Wall v. Kholi

This case concerns an interpretation of federal habeas corpus law, particularly 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides that a person in custody as a result of a state court’s judgment generally cannot file a habeas corpus petition later than one year after his or her conviction goes to final judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). An exception to this rule arises if the prisoner properly applied for “State post-conviction or other collateral review” within that year, in which case the one-year time period is tolled for as long as the prisoner’s application remains pending. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Khalil Kholi maintains that his motion for a reduction of his sentence was sufficient to delay the expiration of the one-year timeframe for filing a habeas corpus petition in federal court. See Brief for Respondent, Khalil Kholi at 7. Petitioner A.T. Wall, the Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections, argues that such a motion does not fit under the statutory definition of “post-conviction or other collateral review” and, therefore, Kholi’s habeas corpus petition was untimely. See Brief for Petitioner, A.T. Wall, Director, Rhode Island Department of Corrections at 15. Ultimately, the case turns on whether the phrase “post-conviction or other collateral review” is broad enough to encompass Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion.

Wall contends that, although the statute does not attempt to define the meaning of “collateral review,” that category cannot include a sentence-reduction motion. See Brief for Petitioner at 19–20. Specifically, Wall argues that a convict’s application for collateral review must essentially challenge the conviction’s or sentence’s lawfulness, with an aim toward upsetting the conviction or sentence outright. See Id. at 21–22. Because Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion did not claim that his conviction or sentence was actually illegal, Wall would place that motion outside the bounds of the statute’s tolling provision. See Id. Also, because the Court had historically used the term “collateral review” in just this way, Wall urges the Court to presume that Congress had this meaning in mind when it originally drafted Section 2244(d). See Id. at 24.

Kholi agrees that Congress did not explicitly define “post-conviction or other collateral review” but asserts that the common understanding of those words compels the inclusion of a sentence-reduction motion. See Brief for Respondent at 11. Mainly, Kholi takes issue with Wall’s conclusion that the word “collateral” limits the type of post-conviction review that should toll the one-year limitations period. SeeId. at 13–14. Kholi’s maintains that collateral review simply refers to any review of a judgment that takes place outside the direct appeal process. SeeId. at 17. Accordingly, a motion need not challenge the actual legality of the defendant’s conviction or sentence in order for review to be “collateral.” SeeId. Moreover, Kholi argues that the statutory language at play here is purposefully broad and has in mind a wide variety of post-conviction motions and applications, ranging from legal challenges to a conviction’s validity to pleas for discretionary, equitable relief. SeeId. at 14. States have various different procedures and names for their post-conviction relief mechanisms, and Kholi believes that Congress intended for the statute’s tolling provision to cover all of them. SeeId. at 12.

Wall additionally contends that his interpretation of the statute remains true to Congress’s original purpose in passing the AEDPA: judicial efficiency, specifically in reducing the delays before criminal sentences may be executed. See Brief for Petitioner at 36. According to Wall, federal habeas corpus law generally suggests that only motions to invalidate convictions or sentences should toll the one-year period. SeeId. at 39–40. This rule arguably achieves the proper balance between, on the one hand, the traditional requirement that the prisoner of a state must exhaust all available state remedies before filing a federal habeas corpus petition, and on the other, a proper respect for the finality of state judgments. SeeId. at 40. Wall contends that the original purpose of the statutory tolling provision was to allow state courts to resolve any questions that might potentially undo a conviction or sentence because such results naturally make writs of habeas corpus unnecessary. SeeId. So, because Kholi’s motion sought only to reduce, not invalidate his sentence, it could have no effect on his need for a writ of habeas corpus, and there was thus no reason for that motion to delay the expiration of the one-year period. SeeId. at 40–41. Therefore, Wall believes that allowing Kholi’s sentence-reduction motion to toll the time period would undermine the goal of preserving judgment finality and, consequently, disrupt the appropriate balance. SeeId. at 41.

In response, Kholi asserts that other purposes besides exhaustion of state remedies stand behind the statute’s tolling provision, namely comity and federalism. See Brief for Respondent at 21–22, 41. He believes these goals are furthered by allowing a state to address every aspect of its criminal convictions, including leniency in sentencing, before a federal habeas corpus court becomes involved. SeeId. at 41. Kholi also suggests that, given these opportunities, state courts may even grant relief sufficient to cause prisoners not to want to pursue federal habeas corpus writs. SeeId. at 37. Finally, Kholi reiterates his argument that Congress intended for the statute’s tolling provision to encompass a broad range of prisoners’ motions, ultimately anything leading to any type of relief, including sentence reduction. SeeId. Kholi finds problematic Wall’s proposed distinction between motions that seek legal invalidation of convictions or sentences and those that do not. SeeId. at 38–39. Kholi instead urges the Court to allow all post-conviction applications for relief to toll the limitations period, arguing that his “bright-line” approach is clearer and would be much easier for future habeas courts to adjudicate. SeeId.