Graham v. Florida; Sullivan v. Florida

The Eighth Amendment prohibits states from inflicting “cruel and unusual punishments” upon a criminal defendant. Over the past thirty years, the U.S. Supreme Court has refined its jurisprudence regarding whether a specific sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Additionally, the Court has created several categorical rules regarding classes of defendants, including juveniles, who are exempt from the death penalty. These cases present the Court with the opportunity to consider whether the rationale behind exempting juveniles from the death penalty also justifies exempting a juvenile from life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense.

To prove an Eighth Amendment violation, a petitioner must demonstrate that the sentence imposed raises an inference of “gross disproportionality.” If a petitioner adequately demonstrates “gross disproportionality” between the crime committed and the sentence imposed, the court will then undertake a comparative analysis, analyzing whether the imposed sentence is an outlier among state and international criminal justice systems. In Roper v. Simmons, the Court set forth a categorical rule that imposing the death penalty on a juvenile defendant always violates the Eighth Amendment, reasoning that juveniles are not as culpable as adults, are more susceptible to peer pressure and negative influences, and have not fully developed their character yet. Consequently, the harshest penalty a juvenile may receive for any crime is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

Should the Court Extend Roper v. Simmons to Include Instances Where Life without the Possibility of Parole Is Imposed for a Non-Homicide Offense?

Relying on the Court’s reasoning in Roper, petitioners, Terrence Jamar Graham (“Graham”) and Joe Harris Sullivan (“Sullivan”), both argue that sentencing a juvenile defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a non-homicide offense clearly violates the Eighth Amendment by imposing a grossly disproportionate sentence on a juvenile defendant. Graham and Sullivan argue that, although life in prison without the possibility of parole may be permissible for adult defendants who commit non-homicide offenses, juvenile defendants’ diminished culpability and lack of maturity necessitates a juvenile exemption. According to Graham and Sullivan, the justifications for imposing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on adults do not apply to juveniles, because juvenile defendants are (1) less culpable than adult defendants, (2) more likely to respond positively to efforts of rehabilitation, and (3) unlikely to be deterred by the threat of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because they lack the ability to accurately assess risk. Finally, Graham and Sullivan argue that, when imposed on a juvenile — in particular, on a young teen — the harshness and finality of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is comparable to the death penalty, because both punishments are irreversible and represent society's complete abandonment of any effort at rehabilitation.

In contrast, respondent, the State of Florida (“Florida”), argues that the Court's “death is different” jurisprudence should counsel against extending Roper to include life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, because the Court has explicitly differentiated between the death penalty and prison sentences, regardless of their length. Additionally, Florida argues that the Court has never before considered the petitioner’s age when weighing the proportionality of a sentence and should not start here, because the Florida criminal justice system has already accounted for petitioners’ ages through its sentencing process.

Does Imposing Life Imprisonment without the Possibility of Parole for a Non-Homicide Offense Violate the Eighth Amendment when Applied to a Juvenile?

For the reasons stated above, Graham and Sullivan contend that imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on a juvenile — in particular, if the juvenile is only a young teenager — raises an inference of gross disproportionality. Additionally, Graham argues that because life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the harshest penalty a court may impose upon a juvenile, it follows that the state should only impose it for the worst crimes, i.e. homicide.

In response, Florida argues that only two considerations are relevant to determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate: (1) the characteristics of the crime committed and (2) the sentence imposed. According to Florida, age is not a factor in determining proportionality. Florida also notes that the Court has previously upheld life sentences for crimes far less severe than those committed by Graham and Sullivan. Consequently, Florida argues that compared to previous sentences already upheld by the Court, the sentences imposed on Graham and Sullivan do not raise an inference of gross disproportionality.

Should the Court Undertake A Comparative Analysis, and If So, Would Other States and Countries Sentence a Juvenile to Life Imprisonment Without the Possibility of Parole for a Non-Homicide Offense?

Graham and Sullivan contend that Florida’s imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juveniles does not comport with the practices of other states and countries. Graham argues that only two states permit a judge to sentence a juvenile without any prior convictions to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for armed burglary, but, practically, only Florida imposes it. Graham and Sullivan argue that the fact that most state legislatures have not explicitly approved life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for juveniles and that those that have rarely impose such a punishment signifies a national consensus against imposing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juvenile defendants. Additionally, Graham and Sullivan contend that, among countries, the United States stands alone in its imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juveniles and that the United States and Somalia are the only two countries that have yet to ratify the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which expressly forbids imposing a life sentence on a juvenile.

Florida counters that a comparative analysis is not necessary in either case, as both Graham and Sullivan fail to meet the threshold requirement of gross disproportionality between the crime committed and the sentence imposed. Florida argues that, even if the Court were to undertake a comparative analysis, the majority of states allow the imposition of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole on juveniles for a variety of crimes, reflecting a national consensus in support of allowing, rather than condemning, the sentence. Florida notes that the Court has traditionally not turned to international trends unless the same trend toward abolition also existed among states. Furthermore, the Convention on the Rights of the Child binds neither the United States nor Florida, because the United States has not ratified it, and consequently, no international obligation dictates sentencing limitations for juveniles.

Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over Sullivan’s Claims?

Florida contends that state procedural law bars Sullivan’s claims and consequently, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review Sullivan v. Florida. Absent a specific exception, Florida law imposes a two-year limitation on filing a post-conviction motion in a non-capital case. In this case, the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review the Eighth Amendment claim if the state court had an adequate basis, independent of the merits of the federal claim, for denying the claim on procedural grounds. A state court’s judgment on procedural grounds is adequate if the procedure in question is (1) strictly or regularly followed and (2) applied evenhandedly to similar claims. A state court’s judgment is independent of the merits of the federal claim if the judgment is not based on a constitutional right.

Florida contends that the trial court appropriately denied relief under Rule 3.850(b) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure and that Florida courts strictly and evenhandedly observe these limitations on jurisdiction. Florida also argues that the state court independently reached its decision, noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never recognized a constitutional right of juveniles not to be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Consequently, the state court’s decision not to extend Roper is independent of the merits of Sullivan’s claim that such a constitutional right exists. Finally, Florida argues that Sullivan’s claims are untimely because he could have asserted them either at trial or on direct appeal under Thompson v. Oklahoma, an earlier case exempting juveniles under the age of sixteen from the death penalty.

In response, Sullivan argues that the Court does, indeed, have jurisdiction, because the Florida court’s disposal of the claim depended upon the court’s consideration of a federal constitutional claim. Because the state court based its denial of relief on its determination that no constitutional right exists to exempt juveniles from a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the court’s decision was not independent of the constitutional claim in question. Additionally, notwithstanding the two-year limitation, Rule 3.850 also allows a Florida court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. Consequently, Sullivan argues, the state court’s decision to deny relief in this case must rest upon a determination that the sentence does not violate the Constitution and, therefore, is not based on independent state law grounds.