Issues
Whether a state appellate court's interpretation of trial court proceedings is a finding of fact that is entitled to deference under the AEDPA.
Whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Strickland v. Washington allows a state court to deny an ineffective assistance of counsel claim when the defendant originally waives the presentation of assumedly mitigating evidence, but later claims that the evidence was erroneously excluded, especially when the state court determines that the exclusion of mitigation did not prejudice the sentence.
What must a defense attorney do when faced with a client who, after being found guilty of murder, refuses to allow family members to testify prior to his sentencing, even though those family members would introduce evidence that might result in the reduction of his sentence? In this case, the Supreme Court will address the extent to which a criminal defendant may claim that his defense attorney acted incompetently by not introducing mitigating evidence during his trial, even when the defense attorney directly follows his orders not to do so. Furthermore, the Court will determine the extent to which a federal court may review and overturn a defendant's state court sentence if he claims his attorney acted incompetently.
Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties
1. In light of the highly deferential standard of review required in this case pursuant to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), did the
Ninth Circuit err by holding that the Arizona state court unreasonably determined the facts when it found that Landrigan “instructed his attorney not to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing”?
2. Did the Ninth Circuit err by finding that the Arizona state court's analysis of Landrigan's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was objectively unreasonable under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), notwithstanding the absence of any contrary authority from this Court in cases in which (a) the defendant waives presentation of mitigation and impedes counsel's attempts to do so, or (b) the evidence the defendant subsequently claims should have been presented is not mitigating?
Facts
An Arizona state court convicted Respondent Jeffrey Landrigan of first-degree murder in 1990. See Petition for Certiorari at 1,2. After Landrigan's conviction, the trial court considered evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id at 2. Landrigan's defense counsel, Dennis Farrell, submitted a sentencing memorandum to the court that explained mitigating evidence of Landrigan's long history of drug abuse, but Landrigan acted to prevent Farrell from developing other mitigating evidence. See id at 3. Farrell tried to explain that previous convictions for assault and murder were actions taken in self-defense but Landrigan interrupted and maintained that the previous instances of violence were largely unprovoked. See id at 3-4. When Farrell subpoenaed Landrigan's mother and ex-wife to testify at the sentencing hearing, Landrigan objected and refused to allow them to testify. See id. The trial court confirmed with Landrigan that he did not want any mitigating circumstances brought forward and fully understood the implications of such a position. See id at 10.
The Arizona state court considered the information presented and found as mitigation that Landrigan loved his family and his family loved him and that his crime was not premeditated. See id at 5. The court found that these mitigating circumstances were not enough to prevent imposition of the death penalty. See id. On appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, the court upheld Landrigan's death sentence after independently reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id at 6.
Landrigan filed a petition with the Arizona Superior Court for post-conviction relief claiming that his counsel, Dennis Farrell, was ineffective at the sentencing hearing because he failed to present mitigating evidence. See Landrigan v. Schriro, 441 F.3d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 2006). The Arizona Superior Court rejected Landrigan's post-conviction claim, holding that Landrigan had expressly waived presentation of any mitigating circumstances. See id. The Arizona Supreme Court denied petition of review of the trial court's ruling. See id.
Landrigan filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court of the District of Arizona and claimed that Farrell was ineffective at the sentencing hearing because he failed to present evidence of a genetic predisposition for violence. See Petition for Certiorari at 6. The federal district court denied Landrigan's petition because he failed to show that Farrell's alleged failure to discover and present mitigation evidence prejudiced his case. See id at 7. Because Landrigan failed to show that the claimed mitigation evidence would have had a reasonable probability of changing the result of the proceeding, the federal district court determined that it was unnecessary to hold an evidentiary hearing. See id.
Landrigan appealed the federal district court's ruling to the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. See id. A unanimous three-judge panel upheld the federal district court's ruling, noting that although there may be close cases regarding the reasonableness of counsels' actions, this was not such a case. See id. The Ninth Circuit agreed to consider the case en banc and withdrew the panel decision. See id at 8. The en banc majority held that Landrigan had alleged a colorable claim for relief and was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. The dissenters of the opinion concluded that at best, Landrigan claimed that he suffered from “antisocial personality disorder” and, therefore, could not control his actions. See id at 8-9. The dissenters maintained that because Arizona courts have found that “antisocial personality disorder” is not a compelling mitigating circumstance, Landrigan had not alleged facts that if proven would create a reasonable probability that he would have received a different sentence. See id at 9.
In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Arizona Department of Corrections argues that the Ninth Circuit's failure to defer to the Arizona state court's factual finding that Landrigan had instructed his counsel not to present any mitigation evidence was improper. Moreover, the Department of Corrections espouses that the Ninth Circuit erred when it found that the state court had unreasonably applied the Strickland analysis to deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See id. The Supreme Court will address the proper amount of deference federal courts should give to state court factual findings in cases decided under the AEDPA as well as the extent of defense counsels' obligations to develop and present mitigation evidence when the defendant actively inhibits those efforts.
Analysis
The AEDPA as a Basis for Jurisdiction
Under the AEDPA, a federal court may not review a state court's sentence under a writ of habeas corpus unless the state court (1) rendered a decision that was contrary to established federal law as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court, or (2) resulted in an unreasonable determination based on the facts offered during the evidentiary phase of sentencing. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).
Arizona's Attorney General, on the one hand, argues that the AEDPA purposefully imposes a highly deferential standard of review. Hence, a federal court should not review a state court's sentence of a criminal defendant unless that sentence was clearly unreasonable in light of all the evidence available to the court. See Petition for Certiorari at 17. The Attorney General's further contends that because Landrigan prevented his counsel from admitting any mitigating evidence, he waived his right to offer that evidence. Thus the court's final sentence was not unreasonable. See id.
Landrigan, on the other hand, believes that the AEDPA does confer federal jurisdiction upon his federal habeas corpus petition because, by not considering any mitigating evidence, the trial court's sentence was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Opposition to Certiorari at 3. Alternatively, Landrigan relies on the Ninth Circuit's holding that the AEDPA confers jurisdiction because the lower courts incorrectly applied federal law while assessing his claim because they failed to apply correctly the test from Strickland v. Washington. Thus, the Ninth Circuit was correct to rely on the AEDPA to remand his case and order an evidentiary hearing.
Strickland: Assessing an Ineffective Counsel Claim
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), is the seminal U.S. Supreme Court case addressing what factors a defendant must prove to make a lawful ineffective assistance of counsel claim for habeas corpus review of a state court decision. Under the standard set forth by Strickland, a defendant who brings a federal habeas corpus claim to challenge the effectiveness of his counsel must first prove that there was an outright deficiency on the part of his counsel, and then that his counsel's deficiency prejudiced the court and resulted in an unfavorable sentencing. Id at 687. In other words, the defendant must prove that if his counsel had not acted in such an incompetent manner, he would have received a less harsh sentence. Seeid.
The Ninth Circuit's Application of Strickland
In applying the outright deficiency prong of the Strickland test, the Ninth Circuit evaluated what steps Farrell took to prepare for the case, as well as how thoroughly he apprised Landrigan of possible theories for mitigation. See Landrigan v. Schriro,441 F.3d 638 (2006). According to the Ninth Circuit's application of Strickland, if defense counsel discovered mitigating evidence, but failed to develop it adequately prior to sentencing, then counsel did not sufficiently defend his client during the sentencing phase. See id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that because Farrell had not fully explained a genetic predisposition theory to Landrigan prior to sentencing, Landrigan could not have fully understood the ramifications of his decision to prevent his ex-wife and mother from testifying. See id. Furthermore, Landrigan's decision to exclude this evidence resulted from his lack of understanding of the legal ramifications of its admittance. See id. Because Landrigan did not understand these ramifications, the Ninth Circuit held that because of Farrell's incompetence, Landrigan lacked the requisite levels of “knowing” or “understanding” required for a defendant to waive his right to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Seeid.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded that, as required by Strickland, were it not for the ineffectiveness of Landrigan's counsel, his sentence would have been more lenient. See id. Here, the Ninth Circuit evaluated the presented aggravating evidence against all mitigating evidence as stated in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, (2003). In applying the evidentiary standard from Wiggins, the Ninth Circuit found that to determine whether mitigating evidence could have changed the judge's decision, reviewing courts must give extra weight to evidence regarding the defendant's mental health and social background. See id. Because the evidence Farrell failed to admit during the sentencing phase illustrated Landrigan's social background and mental health, the Ninth Circuit held that failing to admit this evidence likely prejudiced Landrigan's sentence. See id. Hence, under Strickland, Landrigan presented sufficient facts for an evidentiary hearing in the federal court. See id.
Arguments against the Ninth Circuit's Application of the AEDPA and Strickland
The Arizona Attorney General makes two principal arguments against the Ninth Circuit's application of the AEDPA and Strickland. First, the Attorney General argues that the AEDPA cannot be invoked as a basis for jurisdiction when a defendant instructs his attorney not to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase. See Petition for Certiorari at 10. Hence, a defendant waives his right to petition for habeas corpus review on the basis of an unreasonable determination of the trial court if he was the person who prevented mitigating evidence from being offered at trial, as Landrigan did in this case. Second, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly applied the Strickland test to Landrigan's ineffective counsel claim. The Attorney General relies on the language in Strickland that “the reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.” See Petition for Certiorari, quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 691. Here, because the defendant actively prevented his attorney from presenting mitigating evidence, Farrell did not act unreasonably by not presenting the evidence during sentencing. See id at 18. The Attorney General also points out that none of the decisions relied on by the Ninth Circuit involved “a situation in which the defendant affirmatively represented to the trial court that he did not want any mitigation to be presented and actively undermined any effort by counsel to present mitigation.” See id at 18. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that the right to offer mitigating evidence at trial is waivable, as established by prior Supreme Court precedent. See id at 18.
The Circuit Split
Currently, the federal circuits disagree on how to determine whether a state court's decision is unreasonable and, therefore, up for review in the federal courts. Contrasted with the Ninth Circuit's application of unreasonableness, the Tenth Circuitfinds that a defense attorney who does not offer mitigating evidence has not acted unreasonably if the defendant prevented her from doing so. See Petition for Certiorari at 18, quoting Wallace v. Ward, 191 F. 3d. 1235 (10th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit holds that if “a defendant preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of ineffectiveness can be made.” Id at 19, quoting Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F. 2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1985).
Discussion
The Supreme Court's decision will affect the rights of defendants convicted of capital murder, as well as determine the extent of defense counsel's obligation to continue to present mitigation evidence despite the impeding actions of their clients. In addition, the decision will clarify the amount of deference federal courts must give to state courts in cases arising under the AEDPA.
In its attempt to reverse the Ninth Circuit's decision, the Arizona Department of Corrections argues that the Ninth Circuit exceeded its authority under the AEDPA by failing to defer to the Arizona state court's factual finding that Landrigan instructed his counsel, Dennis Farrell, not to present any mitigation evidence. See Petition for Certiorari at 9. Under the AEDPA, a federal habeas petition must show that the state court applied established federal law unreasonably or determined the facts unreasonably. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(d). The Arizona Department of Corrections argues that the state court's finding that Landrigan instructed his defense attorney not to present any mitigation evidence was a reasonable determination of the facts. See Petition for Certiorari at 10. The Arizona Department of Corrections also argues that the Arizona state court's application of the law is consistent with any relevant Supreme Court cases, including Strickland. See id at 9.
In response, Landrigan argues that the facts clearly show that his actions did not amount to instructing his lawyer not to present mitigation evidence, as the Arizona state court determined. See Opposition to Certiorari at 4. Instead, Landrigan agrees that the Arizona state court's determination was so erroneous that it amounted to an unreasonable determination of the facts, and, therefore, he has a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See id. Thus, Strickland required that the state court conduct an evidentiary hearing before his sentencing. See id.
If the Supreme Court decides to overturn the Ninth Circuit, lower courts will likely infer that federal courts must grant substantial deference to the factual determinations of state courts in ineffective assistance of counsel cases. Hence, such a ruling would make it more difficult for federal courts to overturn state court holdings in certain capital cases. Moreover, overturning the Ninth Circuit will reduce defense counsel's obligation in capital cases to present mitigation evidence when their clients actively impede their actions.
Alternatively, if the Supreme Court upholds the Ninth Circuit ruling, it will mean that state court factual determinations of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in capital cases are more easily reviewable by federal courts. Furthermore, defense counsel will be obligated to continue to attempt to present all possible mitigation evidence in capital cases, even in the face of prolonged opposition from their clients.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in this case should clarify the standard for granting federal habeas corpus review of a state court's criminal sentence under the AEDPA. Specifically, the Supreme Court will determine whether Strickland