Sixth Amendment:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

The Constitution protects against “undue delay” in criminal prosecution through a series of component measures rather than through one overarching requirement of timely prosecution.1 These serial constitutional protections, in turn, are supplemented by statutory protections.2 First, the Due Process Clause provides a basic safeguard against extreme government delay in bringing criminal charges against a suspect,3 although statutes of limitations are generally thought to supply the principal protection against such delays.4 The Speedy Trial Clause of the Sixth Amendment is the next component: as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it applies to delay between the initiation of criminal proceedings (as marked by an arrest or formal charge) and conviction (whether by trial or plea).5 Statutory time limits bolster and, at least in the case of the federal Speedy Trial Act of 1974,6 largely eclipse, by their greater protections, the constitutional right to a speedy trial.7 Upon conviction, the constitutional speedy trial right detaches, leaving due process and applicable criminal procedure statutes or rules to guard against unreasonable delay in imposing a sentence.8

In its landmark 1972 decision Barker v. Wingo, the Supreme Court called the speedy trial protection a “vague concept,” about which “[i]t is impossible to do more than generalize” and which necessitates a “functional analysis.” 9 Under Barker, to determine whether a delay between accusation and conviction violates the speedy trial right, the Supreme Court applies a balancing test that considers the following four factors: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether and to what extent the defendant asserted his speedy trial right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.10 This balancing test requires courts to evaluate speedy trial claims on an ad hoc basis and does not prescribe rigid time limits on the length of criminal proceedings.11 The Speedy Trial Act, in contrast, sets forth two clear time limits: an information or indictment must follow within 30 days of arrest, and a trial must begin within 70 days of indictment or arraignment.12 The Act, however, exempts numerous types of delay from these time limits, including continuances that serve the ends of justice and delays resulting from pre-trial motions.13

The remedy for a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial right is dismissal of the charges with prejudice.14 Courts do not have discretion to fashion less drastic remedies after finding a violation of the Speedy Trial Clause.15

Footnotes

1

See Betterman v. Montana, 578 U.S. 437, 446–48 (2016).

2

See id. at 440, 446–47.

3

Id. at 446–47.

4

United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122 (1966) ( “[T]he applicable statute of limitations . . . is usually considered the primary guarantee against bringing overly stale criminal charges.” ).

5

Betterman, 578 U.S. at 439 ( “We hold that the [speedy trial] guarantee protects the accused from arrest or indictment through trial, but does not apply once a defendant has been found guilty at trial or has pleaded guilty to criminal charges.” ).

6

18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–3174. For a discussion of corresponding state provisions, see 5 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.3(c) (4th ed. 2020) ( “All but a few states have adopted statutes or rules of court on the subject of speedy trial.” ).

7

See Betterman, 578 U.S. at 445 (noting that the Speedy Trial Act directs “that no more than 30 days pass between arrest and indictment, and that no more than 70 days pass between indictment and trial” and explaining that these “'more stringent’” statutory provisions “'have mooted much litigation about the requirements of the [ Sixth Amendment] Speedy Trial Clause’” ) (quoting United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 304 n.1 (1986)) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 8 & n.7 (citing “numerous state analogs” to the federal Speedy Trial Act which “similarly impose precise time limits for charging and trial” ).

8

Id. at 2, 9.

9

Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521–22 (1972); see also Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 89 (2009) ( “The speedy-trial right is ‘amorphous,’ ‘slippery,’ and ‘necessarily relative.’” ) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 522).

10

Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.

11

Id. at 523, 530.

12

See Betterman, 578 U.S. at 445 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3161).

13

See United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647, 650 (2011); LaFave, supra note 6, § 18.3(b). Many state laws contain similar provisions about time limits and exemptions. See Betterman, 578 U.S. at 445; LaFave, supra note 6.

14

Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973).

15

Id. at 439 (holding that remedies other than dismissal with prejudice, such as a sentencing reduction equal to the length of the unconstitutional delay, do not fully vindicate the purposes of the speedy trial protection, including protection against the stress and disruption of prolonged accusation and the “prospect of rehabilitation” ).