Evans v. Chavis

The Ninth Circuit's Decision

According to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the timeliness of Chavis's federal habeas petition depends on whether he is entitled to statutory tolling for each of his state habeas petitions. See Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 924-26 (9th Cir. 2004) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. ? 2244(d)(2)). The court determined that Chavis was entitled to tolling while his second round of state petitions was pending, even though the petitions were denied on procedural grounds, because a state court's ultimate decision is "pending" while the court considers it. See Id. at 925. Under the Ninth Circuit's clarified definition, "a petition is clearly pending after it is filed with a state court, but before that court grants or denies the petition." See Id. The court found that the state's definition of pending would create an unbearable amount of uncertainty for the habeas petitioner; he would not know whether he was entitled to tolling for a petition filed in state court until after the court granted or denied his petition. See Id. They concluded that "so long as the state procedure for filing the habeas petition exists, the petition is pending while the state court considers it, whether the decision is ultimately on the merits or on procedural grounds." Id.

Furthermore, the court determined that Chavis is entitled to tolling for the three-year interval between his petitions to the California Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court because the California Supreme Court did not dismiss the petition as untimely, but decided it on the merits. See Id. at 925-26.

Much of the state's argument rested on Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002), which it argued held that "where a state court does not expressly address the timeliness of a habeas petition, the federal court must independently determine whether the state petition was timely filed." See Petitioner's Brief at 15. Thus under Saffold, the state argued, Chavis's second round petitions were never pending in the state courts, even while the courts had the petitions under submission, because the state courts eventually denied the second round petitions for procedural reasons. See Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 924 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth Circuit disagreed, however, ruling that the Saffold decision was decided under a different context than the instant case. See Id. at 925. The Ninth Circuit explained that the Saffold court was considering whether the word "pending" in the habeas statute applied to a time gap between the petitioner's habeas petitions in the California Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. See Id. The issue was specific to California because the state requires petitioners to file separate writs at each court level, instead of appeals. See Id. In addition, California uses a "reasonableness" standard rather than a strict time limit to determine whether the next writ was timely filed after the first writ was denied. Id.

Petitioner's Argument

AEDPA's one year statute of limitations is tolled while a prisoner is pursuing state collateral review. See 28 U.S.C. ? 2244(d). This provision was created to achieve a balance that "promotes the exhaustion of state remedies while respecting the interest in the finality of state court judgments." See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001). The state argues that the Ninth Circuit's decision grants statutory tolling for the interval preceding the state habeas filing, no matter how lengthy. See Petitioner's Brief at 10. The state also contends that this conflicts with the decision in Saffold, which held that a court's decision on the merits does not in and of itself establish that a state court petition was timely filed. See Id. at 12.

According to the state, the Ninth Circuit did not consider whether their presumption of timeliness would reach the correct result in most cases. See Id. at 30. In California, most state petitions for a writ of habeas corpus are denied by appellate courts without timeliness findings or other explanation. See Id. at 36. Thus under the state's interpretation of the Chavis decision, thousands of California state habeas petitions would be considered timely by the federal district court and all would receive statutory tolling for the period preceding their filing, no matter how lengthy the time period. See Id. Instead, the state hopes that the Supreme Court will reverse the Ninth Circuit decision and rule that federal courts must determine for themselves whether a summarily denied habeas petition was timely filed before allowing statutory tolling for intervals between filings. The state urges that the Ninth Circuit should have reviewed Chavis's Supreme Court habeas petition, filed after a three-year delay, and concluded that it was untimely. See Id. at 47.

Respondent's Argument

Chavis argues that the "federal court should presume that a prior state filing was 'pending' under ? 2244(d)(2) unless the state court has given some indication that the prior state petition was not timely filed under state law." Respondent's Brief at 14 (emphasis in original). Chavis believes that Saffold failed to give instruction to the Court of Appeal "regarding what to do if it could not determine what the California Supreme Court meant by the ambiguous language." Id. Therefore, the Saffold court left open the question presented in this case. Id.

Chavis contends that the Supreme Court here must select the rule that is most consistent with the purpose of AEDPA. See Id. Congress, in enacting AEDPA, was seeking to further principles of federalism, comity, and finality. Id. By preventing state courts from second-guessing state courts' determinations of state law and requiring states to give some indication that a state petition is untimely (rather than requiring federal courts to conduct an independent determination of state law), Chavis's approach furthers the principle of federalism. See Id. at 15. "[I]t is far less intrusive to require state courts to give some indication that a state petition is untimely than it is for federal courts to conduct an independent determination of state law." Id. Moreover, by encouraging prisoners to exhaust state remedies in the manner provided by the state, and discouraging protective federal filings and premature state filings, Chavis's rule promote principles of comity. See Id. Finally, if the Court rules for Chavis, there will be no additional delay or burden placed on the federal courts where a constitutional violation has been alleged. Id. This will further the principle of finality.