Iraq v. Beaty (07-1090); Iraq v. Simon

Traditionally, under customary international law, foreign states have enjoyed virtually absolute  from the  of other states' courts. See The Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137-40 (1812). Throughout the twentieth century, however, states have increasingly adopted a restrictive theory of , granting immunity to public but not private acts of sovereigns and states. See Tate Letter (1952). In 1952, the  ("State Department") followed suit and in 1976, Congress codified the restrictive theory in the  ("FSIA"). See id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1330, et seq. In 1996, Congress amended the FSIA, providing in relevant part, that a state "designated as a state sponsor of terrorism . . . at the time the act [at issue] occurred" is not immune from an action for "money damages . . . for personal injury . . . that was caused by an act of torture . . . [or] hostage taking" to a "national of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7); see also Simon v. Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The State Department designated the Republic of Iraq as a state sponsor of terrorism from 1990 to 2004. See American Forces Press Service News Articles. In these consolidated cases, the  will decide if, under , U.S. courts have jurisdiction over Petitioner the , et al. ("Iraq"), in cases involving alleged misdeeds, including torture and hostage taking, by Saddam Hussein's regime, or if Iraq is immune from prosecution.

Applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) to Iraq under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Authorization Act

The  ("EWSAA") provides, in relevant part, that "the President may make inapplicable with respect to Iraq . . . any other provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism." Pub. L. No. 108-011, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (2003). Iraq contends that the plain language of the EWSAA unambiguously authorized then President George W. Bush to make 's exception to sovereign immunity inapplicable to Iraq and that President Bush exercised that authority in 2003. See Brief for Petitioners, Republic of Iraq, et al. ("Iraq") at 23-28. According to Iraq, "federal courts ‘are not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute to reflect a meaning [they] deem more desirable. Instead, [they] must give effect to the text Congress enacted.'" See id. at 28 (citing Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S.Ct. 831, 841 (2008)). Iraq argues that because the phrase "any other provision of law" is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to "resort to legislative history" to inform the EWSAA's meaning. Id. at 29 (citing U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997)). Nevertheless, Iraq asserts that the EWSAA's legislative history, in particular Congress' inclusion of the word "any," supports Iraq's expansive reading of the EWSAA. See id. at 29. In addition, Iraq notes that "the President has independent constitutional authority-even without express statutory authority-to compromise the claims of U.S. nationals to further foreign policy interests," such as determining "whether and when a new government of Iraq [should] be freed from the sanctions imposed on its predecessor regime." Id. at 30-32. Finally, Iraq contends that § 1083(c)(4) of the  ("NDAA"), enacted five years after the EWSAA to clarify congressional intent, neither altered Congress' original intent in enacting the EWSAA nor undermined the President's authority to make 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to Iraq. See id. at 34-37.  the United States agrees. See Brief for United States in Support of Reversal at 28-30. In addition, the United States supports Iraq's argument that the EWSAA unambiguously authorized President Bush to make 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to Iraq and that President Bush validly exercised that authority. See id. at 10-19. Finally, the United States contends that even if the EWSAA was ambiguous, courts should accord the President's reasonable interpretation "great deference." Id. at 22-25.

Conversely, Respondents Robert Simon, et al. ("Simon") and Jordan Beaty, et al. ("Beaty") contend that the EWSAA did not grant President Bush the authority to make  inapplicable to Iraq. See Brief for Respondents, Jordan Beaty, et al. ("Beaty") at 29-42 (citing Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see Brief for Respondents, Robert Simon, et al. ("Simon") at 11-14. According to Simon, under the plain language of the EWSAA, the phrase "any other provision of law" refers only to "statutes contained in § 620A(a)" of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, not to 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7). Id. at 14-23 (citing Pub. L. No. 108-011, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579 (2003)). Simon argues that conventions and presumptions of statutory language, including contextualizing statutory language and recognizing express but not implied statutory repeals, also support this interpretation. See id. at 23-34. In addition, Simon asserts that "there is no indication anywhere in the legislative history of § 1503 [of the EWSAA] that Congress intended to authorize the President to make inapplicable any part of the FSIA." Id. at 37-39. Simon further asserts that , post-EWSAA legislation which mandates the manner in which the EWSAA "is to be interpreted," supports his argument and should be accorded "great weight." Id. at 39-42 (citing Loving v. U.S., 517 U.S. 748, 770 (1996)). Finally, Simon contends that even if President Bush did effectively render 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to Iraq under the EWSAA, it is no longer effective because the EWSAA lapsed on September 30, 2005. See id. at 39-42. In addition, Beaty adds that even if the EWSAA authorized President Bush to make 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) inapplicable to Iraq, it did not authorize the President to do so retroactively and therefore, U.S. courts have jurisdiction over Simon's and Beaty's claims. See Brief for Beaty at 7-24.

Effect of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 on 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7)

Iraq contends that even if President Bush did not effectively render  inapplicable to Iraq under the EWSAA, § 1605(a)(7) does not apply to Iraq because the NDAA expressly repealed it and President Bush "waived its replacement as to Iraq." Brief for Petitioners at 37-38. According to Iraq, both the NDAA and its legislative history support Iraq's argument that the NDAA repealed § 1605(a)(7). See id. at 40-50. In addition, according to Iraq, U.S. courts have jurisdiction under the FSIA only if a state is not entitled to immunity under §§ 1605-07. See id. at 38. Accordingly, U.S. courts lack jurisdiction over Iraq because §§ 1605-07 do not currently except Iraq from sovereign immunity. See id.

Conversely, according to Beaty and Simon, the NDAA does not apply retroactively. See Brief for Beaty at 25-29; see Brief for Simon at 50-52. Thus, they argue, even if it repeals , U.S. courts would maintain jurisdiction over Simon and Beaty's claims. See id. In addition, Beaty argues that even if the NDAA applied retroactively, U.S. courts would maintain jurisdiction over Simon's and Beaty's claims because President Bush waived the NDAA with respect to Iraq. See Brief for Beaty at 25-29.

According to the United States, although both parties rely on the NDAA, it has no effect on U.S. courts' jurisdiction over Simon's and Beaty's claims because President Bush "immediately waived application of the NDAA with respect to Iraq upon its enactment." Brief for United States at 25-27.