Logan v. United States

Statutory Background

The ACCA subjects felons convicted of firearm possession to an enhanced minimum penalty of fifteen years if they have at least three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses.  � 921(a)(20) adds several elements to this equation. First, a conviction for a state misdemeanor counts as a "violent felony" if the punishment exceeds two years. Second, the "choice-of-law" clause provides that the jurisdiction where the conviction occurs determines what constitutes a conviction. Next, the "restoration-of-rights" exemption clause provides that any convictions that have been expunged, pardoned, set aside, or "ha[ve] had civil rights restored" are not "convictions" under the ACCA. 

Section 921(a)(20)'s current structure derives from Dickerson v. New Banner Institute, Inc., 460 U.S. 103 (1983). In Dickerson, the Supreme Court held that federal law determines what qualifies as a conviction, and that a conviction expunged by a State still counts as a conviction under federal firearms law. Congress disagreed with this result, and responded by enacting the Firearm Owners' Protection Act ("FOPA"). FOPA replaced Dickerson's uniform federal rule with each State's definition of conviction by amending 921(a)(20) to include the exemption clause.    

How to interpret "restore"

The United States argues that this case presents a simple question of statutory interpretation. The plain meaning of "restore" is to "give back" something that has been taken away.   The Court of Appeals agreed with this argument, and stated that "the 'restoration' of a thing never lost or diminished is a definitional impossibility."       Applying this logic, the state could not have "restored" Logan's rights simply because it had never taken them away.  

Logan, however, argues that the United States relies too heavily on the literal meaning of "restored."  He maintains that the First Circuit took the correct approach in United States v. Indelicato, 97 F.3d 627 (1st Cir. 1996). In Indelicato, the court found no reason why Congress would intend to treat a person who had never had their civil rights taken away more harshly than a person whose rights were taken away and later restored.   

Does the statute lead to "absurd" results?

Logan argues that the United States' literalist approach ignores the practical purpose and application of the statute and leads only to absurd results.    One absurd result is that the ACCA could treat persons convicted of less serious offenses the same or more harshly than those convicted of more serious offenses.   Because there is no legislative history addressing convictions where civil rights were retained, Logan contends that the Court should interpret the statute to avoid this "absurd and unjust result which Congress could not have intended."  Furthermore, a narrow interpretation of Section 921(a)(20) could subvert state law by criminalizing firearm possession that is lawful under some state statutes.    For example, in twelve states, including Wisconsin, all misdemeanants retain their civil rights and their right to possess firearms.  Under the narrow interpretation of Section 921(a)(20), however, the fact that they retain their civil rights disqualifies these convictions from the exemption clause. Therefore, the ACCA would make firearm possession illegal for people with three qualifying misdemeanor convictions, people who would otherwise be free to possess firearms under state law.   

The United States maintains that disparate sentencing under the ACCA is not absurd, but rather is a byproduct that Congress anticipated when it created the enhanced sentencing scheme.   Further, the United States argues that the ACCA appropriately defers to state law by exempting those convictions that states have "forgiven." The United States argues that Logan endorses "imaginative reconstruction" with his suggestion that the Court should interpret the statute to reflect what Congress would have done "had it thought" about it, rather than what Congress actually did.    The Seventh Circuit anticipated this argument when it noted that the Supreme Court has declared it "democratically illegitimate" to "set up the judiciary as effective lawmakers." 

Analysis of similar statutory provisions as applied to Section 921(a)(20)

The United States also contends that the legislative history of closely related ACCA provisions shows that Congress intended Section 921(a)(20)'s meaning of "restored" to include only those convictions that removed and then restored a convict's civil rights.   In particular, one provision of the ACCA criminalizes firearm possession for people convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence. This provision contains almost identical restoration-of-rights exemption language as Section 921(a)(20).   However, the domestic violence provision specifies that its restoration-of-rights exemption clause only operates "if the law of the applicable jurisdiction provides for the loss of civil rights under such an offense."  Hence, if a person is convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence in a state that allows him to retain his civil rights, the ACCA does not exempt that conviction.

The United States argues that the specification in the domestic violence provision clarifies the meaning of "restored" for Section 921(a)(20).   The United States notes that Congress enacted the domestic violence restoration-of-rights exemption clause ten years after Section 921(a)(20).   During those ten years, several courts of appeals questioned whether the "civil rights restored" exemption included persons who had never lost their civil rights.  The United States argues that the additional language in the domestic violence provision signifies Congress' response to these concerns.

Logan, however, reasons that "differing language within the same statute should yield different results."   He argues that Congress acts intentionally when it selects statutory language. Thus, Congress intended to limit the exemption clause only in the domestic violence provision. Logan argues that if Congress had meant for the restrictive language to apply to Section 921(a)(20), Congress would have amended Section 921(a)(20).  

How does the exemption clause defer to state post-conviction determinations?

Logan argues that the "restoration-of-rights" exemption clause defers to a state's determination that a person is trustworthy enough to possess firearms.   The state indicates such a determination by choosing not to deprive a defendant of his civil rights, or by bestowing an expungement, set aside, pardon, or restoration of civil rights.  Logan argues that the inquiry should focus on whether a person possesses civil rights subsequent to conviction, rather than how such a person obtains his civil rights.    In Caron, the Court acknowledged that although a convict's right to vote had never been taken away, his civil rights should be considered "restored" because he possessed all three rights after conviction. Logan urges, therefore, that there is no substantive difference between rights regained and rights retained after a conviction because "[b]oth are means to the same end."   Logan emphasizes that federal law should defer to the state's determination to leave a defendant's civil rights intact.  

Conversely, the United States contends that the restoration-of-rights clause does not defer to a state's determination that a person is trustworthy to possess firearms.    Instead, the United States cites Caron to argue that states confer a "measure of forgiveness" and a changed legal status when they restore a convict's civil rights, and that this forgiveness is what justifies excluding the conviction under the ACCA.   In Caron, the Court stated that the ACCA is intended to "keep guns away from all offenders who, the Federal Government feared, might cause harm even if those persons were not deemed dangerous by States."  Thus, the ACCA merely defers to a state's expressed decision to forgive a conviction, and is unrelated to a convict's "trustworthiness."   The United States argues that a state does not forgive or change the legal status of a person like Logan, who retains his civil rights after conviction. Therefore, the restoration-of-rights exemption does not apply to him.  

Does the rule of lenity apply?

Lastly, Logan argues that because the government's position cannot be shown to be "unambiguously correct," the Court should apply the rule of lenity and "resolve the ambiguity in the defendant's favor."   He contends that Section 921(a)(20)'s restoration-of-rights is ambiguous and does not give fair warning to people who do not believe they fall under the statute.  The United States disputes this reasoning because it believes the statute's text is unambiguous, and consequently argues that the rule of lenity does not apply.