United States v. Jones

The forbids warrantless or unreasonable governmental intrusions upon a person’s righttoprivacy. When faced with an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the Supreme Court must first examine the subjective personal and societal expectations of privacy associated with the government action in order to determine whether an unreasonable search or seizure has occurred. SeeSmith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979). If the Court finds either a search or seizure, it will then decide whether the specific circumstances allow for an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The United States argues that no illegal search or seizure occurred here because Jones did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when driving in public and did not lose possessory rights over his vehicle. See Brief for Petitioner at 17–18. In opposition, Jones objects to the United States’ formulation of what constitutes a reasonable expectation of privacy and contends that the installation of the GPS device interfered with his possessory interest in his vehicle. See Brief for Respondent at 14, 45–46.

GPS Tracking as a Fourth Amendment Search

Relying on the Supreme Court’s Katz decision, the United States asserts that Jones could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy while driving on public roads. See Brief for Petitioner at 17–18. In Katz, the Supreme Court found that individuals cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy while engaging in activities within the public sphere. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). The United States argues that, according to Katz and its progeny, all actions performed in public are subject to scrutiny, even if it is unlikely that any one person would witness all of the activities—as long as the particular activities could have been tracked by the lay observer, a reasonable expectation of privacy cannot exist. See Brief for Petitioner at 22–24. The government maintains that since Jones traveled on public roads to reach his stash house, he could not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy when going to and from the house because any passerby could have observed his actions. See id. at 37–38. Although the stash house may not be in a public area, the United States notes that a passerby could still have viewed Jones’s repeated visits to the house via the public roads. See id. Finally, the government adds that the use of a visual aid, such as a GPS device, does not matter because the legal emphasis should be placed on whether the target moved in a public space. See id.

In opposition, Jones contends that the United States misconstrued the language in Katz by omitting key portions of the opinion. See Brief for Respondent at 34–35. He argues that the missing text explains that if an individual reasonably wishes to keep private certain actions performed in the public sphere, the privacy of those actions may be constitutionally protected. See id. at 33–34. Given this language, Jones asserts that the appropriate test does not only look to whether an action occurs in public, but examines the reasonableness of the means of observing those actions. See id. at 31–32. He explains that even if certain actions happen in public, there may still be a socially accepted expectation of privacy as to the actions themselves and the means of capturing information about them. See id. at 34–35. Due to the uniquely intrusive nature of prolonged GPS tracking, Jones concludes that he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy against this specific means of observation. See id. at 16. In addition, he contends that although a person’s routes on public roads may be observed by the naked eye, continuous GPS tracking allows law enforcement to capture entire patterns of movement—a feat likely unachievable by a random passerby. See id. at 43–44.Thus, Jones concludes that he reasonably held an expectation of privacy as to the entirety of his movements, and that the status of being in public cannot determine what are reasonable and socially acceptable expectations of privacy. See id.

GPS Device Installation and Use as a Fourth Amendment Seizure

Jones first contends that the GPS device’s installation constituted a seizure because it materially interfered with his possessory interest in the vehicle, intruding upon his fundamental right to exclude others from using his property. See Brief for Respondentat 46–49. Further, he points out that no existing precedent accommodates the stealth installation of tracking devices on individuals’ cars because such intrusion represents a sort of “infection” on the property. See id. at 49. Jones distinguishes other tracking methods, such as an “X” chalked on a vehicle, by pointing out that it is not the intrusion itself but its nature that determines when innocent tracking becomes an unconstitutional seizure. See id. at 51–52. He further argues that both the recording and storage of GPS data constitute a seizure because those actions memorialize private information. See id. at 54. Jones concludes that after the police officers installed the device, all further operation of the tracker, including data collection, was an illegal seizure. See id. at 53–54.

In response, the United States argues that there was no seizure when the FBI agents installed the device because the agents did not interfere with Jones’s right of possession of the vehicle. See Brief for Petitioner at 39. First, the government explains that no privacy barrier shields the exterior of a vehicle because of its public nature. See id. at 39–40. The United States argues that the mere attachment of the device did not convey any information that Jones wished to keep secret, and the potential to convey information does not make installation itself a search or seizure. See id. at 41–42. The government next contends that the attachment did not meaningfully interfere with Jones’s use of his vehicle, as Jones does not claim any actual interference or danger stemming from the GPS device, and therefore the device did not affect any possessory interest. See id. at 42–43, 45–46. Ultimately, the United States asserts that if the GPS installation’s “infectious” nature only violated theoretical possessory interests, Jones’s claim of property interference cannot be sustained. See id. at 45–46.

Alternatively, the government argues that even if the Court finds a search or seizure, a reasonableness test demonstrates that a warrant exception should apply. See Brief for Petitionerat 47–48. The United States contends that after considering all of the circumstances surrounding the GPS’ installation and use, the need for such use greatly exceeded any privacy rights affected. See id. at 49–50. The government notes that while the only information conveyed was regarding Jones’s location, law enforcement greatly benefited from the data. See id.

Jones disagrees, stating that the Fourth Amendment demands more than a simple balancing test. See Brief for Respondent at 56–57. Jones argues that the warrant requirement checks the power of law enforcement, and that the Court has created special exceptions only for exceptional cases. See id. at 59. After listing such exceptional cases, Jones points out that no special circumstances aside from law enforcement facilitation exist here. See id. In addition, Jones asserts that even with a balancing test, the incredibly intrusive and continuous nature of GPS tracking tips the scales in favor of requiring a warrant. See id. at 58.