Maryland v. Blake

In Miranda, the Supreme Court recognized that custodial police interrogations are inherently coercive and, therefore, that procedural safeguards are necessary to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Brief for Respondent at 11; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. In Edwards, the Court applied this protection to cases where a suspect who has first invoked his right to counsel, subsequently waives it. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. The Court has gone on to treat Edwards as the source of a "bright line" standard providing "clear and unequivocal" guidance on the issue. Brief for Respondent at 12 (quoting Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 154 (1990)). Edwards now stands for a two prong standard: first a suspect does not waive his previously-invoked right simply by responding to police-initiated interrogation-he must initiate the conversation himself. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. Second, the suspect must "knowingly and intelligently waive the right he had previously invoked. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984).

How the two prongs of the Edwards test are to be applied strikes at the heart of this controversy. The State argues that the Edwards test was established to prevent "police badgering," and that the Court should consider the "entire course of conduct" by the police after a suspect invokes his rights. Brief for Petitioner at 10. If the suspect is found to have re-initiated conversation, then the Court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine if he waived his rights knowingly and intelligently. Id. Not surprisingly, Blake argues for a more strict interpretation of whether or not the suspect re-initiated the conversation: "If the accused did not re-initiate dialogue, all post-invocation statements are inadmissible regardless of whether such statements were the product of actual coercion." Brief for Respondent at 13 (emphasis added). If the suspect did not re-initiate, then the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether waiver was made knowingly and intelligently or under coercion. Id.

As its name suggests, the "totality of the circumstances" encompasses a range of elements that the Supreme Court may take into account, including: Blake's age, the incorrect assertion that he was eligible for the death penalty and the fact that this assertion was not corrected, Blake's physical condition, the condition of the holding cell, Officer Reese's remark and Detective Johns' reaction to it, Blake's likely reaction to Officer Reese's remark, the twenty-eight minutes that lapsed between Officer Reese's remark and Blake's question of "Can I still talk to you?" and Detective Johns' response. It seems that if Detective Johns' words and actions in response to Officer Reese's comment are deemed sufficiently curative, then the Court will find that Blake knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel.?

The State argues that, because the Court should consider the entire course of dealings between the police and the suspect, Officer Reese's remark, though regrettable, is not enough to render Blake's later statements inadmissible. Brief for Petitioner at 18. In this case, where Detective Johns quickly silenced Officer Reese and physically removed him from Blake's cell, the Court may find that Detective Johns "effectively corrected" Reese's remark by stating within Blake's hearing that Blake had asked for a lawyer and could not speak with the officers. Id. at 26-27. Moreover, the State argues that the way Blake phrased the question-"Can I still talk to you?"-suggests he did not know if he would be allowed to speak and he could not, therefore, be responding to Reese's comment. Id. at 27. The State also places great emphasis on Blake's testimony during the evidentiary hearing-that Blake was angered by Tolbert's statement in the print-out, which blamed Blake for the murder, and that Blake wanted to tell the police the truth. Id. Finally, the State points to Detective Johns' repeated and thorough efforts to confirm Blake's awareness of his rights after Blake asked his first question. Id. at 27-28. Thus, the State argues, Detective Johns' curative statements sufficed to reaffirm Blake's Miranda rights before Blake's statements, and allowed for Blake to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights.

Regarding Blake's state of mind, the State will argue that, while Blake was understandably scared by the incorrect statement that he faced the death penalty, his fear also reflects his knowledge of his own role in the crime. By extension, given Blake's awareness of the serious charges against him, it was very reasonable for him to come to the decision on his own to speak with police officers. The fact that Detective Johns reasserted Blake's Miranda rights on more than one occasion reinforces the argument that Blake had full knowledge of his rights when he decided to waive his right to counsel.

On the other hand, Blake first argues that, as a matter of procedure, the Maryland state court determined as an issue of fact that Blake did not initiate the conversation with the police. Brief for Respondent at 15-16. Thus, again as a matter of procedure, unless the trial court's factual determination was "clearly erroneous," it must be upheld. Id. at 16. Paired with the fact that the State has conceded that Officer Reese's remark constituted an unlawful interrogation, the Edwards analysis becomes clear-Blake's statement was a response to illegal interrogation and must be suppressed. Id. at 19.

Blake also argues that "curative measures" must ensure that a suspect decided to re-initiate the conversation independent of the illegal interrogation and that Detective Johns' statement was insufficient. Brief for Respondent at 20. If the police have violated Edwards by illegally questioning a suspect after he has invoked his right to remain silent, there is a presumption that any subsequent statements made by the suspect are inadmissible. Id. at 21. The most effective curative measure to counteract this presumption is to provide the suspect with counsel; short of that, there must be a clear demonstration that the claimed re-initiation was "a separate encounter from the previous unlawful interrogation." Id. at 22. In this case, Blake argues, there was no break in time or circumstance. The time between Reese's comment and Blake's question was insufficient because, in that time, Blake remained in his underwear and tank top to consider the incorrect penalty before him, and only then spoke to Johns at the next possible opportunity. Id. at 22-23.

Further, Blake argues that Detective Johns' statement was insufficiently "curative" for two reasons. First, Johns' statement merely restated Blake's Miranda rights, which may be considered ineffective and might only have confused Blake after Reese's challenge to his decision to seek counsel. Id. at 23-24 (citing Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 686 (1988)). More importantly, unlawful interrogation of a suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights compromises the trustworthiness of the police altogether, and it is questionable whether any comment alone by a police officer can be sufficient as a curative measure. Brief for Respondent at 26. The second reason for the insufficiency of Detective Johns' statement is that even if it did reaffirm the intention of the police to honor Blake's decision to seek counsel, it fails to address the specific harm of Reese's remark. Id. at 27. Reese's remark not only challenges Blake's decision to invoke his right to counsel, it suggests that the decision could make it more likely that Blake will receive the death penalty; such a suggestion, that Blake made the wrong decision, cannot be cured by stating that Blake had the right to make that choice. Id. at 27-28. Moreover, Detective Johns' statement was not even directed towards Blake, but rather to Officer Reese. Id. at 30.