Renico v. Lett

The parties in this case disagree over whether the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in affirming a district court’s decision to grant an inmate a writ of habeas corpus. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA,” codified at 28 U.S.C. 2254) requires federal courts to give state court decisions in habeas proceedings deference unless they unreasonably applied clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. See Brief for Petitioner at 13. The Petitioner, Paul Renico (“Renico”), argues that the state court’s decision to declare a mistrial did not unreasonably apply clearly established Supreme Court precedent, and therefore, it is entitled to deference. See Id. at 13. The Respondent, Reginald Lett, argues the opposite—that the state court’s decision unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent and violated his right to be free from Double Jeopardy. See Brief for Respondent at 6.

Did the Trial Court Exercise “Sound Discretion?”

The parties agree that clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent requires a trial court to exercise “sound discretion” in finding “manifest necessity” before declaring a mistrial. See Brief for Petitioner at 16; Brief for Respondent at 8, 10. The parties also agree that a genuinely deadlocked jury constitutes “manifest necessity,” meaning that if the trial court exercised sound discretion in determining that the jury was deadlocked, then a new trial would not violate the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition against Double Jeopardy. See Brief for Petitioner at 16; Brief for Respondent at 9. They differ on whether the trial court’s finding of “manifest necessity” was within the discretion afforded to it by Supreme Court precedent.

Renico argues that the discretion afforded to trial courts in ordering a mistrial is broad. See Brief for Petitioner at 17–18. To support this argument, Renico looks to the language found in Supreme Court cases like United States v. Perez, where the Court said that trial courts have “the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is manifest necessity.” SeeId. at 20 (citing United States v. Perez,22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824)). Renico argues that because this articulation of the rule is framed in general terms like “manifest necessity” rather than specific terms indicating exactly when courts should order a new trial, courts should have broad discretion in applying the standard. SeeId. at 18. Renico also argues that broad discretion is necessary in order to properly balance the competing rights at stake in the Double Jeopardy Clause, such as the rights of the public to justice and the rights of the accused to not be continuously tried by the state until convicted. SeeId. at 22.

On the other hand, Lett argues that the discretion afforded to trial courts in ordering a new trial is narrow. See Brief for Respondent at 10. Lett also quotes the Supreme Court in Perez, noting that, “the power [to declare a mistrial] ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.” See id. (citing Perez, 22 U.S. at 580). Furthermore, Lett looks to other Supreme Court decisions that define “manifest necessity” as being a “high degree” of necessity only found in “striking” or “extraordinary” circumstances. See Id. at 10–11 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506 (1978); Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736 (1963)). Accordingly, Lett argues, a trial court should only make a finding of “manifest necessity” after a careful, deliberate consideration of the circumstances. See Id. at 12. Lett also argues that the record must evidence this careful, deliberate consideration, and the record in this case does not because the trial judge’s limited inquiries did not demonstrate whether the jury was genuinely deadlocked. See Id. at 13–14.

The parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review that should be applied by appellate courts to determine whether the trial court properly exercised “sound discretion.” Lett argues that sound discretion is applied only where the facts establish both that the jury was genuinely deadlocked, and the record demonstrates that the trial court acted carefully and deliberately. See Brief for Respondent at 20. Renico believes that where the facts do not show that the trial court acted irresponsibly or irrationally by ordering a mistrial based on something other than a belief that the jury was deadlocked, then the judge exercised “sound discretion.” See Brief for Petitioner at 28–29.

Lett argues that the evidence does not show that the jury was genuinely deadlocked because the court did not let counsel speak on whether there should be a mistrial, only heard from the foreperson, and only allowed the foreperson to answer “yes or no” to the question of whether the jury would agree. See Brief for Respondent at 16. Lett notes that only three minutes after reading aloud a note from a jury asking what would happen if they could not agree, the trial court dismissed them and ordered a new trial. See Id. at 15. Lett argues that a trial court could not have responsibly concluded that the jury was deadlocked based on this evidence, as the foreperson’s one word answer is ambiguous, no other jurors were asked, and the jury’s note did not in any way state that they were, in fact, deadlocked. See Id. at 16–18. Furthermore, in Supreme Court precedent where the “sound discretion” standard was met, the trial court allowed counsel a chance to argue the matter— in this case, the trial court did not allow argument, or even consider any other alternatives. See Id. at 12–13, 17. Lett argues that if such a small amount of evidence in the record suffices to order a new trial, then state appellate courts’ only purpose is to add a “rubber stamp” of approval to trial courts’ findings of “manifest necessity.” See Id. at 17.

Renico is less concerned with whether the evidence shows the jury to be genuinely deadlocked, but rather whether there is evidence that goes directly to the policy rationales behind Double Jeopardy. Renico notes that there is no evidence or insinuation that the judge acted for any reason other than a belief that the jury was deadlocked. See Brief for Petitioner at 29. According to Renico, this is not then a case where the prosecution is attempting to try to defendant a second time just to get a conviction. See Id.In the absence of any evidence that the judge decided for some other reason than a belief that the jury was deadlocked, Renico argues that appellate courts should defer to the trial court’s factual determinations because the trial court is in the best situation to make those determinations. See Id. at 33.

The Scope of Federal Review Under the AEDPA

While the parties agree that the requirements for “sound discretion” and “manifest necessity” are “clearly-established” precedent, they still quarrel over the meaning of “clearly-established” in other respects, which is important because federal courts must defer to a state court’s decision in a habeas proceeding unless the state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under the AEDPA. See Brief for Petitioner at 13.

Renico argues that there is no clearly established Supreme Court precedent that requires state courts to take any particular steps before declaring a mistrial, meaning that there is no basis for a federal court to overturn the trial court’s decision to declare a mistrial under the AEDPA. See Brief for Petitioner at 32. Renico argues by analogy to a recent Supreme Court case involving AEDPA, United States v. Cronic, which involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Id. at 36; United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). Renico argues that, in Cronic, the Court held that there was no clearly established precedent on what constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel and therefore a federal court had no basis upon which to overturn a fact-based state court determination on the issue. See Id. Similarly, Renico argues, a federal court would have no basis to overturn a state court decision to order a new trial because no clearly established precedent finds particular facts dispositive or requires the state court to take any specific measures prior to reaching such a decision. See Id.

Lett argues that Renico’s argument that a federal court must defer to a state court’s factual findings should be ignored because it was first raised on appeal and not in the district court. See Brief for Respondent at 36. Lett also responds that the Supreme Court has intentionally avoided specifying exactly what steps a state court must take before declaring a mistrial, but has clearly held that they must be cautious and take all of the circumstances into account. See Brief for the Respondentat 21. Further, Lett argues that trial court’s abrupt action, failure to allow counsel to argue, and failure to consider alternatives, constitutes an “unreasonable” application of this precedent. See Id. at 24. To support this, Lett cites to various circuit court cases, arguing that they all reject bright line rules and look to the myriad factual circumstances present when judges declare mistrials to determine if there is enough evidence to support a finding of “manifest necessity.” See Id. at 26. While the circuit courts may list the factors and considerations they look for differently, their decisions all essentially apply the same legal standard—a careful and cautious consideration of all the circumstances. See Id. at 31.