Hudson v. Michigan

Background: The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995). Ten years ago, in Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, the Court held that the knock-and-announce rule formed a part of the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry. Id. The rule requires police to “knock and announce” themselves before entering a home. The typical penalty for a Fourth Amendment reasonableness violation is suppression of the evidence found as a result of the illegal entry. Id. Where the only violation of the Fourth Amendment is a knock-and-announce violation (there was no other violation such as failure to obtain a search warrant where necessary), the courts are split as to the standard to apply to determine if suppression is warranted; the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme Court have held that the inevitable discovery doctrine creates a per se exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized after a Fourth Amendment “knock and announce” violation, whereas the 6th and 8th Circuits, the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have held that suppression is possible.

At the crux of this dispute is the Michigan Supreme Court’s definition of the inevitable discovery doctrine. The inevitable discovery doctrine was first established in Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431 (1984), where the Court determined that the government should neither profit from illegal activity nor be “placed in a worse position than it would otherwise have occupied” absent the illegality. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9, quoting (Nix v. Williams 467 U.S. 431 (1984)). The reasoning behind inevitable discovery is that it restores police to the same legal position they would have occupied if no police error or misconduct had occurred. In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court determined that this doctrine applied to except evidence from suppression because if the evidence seized after a knock-and-announce violation had been excluded, the exclusionwould have placed the prosecution in a worse position than if the police had acted lawfully. Brief for Petitioner at 7.

Petitioner’s Argument: Petitioner’s argument centers around a characterization of the evidence acquired after a knock-and-announce violation as the direct fruits of the illegal method of entry, meaning that any evidence acquired after such a violation would be subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure. See Brief for Petitioner at 5. Under this characterization, the inevitable discovery doctrine is thus a purely exculpatory principle which prevents automatic suppression after a clear violation, rather than a per se exception to the exclusionary rule. See Brief for Petitioner at 18. Both precedent and the history and intent of the Fourth Amendment, Petitioner argues, point toward this characterization. See Brief for Petitioner at 5.

In Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958), the Court decided that since the petitioner was the subject of a knock-and-announce violation, “his arrest was unlawful,” and the evidence seized should have been suppressed; the implication of this precedent, Petitioner argues, is that knock-and-announce violations cast the entirety of the arrest as unlawful, hence the evidence gathered during the arrest were the direct fruits of the illegal method of entry. Brief for Petitioner at 10, quoting (Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313-314 (1958)). Under this characterization, all proven knock-and-announce violations should result in suppression of the evidence seized, shifting the burden of proof to the prosecution to prove the applicability of exceptions such as the inevitable discovery doctrine. See Brief for Petitioner at 11.

Petitioner further contends that Millerdefined the primary purpose of the knock-and-announce rule as an affirmation of “the reverence of the law for the individual’s right of privacy in his house,” which is consistent with the idea that proven knock-and-announce violations should be punished to deter police misconduct, whether it be by suppression of the evidence or other civil or criminal remedies. Brief for Petitioner at 9, (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1958)). Criminal remedies against police misconduct, Petitioner argues, will not deter police from committing knock-and-announce violations because, as the Court stated in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 & n.7 (1961), state statutes imposing criminal liability on officers, are “worthless and futile” in protecting citizens’ Fourth Amendmentrights because state prosecutors are unlikely to prosecute such cases. Brief for Petitioner at36,quoting (Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-652 & n.7 (1961)). Civil remedies are similarly useless, as there are few cases of this sort which have been successfully brought—the cases which do exist, however, have not resulted in more than a single dollar in compensation. See Brief for Petitioner at 37. Thus, the Petitioner argues that the only effective deterrent to knock-and-announce violations and the protection of the law’s reverence for individual privacy in the home is the application of the exclusionary rule.

Respondent’s Argument: Respondent’s main contention is that the evidence seized after a knock-and-announce violation is not causally related to the manner of entry, and hence, should be exempted from suppression on a per se basis, given that the knock-and-announce violation is the sole violation of the Fourth Amendment.[1] In other words, Respondent argues that suppression is only appropriate if the excluded evidence has been seized as a result of illegal governmental activity, and in the case of pure knock-and-announce violations, there is no indication that the manner of entry has any causal relation to the seized evidence. Brief for Respondent at 2.

In support of its characterization, Respondent refers to the language in United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), which states that suppression is appropriate only if “the challenged evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8, quoting (United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (emphasis added)). Respondent bolsters this precedental argument by reference to the test explicated in Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), which states that evidence is the “fruit” of a prior illegality when it was “come at by exploitation of (the initial) illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Id. at 8, quoting (Wong Sun, 371 U.S. 471 at 488 (1963)).

Respondent also appeals to the utility of a lenient or non-existent knock-and-announce rule. If, Respondent contends, the only function of allowing suppression following a knock-and-announce violation is to allow those inside time to destroy evidence or ready themselves to resist police officers, then the Fourth Amendment’sreasonableness test will only properly balance society’s interest in deterring illegal methods of entry with society’s interest in having juries receive all valid evidence of a crime if the exclusionary rule is exempted on a per se basis. See Brief for Respondentat 3; See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 9.

Respondent also disagrees with Petitioner’s contention that police officers will not have incentives to comply with the knock-and-announce rule under their per se “causation” standard. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 23. The “causation” argument, Respondent contends, still allows for suppression when the evidence seized is a “direct result” of the entry. Id. However, the best example of possibly excluded evidence cited by Respondent is an incriminating excited utterance caused by a police officer’s illegal entry, so it is probably best to take this assertion with a grain of salt. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4. This is not to say that Respondent is incorrect because perhaps civil or criminal sanctions would be effective.