Holder v. Gutierrez (10-1542) & Holder v. Sawyers

Section 1229b of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") requires an alien seeking cancellation of removal from the United States to have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for at least five years, or to have resided continuously for seven years in the United States after being admitted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held, in Mercado-Zazueta v. Holder, that a minor child can impute a parent’s lawful residence period for the purpose of satisfying Section 1229b. Respondents Gutierrez and Sawyer are seeking to persuade the Supreme Court that this holding is correct, and that it should be applied to them.

Does Section 1229b’s Plain Language Permit Imputation?

Petitioner Eric Holder argues that the statutory language of Section 1229b does not permit an alien seeking cancellation of removal to impute a parent’s period of residence to satisfy the eligibility requirements. Holder contends that the plain language of the statute calls for consideration of the alien’s status alone, not that of a parent or other individual, in determining whether the alien satisfied the eligibility requirements. He also argues that, while Section 1229b does not expressly bar imputation, the statute does not affirmatively permit imputation; indeed, it would be unreasonable and difficult for a statute to disallow every possible option.

Respondent Gutierrez counters that, while the text of the statute is silent as to whether imputation is permitted, allowing imputation would be in line with the plain language of Section 1229b. Respondent Sawyers argues that imputation is implied in the context of Section 1229b, although the text of the statute does not expressly permit or deny imputation. The Respondents claim that other immigration statutes use similar language, and that courts have permitted imputation in those contexts. Gutierrez argues that the Supreme Court has approved imputation in other contexts when the statute was silent. Gutierrez adds that imputation is not contrary to the plain language of the statute because, while the parent’s period of residence would be given consideration, the alien would still need to meet the durational requirements listed in Section 1229b.

Is Imputation Consistent with Congressional Intent?

Holder argues that imputation is inconsistent with Congress’s intent in drafting the statute because Congress created specific requirements in the subsections of Section 1229b that an alien must satisfy to be eligible for cancellation of removal. Holder contends that Congress would have added a subsection allowing imputation of a parent’s residency if it wanted to do so because Congress has allowed alien children to benefit from their parents’ status in other immigration statutes. Holder also argues that there is no legislative history indicating that imputation should be permitted, because Congress did not consider imputation when it enacted Section 1229b. Holder claims that Congress was instead concerned that the statute would be construed outside of its narrow limits; Congress wanted the eligibility rules to prevent aliens convicted of crimes from obtaining cancellation of removal, and to prevent aliens from accruing time to meet the residency requirement.

Gutierrez counters that Congress’s goals in enacting Section 1229b were to allow legal aliens residing in the United States to be eligible for cancellation of removal, and to protect the unity of the immediate family. Gutierrez argues that imputation is consistent with congressional intent because it works to maintain the family unit, which Congress considers to be a central purpose of immigration law. Sawyers agrees that imputation is consistent with congressional intent to favor children and maintain family unity. Sawyers also contends that imputation is consistent with congressional intent because Congress liberalized the requirements for aliens to demonstrate residence in the United States when it amended Section 1229b. Sawyers argues that the amendments Congress made to the statutory language of Section 1229b in 1996 were to resolve issues unrelated to imputation, and that Congress did not intend to prohibit imputation when it amended the statute.

Are the BIA’s Decisions Entitled to Deference?

Holder argues that the Board of Immigration Appeals should be accorded deference based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. In Chevron, the Supreme Court held that, when a court reviews an agency’s decision and the statute is silent or ambiguous, the Court must decide whether the agency’s decision is based on a permissible statutory construction. Holder claims that Section 1229b is a broad statute and the BIA’s decision is permissible under Chevron because it reasonably interpreted the statute.

Gutierrez and Sawyers counter that the BIA is not entitled to deference because Section 1229b is not ambiguous. Gutierrez argues that deference is not warranted because, rather than claiming that it was interpreting a statute that was silent or ambiguous, the BIA prohibited imputation because it considered imputation to be contrary to the plain language of Section 1229b. Sawyers argues that the statute was unambiguous because courts construe ambiguities in immigration statutes in favor of the alien. Gutierrez and Sawyers contend that the BIA is not entitled to deference, even if the statute is ambiguous, because the BIA’s decision is not based on a reasonable construction of Section 1229b. Gutierrez argues that the BIA’s interpretation of Section 1229b is impermissible because the amendment of the cancellation of removal statute was not intended to alter circuit courts’ uniform interpretation of the statute allowing imputation of a parent’s status to a child. Gutierrez further argues that the BIA’s interpretation of the statute is unreasonable because it is contrary to the statute’s objective of protecting lawful permanent residents who have strong ties to the United States, and to Congress’s goal of maintaining family unity through the immigration laws.