections Clause explicitly grants each state legislature redistricting power as a constitutional right. Accordingly, the Legislature argues that deprivation of its redistricting power is a concrete and particular injury to its constitutionally protected powers. Second, the Legislature contends that the AIRC caused the Legislature’s injury in fact by “exercising [the Legislature’s] redistricting authority.” The Legislature explains that the AIRC’s only purpose is to redistrict; therefore, the AIRC’s exercise of redistricting authority directly injures the Legislature. Third, the Legislature contends that its injury will be redressed if the Court holds that the AIRC cannot exercise redistricting authority. The Legislature notes that the Court has granted standing to litigants, such as school boards, with similar institutional injuries. The Legislature concedes that its standing would be questionable had the Legislature created the AIRC. In that case, the Legislature could rectify its “injury” by eliminating the AIRC. However, the Legislature argues that Proposition 106, a popular referendum, deprived it of its federal constitutional powers. Hence, the Legislature maintains that its injury was not self-inflicted, and it has no means of self-help.

However, the AIRC counters that the Legislature does not have standing because its challenge presents a nonjusticiable question of the delegation of lawmaking authority in Arizona. The AIRC explains that Arizona’s Constitution gives Arizona citizens the right to amend the state’s constitution and thereby allocate legislative power at their discretion. In this case, the AIRC argues that the citizens saw fit to grant redistricting power to the AIRC. Even if the delegation issue was justiciable, the AIRC argues that the Legislature has failed to raise a “[c]oncrete [a]nd [p]articularized [i]njury.” To show a particularized injury, the AIRC asserts that the Legislature at least needs to demonstrate that it was prevented from enacting a piece of legislation because of Proposition 106. The AIRC explains that the Legislature has not “point[ed] to any specific legislative act that would have taken effect but for Proposition 106.” The AIRC maintains that the Legislature’s loss of redistricting power is a generalized attack on the legality of Proposition 106. Accordingly, the AIRC contends that the Legislature’s injury is “hypothetical.” The AIRC also suggests that the Legislature has means of self-help, such as submitting a constitutional amendment to the citizens to regain its redistricting authority.

CAN REDISTRICTING POWER BE DELEGATED TO THE AIRC?

Assuming that it has standing to sue, the Legislature contends that redistricting authority cannot be delegated to the AIRC pursuant to the Elections Clause. The Legislature argues that the text of the Elections Clause unambiguously vests each state “legislature” with the sole authority to regulate the manner of congressional elections in its state, which includes redistricting. The Legislature asserts that the Framers appreciated the difference between a “general delegation” of authority to states and delegations made to specific bodies, such as the legislature. The Legislature maintains that this understanding is reflected in the varied delegations of power made in the text of the Constitution. Hence, the Legislature argues that the Framers consciously vested state legislatures with authority over the manner of elections, and did so to ensure that citizens could exercise some control over how their representatives were elected. Accordingly, the Legislature maintains that the AIRC is not “the legislature” envisioned by the language of Elections Clause. The Legislature explains that the AIRC, unlike a legislative body, “has no general lawmaking power,” is comprised of unelected officials, and is largely outside the control of the Legislature itself. Although the Legislature may propose redistricting maps to the AIRC, the Legislature explains that the AIRC is under no obligation to adopt the Legislature’s proposals.

The Legislature further argues that upholding the constitutionality of the AIRC would contradict the plain meaning of the Elections Clause by permitting any entity that acts legislatively to exercise redistricting power. The Legislature argues that no court has ever upheld an allocation of redistricting power that eliminates the legislature’s role entirely. Furthermore, the Legislature contends that § 2a(c) does not authorize the AIRC to exercise redistricting power. The Legislature explains that § 2a(c) is a “gap-filling statute,” which sets default procedures “if the state legislatures could not produce a timely redistricting map . . . [after] a decennial census.” The Legislature argues that the Court has struck down most of these default procedures.

The AIRC concedes that state legislatures can exercise authority over the manner of elections. However, the AIRC maintains that the Framers granted state legislatures this authority as a means of ensuring that state citizens could “structure [elections] as they see fit.” Hence, the AIRC contends that Arizona citizens were within their rights to alter the manner of elections by delegating redistricting power to the AIRC. Contrary to the Legislature’s assertion, the AIRC argues that the Court has interpreted the term “legislature” as encompassing a broad range of functions. The AIRC contends that the term as it appears in the Elections Clause is properly understood as relating to the exercise of lawmaking authority. The AIRC argues that “[h]ow States structure that lawmaking process” is not dictated by the Elections Clause, and is left to the citizens of each state.

Furthermore, the AIRC argues that the Framers were concerned that state legislatures might exercise improper influence over the manner of elections. Accordingly, the AIRC maintains that the Elections Clause empowers Congress to create laws to protect the citizens’ right to alter the manner of elections. The AIRC argues that Congress did so in § 2a(c) by authorizing citizens to alter election law through means available under state law, including popular referendum or initiative. The AIRC explains that legislative history shows that Congress passed § 2a(c)’s predecessor, the Apportionment Act of 1911 (“Act”), to protect this right. For example, when the Act was amended, the AIRC contends that Congress retained language protecting “popular lawmaking to regulate redistricting.” The AIRC argues that § 2a(c)’s current language is traceable to the Act, because Congress has not adopted language restricting the citizens’ right to alter redistricting procedures through means established by state law. As such, the AIRC contends that § 2a(c), like the Act, authorizes citizens to alter the manner of elections through means available to them under state law.