Smith v. Cain

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that suppression of evidence that would be favorable and material to the guilt or punishment of a defendant violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and merits a new trial. See 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963). On the other hand, where the evidence is not material or favorable, its suppression does not fall under Brady. See id. Information is deemed “material” if there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceeding would be different if the information had been included. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 (2009). In this case, the Court will determine whether Petitioner Juan Smith’s proffered evidence—which the defense obtained only after his conviction—casts sufficient doubt on his conviction to indicate a violation of due process, providing grounds for a new trial.

Materiality of the Evidence

Smith argues that the prosecution in his case, the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, deliberately withheld material evidence. SeeBrief for Petitioner Juan Smith at 34. Smith claims that, under Supreme Court precedent such as Kyles v. Whitley, the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose information favorable to the defendant. See 514 U.S. 419, 432–33 (1995); Brief for Petitioner at 29. Proceeding through four categories of suppressed information, Smith attempts to show how the presence of each would have caused the jury to doubt his guilt; cumulatively, Smith argues, the evidence must undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. SeeBrief for Petitioner at 34.

(a) Larry Boatner’s Testimony

First, Smith addresses the evidence undermining Larry Boatner’s testimony. At trial, Boatner confidently identified Smith as one of the gunmen, providing the prosecution with its only link between Smith and the murders. See Brief for Petitioner at 34, 36. However, Boatner’s inability to describe or identify the perpetrator in three prior instances, Smith claims, casts serious doubt on his identification of Smith at trial. See id.at 35–36. Furthermore, Smith argues that notes from interviews with shooting victim Shelita Russell—who claimed the first man through the door had a mask on his face—and Dale Mims, a neighbor who said that all the men who left the house wore masks, further rebut Boatner’s identification. See id.at 36–37. Smith underscores the lack of any other evidence linking him to the crime, suggesting that, absent reliance on Boatner’s testimony, the prosecution had no case. See id.at 41–42.

Respondent Burl Cain, on the other hand, insists that Smith exaggerates the weight of evidence supposedly undermining Boatner’s identification. See Respondent’s Brief at 47–48. According to Cain, Russell’s statement can be reconciled with Boatner’s testimony because, given the chaotic nature of the shooting, it is possible they were referring to two different people. See id. at 48. Likewise, Boatner’s initial inability to identify or describe the man who held him at gunpoint would be understandable to the jury as a result of Boatner’s confusion and trauma at seeing his friends murdered. See id.at 58–59. Cain thus insists that a jury would be able to account for the contradicting evidence surrounding Boatner’s testimony, denying that there is reason to doubt the jury’s verdict. See id.at 57–58.

(b) Detective John Ronquillo’s Notes

Smith turns next to the suppressed notes of detective John Ronquillo’s interview with Phillip Young, another perpetrator accused of the shooting. See Brief for Petitioner at 43. Smith claims that Young denied Smith’s involvement in the crime: Young allegedly told Ronquillo that “Short Dog” (believed to be Smith’s alias) was not at the house where the shootings occurred. See id.at 44. Smith asserts that the defense could have introduced this evidence at trial, either by calling Young to testify or by introducing his statement as a declaration against interest by an unavailable witness (thereby circumventing the hearsay rule). See id.

While Smith accuses Ronquillo of dishonestly concealing this information, Cain’s more detailed account of Ronquillo’s interview with Young suggests that the interview yielded nothing conclusive or material. SeeRespondent’s Brief at 35–36. Cain first argues that Young did not provide Ronquillo with any “statement” to begin with: Young suffered severe brain damage as a result of the shooting, and communicated with Ronquillo only by blinking. See id.at 24, 36. Second, even if Ronquillo’s notes yielded anything coherent, Cain contends that the notes would not be admissible as declarations against interest because they lacked corroborating circumstances. See State v. Hammons, 597 So. 2d 990, 997 (La. 1992); Respondent’s Brief at 37–38. Furthermore, Cain notes that, as Smith’s friend, Young had motivation to falsify his statements to Ronquillo. See Respondent’s Brief at 38.

(c) Evidence Concerning the Alleged Murder Weapon

Smith’s next argument is that suppressed gun-related evidence undermines the prosecution’s theory that Smith was one of the shooters. SeeBrief for Petitioner at 45–46. Smith insists that Boatner’s inconsistent statements about the gun Boatner allegedly saw at the crime, combined with the firearms examiner’s finding that casings found at the scene did not match a nine-millimeter handgun (the weapon allegedly used by Smith), could lead the jury to exonerate Smith as a shooter. See id.at 48–49. Smith claims that his identification as the shooter is central to the prosecution’s case; thus the suppressed evidence related to the murder weapon would unhinge the prosecution’s trial strategy. See id.

Cain, however, attacks Smith’s gun-related argument in two ways. First, Cain claims that the firearms examiner’s testimony about the bullet casings is consistent, as the examiner was certain that the casings came from a handgun—either a nine-millimeter or a similar model. SeeRespondent’s Brief at 45–46. Second, Cain argues that Smith’s gun-related argument is, in any event, irrelevant: under Louisiana law, the prosecution need not prove that a criminal defendant was the actual shooter in order to convict the defendant of a shooting murder. SeeState v. Wright, 834 So. 2d 974, 982 (La. 2002); Respondent’s Brief at 46.

(d) Eric Rogers’s Prison Statements

Finally, Smith points to suppressed evidence indicating that Eric Rogers, a prison inmate, heard a fellow inmate confess to the shooting, thereby exculpating Smith. See Brief for Petitioner at 49–50. Specifically, Smith notes that Rogers received conflicting answers as to the identity of “Short Dog”—identified once as Juan Smith, once as Robert Home. See id.at 50. Smith also observes that Rogers failed to name Smith when listing members of the “Cut Throat Posse,” the group allegedly responsible for the shooting. See id.Smith contends that Rogers’s testimony would have allowed the defense to argue that Smith was not “Short Dog,” and thus not present at the scene of the murders. See id.at 51. Furthermore, Smith argues that, had the defense been able to question Rogers, it could have discovered Rogers’s allegation that a police officer asked him to falsely implicate Smith in the crime. See id.

Cain, on the other hand, seeks to dispel any notion of a Brady violation by noting that Smith’s own investigator was present at the time Rogers made his statement; thus, the statement could not have been suppressed. See Respondent’s Brief at 43. Furthermore, Cain denies that a police officer pressured Rogers to frame Smith, pointing to the fact that Rogers waited until the police officer’s death to allege the framing agreement. See id.at 43–44. Cain suggests that Rogers’s testimony on this point is unreliable, merely the invention of a desperate criminal. See id.

Prejudice to the Result

Each party allocates different weight to the items of suppressed evidence, leading to different conclusions as to the reliability of Smith’s trial. Smith claims that all of the evidence, taken cumulatively, creates a reasonable likelihood that the result of the proceeding would have been different had the evidence been included, thus necessitating a new trial. SeeBrief for Petitioner at 53. To cement his prejudice argument, Smith refers to the summary treatment his case received at the post-conviction hearing and at the appellate level, treatment which in Smith’s view amplified the unfairness of the entire proceedings against him. See id.at 54–55.

In his review of the evidence, however, Cain asserts that each disputed item was either inadmissible in trial, unsuppressed in the first place, or unfavorable to Smith. See Respondent’s Brief at 59. According to Cain, once the allegedly suppressed evidence is removed from the equation, the remaining evidence does not undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict; therefore, there is no Brady violation. See id. Finally, Cain insists that any suggestion that Smith’s review applications were not given proper consideration is baseless; according to Cain, Smith was convicted because of his guilt, not because he was denied a fair trial. See id. at 60.