Schaffer v. Weast

A. BURDEN OF PROOF

Which party, in a given case, has the burden of proof can be determinative to the outcome of the case. The case at hand is a quintessential paradigm of this point. When the ALJ presumed that the party bringing the IEP challenge had the burden, he ruled in favor of the school district. But when the District Court ruled that the burden should be placed on the school ( Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538 (D. Md. 2000) ), the ALJ ruled for the parents. Hence, the question of burden of proof in the IDEA context is crucial to IEP litigation.

B. PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT

1. Due Process

Petitioner argues that due process dictates a ruling in their favor. Petitioner argues that although the IDEA does not explicitly state where the burden should fall, inherent in the statute is the congressional dictate that due process should govern IDEA litigation. Pet'r brief at 20. . Additionally, Petitioner argues that when the traditional due process analysis is applied to IDEA administrative hearings, the analysis points to allocating the burden of proof to the school.

The text of the IDEA includes a requirement of an “impartial due process hearing.” 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f). This language, argues the Petitioner, indicates that Congress clearly and intentionally incorporated the standards of due process to apply in the IDEA context. Pet'r Brief at 20. . Petitioner points to the “cardinal principle of statutory construction” that no terms included in a statute should be “superfluous, void, or insignificant” (id. ) and concludes that by Congress using the language they did in writing the text of the IDEA they intended principles of due process to govern IDEA hearings.

Applying the three-prong due process analysis for administrative hearings laid out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) , Petitioner argues that balance of factors weighs in favor placing the burden on the school. The first prong is the private interest that will be affected. This is the interest of special needs children affected by the IDEA which, Petitioner argues, is very substantial. Petitioner also points out that this interest is the very interest Congress had in mind in enacting IDEA. Id. at 25. The second prong, the risk of erroneous deprivation, Petitioner argues naturally points to placing the burden on the school. Petitioner points out that when the evidence is in equipoise, the burden of proof is outcome determinative – usually the party with the burden will lose. Thus, Petitioner argues, if the burden is placed on the parents, the risk of erroneous deprivation of the private interest (the special needs child's education) will be great. Id at 25. The third prong is the government's interest. The two interests in this prong are (1) the school district's interest in avoiding the expenditure of the resources required for the IEP in dispute and (2) the government's interest in ensuring that each child receives an appropriate education. Petitioner points out that this second governmental interest parallels the child's interest. Petitioner also argues that the first of these governmental interests is outweighed by the child's private interest, as well as the risk of erroneous deprivation, and thus, the balance of the interests tips toward allocating the burden to schools. Id. at 26.

2. Policy and Fairness

Petitioner argues that even if statutory construction were not a consideration in the Court's decision, principles of “policy and fairness” ( Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) ) dictate allocating the burden to the school.

Petitioner argues that the policies underlying the IDEA dictate allocating the burden to the school. The purposes of the IDEA include providing special needs children with appropriate educational programs and empowering parents to hold schools accountable through parents' meaningful participation in the IEP process and parents' ability to challenge IEP decisions in administrative hearings. Thus, placing the burden on parents runs contrary to these goals. Id. at 30.

Petitioner also argues that the Court should place the burden on schools because the consequences of an erroneous decision are much worse for parents than for schools. Schools face only the financial costs of providing services beyond what is necessary for a child. A child with special education needs, however, faces being denied an appropriate educational program and possibly missing a window of opportunity in which to effectively develop (for example children with autism and severe hearing loss). Thus, the burden should be placed on schools to avoid the possibility of detrimental loss to children with special education needs, at the expense of the relatively less significant risk of financial loss to schools. Pet'r Brief at 39.

Petitioner further argues, in the interest of fairness, that the school should bear the burden of proof because school districts typically have greater access and control over relevant facts and witnesses. Pet'r Brief at 41 “The ordinary rule, based on considerations of fairness, does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of his adversary.” United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartform R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 (1957).

C. RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT

Respondents argue that, when drafting the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., Congress intended to allocate the burden of proof to the party seeking relief. The customary rule for legislation that does not expressly allocate the burden of proof to a particular party is that the party initiating the hearing and seeking relief bears the burden. See Bull v. United States , 295 U.S. 247, 260 (1935). Thus, the petitioners in this case would be required to show that the “free appropriate public education” (FAPE) provided to Brian in his Individualized Education Program (IEP), 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)-(4), by the Montgomery County Public School System (MCPS) did not provide “personal instruction with sufficient support services to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction.” Board of Education v. Rowley , 458 U.S. 176, 203 (1982).

Respondents reason that Congress intended to allocate the burden in this manner because Congress legislates with a particular burden of proof in mind, and that absent any express wording to the contrary, such default burden should govern. Also, the language found in the IDEA, including specific reference to “due process,” indicates that Congress intended to allocate the burden to the party seeking relief as is customary in many types of administrative hearings. Because the IDEA does not allocate the burden in any other manner, although it carefully details appropriate “safeguards,” Congress intended and desired that the customary burden apply. Importantly, in some particular cases, the IDEA specifically places the burden on the school district, again implying that Congress intended the default burden to apply in all other instances. Furthermore, the many procedures already available to parents under the IDEA provide adequate due process without allocating the burden of proof to the school district. Finally, if the Court were to agree with petitioner and allocate the burden to the school district in all cases, the IDEA would become a tool for inflicting additional and unintended burdens on state and local administrators. According to Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), “if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.” In this case, Congress did not unambiguously instruct school districts that they would be required to bear the burden of proof in all administrative hearings challenging the validity of an IEP.

Respondents also argue that the policies underlying the IDEA are best served by following the customary rule and allocating the burden to the party initiating the hearing. Forcing the school districts to bear the burden would create and encourage costly gamesmanship-type litigation. Parents would have a disincentive to work with the school district and administrators to create an acceptable IEP if the school district was forced to justify each aspect of the IEP in an administrative hearing. Also, such an increase in litigation would not only cost the school districts financially, but would also defer teachers and resources away from all other students. Because the IDEA was intended to protect the educational interests of all children, placing a burden on the school system that causes the majority of students to suffer directly opposes the policies underlying the legislation. Moreover, the school districts are already accountable for ensuring that students receive a FAPE under the IDEA. Therefore, shifting the allocation of the burden would have no effect on the school district's already existing duties. In response to petitioner's argument that school districts are in a better position to access the relevant information, Respondent argues that it is the parents who are in the best position to gather information because they have the greatest access to the child. See Amanda J. ex rel. Annette J. v. Clark County Sch. Dist. , 267 F.3d 877, 891 (9th Cir. 2001). Respondent further argues that the additional policy arguments made by the petitioner are not relevant for the purposes of determining who should bear the burden of proof. Finally, Respondents argue that should a particular state choose to abrogate the burden of proof to the school district in all cases, they are free to do so under the IDEA. However, it was not Congress' intent to give the burden to the school districts in all cases.

D. SIGNIFICANCE

Importantly, whether or not school districts are forced to shoulder the burden of proof will affect the availability of valuable resources for all other school functions. The intent of Congress when creating the IDEA and including the IEP requirement was not to concurrently undermine those IEPs by forcing the school districts to preemptively defend the created program. However, the school district appears to be in the best position to defend that program because their administrators researched and created the program. Moreover, the likelihood that the school district, and not the parents, will ever be initiating an administrative hearing over an unacceptable IEP seems low. Why would a school district seek to challenge a program it created? Thus, parents will likely always initiate such hearings and thus allowing the burden to remain on the party initiating the hearing effectively allocated the burden to the parents in most cases.