Thompson v. North American Stainless

Under Title VII, employees may sue their employers for workplace discrimination. See Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d at 806–07 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Section 704(a) of Title VII, known as the “anti-retaliation provision,” forbids employers from “discriminat[ing] against any . . . [employee] because he . . . has made a charge . . . under this title.” See Id. Eric Thompson contends that he was fired because his then-fiancée filed a discrimination claim against North American Stainless, their mutual employer. See Brief for Petitioner, Eric L. Thompson at 3. He argues that this violates Title VII because Section 704(a) forbids employers from retaliating against Title VII claimants by inflicting punishment upon a closely related third party. See Id. at 9–10. Thompson further contends that if this third-party retaliation does occur, Title VII authorizes the third-party victim to sue the employer. See Id. at 35. In opposition, Stainless agrees that third-party reprisals are illegal under Title VII, but argues that the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision bars a third-party victim from bringing suit because he or she has not personally engaged in conduct protected under Title VII, such as filing a discrimination complaint. See Brief for Respondent, North American Stainless, LP at 11.

Do Third-Party Reprisals Violate Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Clause?

Thompson argues that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision prevents an employer from retaliating against an employee by firing or otherwise disciplining a third party. See Id. at 9–10. He contends that because Congress broadly worded the protections in this provision, it intended to forbid all forms of retaliation, including reprisals against third parties. See Id. 11–12. Further, Thompson points to other sections of Title VII that an employer violates only when the effects are on the “plaintiff’s own employment”; accordingly, Thompson argues that the lack of such a requirement in the anti-retaliation provision supports the contention that an employer violates it when the effects of retaliation are felt by a third party. See Id. 13–15.

Stainless, however, contends that the issue in this case is not, as Thompson alleges, whether employers can or cannot retaliate against third parties. See Brief for Respondent at 19–20. In fact, Stainless asserts that reprisals against third parties are actionable under the anti-retaliation provision, and that the person who engaged in the protected conduct—by filing a suit under Title VII—may bring a suit for such retaliation. See Id. Therefore, Stainless argues, this case is actually about who may sue the employer when that employer retaliates against a third party who did not engage in activity under Title VII. See Id. at 20.

May Third-Party Victims of Retaliation Bring Suit Against Their Employer Under Title VII?

Thompson contends that he may sue his employer, Stainless, because he is the third-party victim of retaliation against the protected party, his then-fiancée Regalado. See Brief for Petitioner at 35. Specifically, Thompson argues that as a third-party victim he is a “person aggrieved” under Title VII and, as such, has standing to sue. See Id. at 35–36. According to Thompson, use of this broad term evidences Congress’ intent to construe standing broadly, thus extending the right to sue beyond those “whose own rights have been violated” to all those against whom employers have retaliated. See Id. at 36. Even absent standing as a person aggrieved, Thompson contends that he may bring this action by asserting traditional third-party standing. See Id. at 21. Thompson argues that he satisfies the three requirements for third-party standing: (1) he suffered an injury in fact when he was fired; (2) he has a close relationship to the party whose rights were violated, Regalado, his now-wife; and (3) it would be nearly impossible for Regalado to obtain relief for the injury that Thompson suffered, as she does not have a “personal stake in the outcome” of Thompson’s claim. See Id. at 40–43.

In opposition, Stainless argues that both the purpose and the plain language of the anti-retaliation provision bar Thompson from bringing a claim as a third-party victim. See Brief for Respondent at 11, 14. The anti-retaliation provision, Stainless asserts, is intended to prevent harm to individuals who engage in protected activities under Title VII, such as filing a discrimination complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. See Id. at 11–12. Therefore, because Thompson never engaged in such activity he is not a member of the class that the anti-retaliation provision intends to protect. See Id. Moreover, Stainless argues, according to Section 704(a)’s plain language, Thompson does not have a cause of action because Title VII litigants are protected based “upon their conduct, not upon their associations.” See Id. at 15–16. Accordingly, addressing Thompson’s specific claims of standing, Stainless contends that Thompson does not have standing under Title VII because “person aggrieved” does not include any injured party. See Id. at 31–32, 35. Rather, Stainless argues, if Congress had intended such a broad meaning, “injured” would replaced “aggrieved” or, as is done in the Fair Housing Act, Congress would have defined aggrieved to include “any injured person.” See Id. at 35–36. Moreover, Stainless contends, Thompson cannot obtain third party standing because the term “person aggrieved” encompasses prudential standing rules, which include “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising another person’s legal rights.” See Id. at 34–37. Therefore, by adopting “person aggrieved,” Congress intended to preclude suits based on third-party standing. See Id. at 35–37.

Is the EEOC’s Interpretation of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision Entitled to Deference?

Thompson, and his supporting amici curiae, contend that the Supreme Court should give deference to EEOC interpretations and guidance regarding the anti-retaliation clause. See Brief for Petitioner at 21. Through guidance and adjudication, the EEOC has repeatedly stated that reprisals against a third party violate the anti-retaliation provision and that the victim of such retaliation may assert their own rights against the employer. See Id. at 21–23; Brief of Amici Curiae NELA, et al. in Support of Petitioner at 18–19. Thompson argues that the Court should recognize, as it has in the past, the importance of this “longstanding construction” by the EEOC, an agency with the information and experience to make such a judgment. See Brief of Petitioner at 23–24. Additionally, NELA contends that because the anti-retaliation provision is ambiguous, the Court should defer to the EEOC’s valid interpretation because it furthers Title VII’s anti-discrimination purpose. See Brief of NELA at 17.

In contrast, Stainless argues that EEOC interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision is not entitled to the Court’s deference. See Brief for Respondent at 48–49. The Court, Stainless contends, has already determined that interpretive guidelines, such as those that Thompson relies upon here, are merely entitled to respect, not deference. See Id. Furthermore, lower courts have already refused to rely upon these same interpretations. See Id. at 49. Ultimately, Stainless asserts, this case revolves around statutory construction, an area where the judiciary maintains the final authority. See Id. at 51–52.